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Decentralisation in most African countries is fraught with problems and failures. A few 
countries in Africa experienced some successes in their pursuit of decentralisation. Several 
studies on democratic decentralisation have been conducted in the context of one political 
party controlling both the central state and the decentralised institution, where it is assumed 
that there is a concordance of vision between the central state and the local decentralised 
institution. However, a new context of decentralisation is emerging in the African context 
with opposition political parties capturing the decentralised institutions; thereby creating a 
disjuncture in vision between the central state and the decentralised institutions. This thesis 
examined the impact of shared or unshared vision between the local and central government 
in the event that there are different political parties controlling the two spheres of 
government. It also examined how service delivery and public participation plays out in the 
context of ‘unshared vision’. The location of the study was primarily the City of Harare, the 
capital of Zimbabwe, where an opposition political party is in power.  The main theoretical 
framework in this study is critical realism. Primary and secondary data was collected from 
various sources. Primary data was collected through structured and unstructured interviews 
with various stakeholders in the City of Harare. The key findings of this thesis are that there 
is ‘unshared vision’ between the decentralised institutions and the central state. This 
disjuncture in vision is manifested in various contestations between these two spheres of the 
state; resulting in political battles being prioritised at the expense of services delivery for the 
residents of the City of Harare. Consequently, the voices of the citizens have been lost. The 
disjuncture has also resulted in the prime reason for decentralisation, namely; bringing 
government closer to the people, not being realised. This study contributes to the broad 
academic debate on decentralisation in situations where there is unshared vision between the 
local and central state.  
Keywords: decentralisation, public participation, service delivery, unshared vision, 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
“Local councils enjoy a delegated authority, and thus should follow government and 
by extension, ZANU PF policies”. Minister of Local Government and Public Works - 
Zimbabwe. (The Daily Mirror, 30 August 2004: 4) 
1.1 Introduction  
Some years back, before I even thought of pursuing post graduate studies, I was a resident in 
the City of Harare
1
 and was fascinated with how the city operates. My fascination increased 
with the taking over of the council (political arm) of the city by a newly formed political 
party which was the official opposition political party nationally. This created a situation 
whereby the national ruling party was now the opposition political party in the City of 
Harare. In the process of being fascinated by this situation; I began to ask myself some 
questions I could not answer. Questions such as: How does the opposition-controlled city 
operate within an environment where it is being supervised by a different political party? As 
a resident, I was also experiencing the deficiencies in service delivery through inadequate 
water provision, inadequate sewerage and sewage and waste removal, dilapidated roads and 
lack of housing. My biggest issue was the question of who was actually responsible for this 
failure to deliver these basic services – was it the national ruling party or the official national 
opposition political party controlling the city?  
In some cases, the most agonising situation was that, as a resident, I was paying the levies 
and charges to the City of Harare on a monthly basis and in turn, I was not receiving anything 
in terms of service delivery. I ended up asking myself: is there any reason why we should 
have an institution such as the City of Harare when it is failing to perform its basic functions? 
My argument during that time was that as a resident I was in a contract with the City of 
Harare; whereby the city was supposed to provide certain services which I must pay for those 
services in return. Within this contract, the city authorities had various options of recouping 
their levies and charges in the event that I failed to pay, but what were my options if I paid 
for something the city failed to deliver? My only options were to protest and vote for a 
different ward councillor in the next election. A more fundamental question that was raised 
                                                 
1
 Also referred in this thesis as the City or Harare City Council.  
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by those experiences is: does democracy fail to execute citizen’s rights and entitlements in 
the context of an ‘unshared vision’ of political players? It is thoughts such as these which 
influenced this study.  
The focus of this thesis is on decentralisation which is defined as the transfer of authority and 
responsibility or public functions from the central government
2
 to local government
3
 or 
private sector (Ribot and Larson 2013). This study not only focuses on the transfer of power 
but goes beyond that and examines how the central state relates to the decentralised 
institutions. This relationship is called the centre-local relationship. It also examines how this 
relationship plays out in the event that the local state is controlled by a different political 
party from the one controlling the central state. The assumption, in this case, is that there is a 
difference in vision between two different political parties controlling the two tiers of the 
state. Differences in vision lead to a situation of ‘unshared vision’ which is defined in this 
study as the difference between political parties mainly in ideology, policy and practice. 
Political parties by nature want to implement and influence the state through implementing 
programmes which advance their political and developmental agenda. What is lacking in 
decentralisation literature, especially in the African context, is an analysis of how this 
situation of unshared vision influences the outputs and outcomes of decentralisation. How 
does this situation influence the centre-local relationship and whose vision does the local 
state implement? Is it that of the national ruling party or the local ruling political party? Such 
situations have happened in Kenya, Botswana, and South Africa etc. but not at the scale as in 
Zimbabwe where the major opposition political party won the control of the majority of 
urban local authorities but failed to win control of the central state. The situation in 
Zimbabwe is unique in the sense that the political environment is defined by the ruling party. 
Zimbabwe has been under the control of one political party since independence and the 
nature of political contestation between the ruling party and opposition political parties lacks 
civility and is marked by polarity and violence. In such situations, the focus of most of the 
studies is in the central state politics. There is a dearth of literature related to the issue of 
decentralisation in situations where the opposition political parties have a foothold on power 
                                                 
2
 Also known as central state in this thesis. 
3
 Also known as local state in this thesis. 
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at the local state level and are a threat to the ruling party nationally. In some ‘mature’
4
 
democratic states the issue of ‘unshared vision’ might not be as important as in the context of 
the City of Harare in Zimbabwe. The next section provides a brief description of the context 
of decentralisation in Zimbabwe.  
1.2 Context of the City of Harare  
1.2.1 Colonial context 
The focus of this study is the City of Harare which is the capital city of Zimbabwe. The City 
of Harare, like most African cities, has a history of colonisation. Urban and rural areas in 
Zimbabwe during the colonial era were characterised by racial segregation (Feremenga 1990: 
344). In the case of the City of Harare, since colonial settlers set up urban areas in 1899, there 
was a racially based form of decentralisation with voting in local government elections 
reserved for white British males with the black majority not having a voice nationally or 
locally (Kamete 2010: 193). During the course of the colonial period, local government 
voting was later changed and was based on property ownership which immediately 
disenfranchised blacks who were not allowed to own properties in the cities. Cities during the 
colonial period were regarded as white areas; blacks were not allowed to own properties and 
were regarded as temporary residents of cities (Wekwete 1990: 40).  
                                                 
4
 The issue of whether there is a mature democracy is contestable. When I am saying mature I mean democratic 
states which at the very least are marked by defined political civility and their state institutions are clearly or 
markedly separated from political parties 
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Figure 1: Map of colonial Salisbury/Harare 
 
 
Source: Kay and Smout (1977) 
 
Most townships in urban areas were governed by boards which were composed of coloureds, 
whites and Asians who were elected as representatives of the blacks (Makumbe 1998). As a 
result, local government institutions in African areas in colonial Zimbabwe did not enjoy 
autonomy to pursue local interests but the interests of other racial groups (Chatiza 2010: 4). 
In the rural areas, black communal farming areas or reserves were separated from white 
farming areas. Resources were mainly channelled towards the development of white areas 
creating a disparity between the councils. What the colonial era did to cities and rural areas in 
Zimbabwe was to divide these areas according to racial lines (Wekwete 1990: 40). At 
independence, the new government inherited this inequality and it was converted from a 
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racial division to economic division with the majority of the affluent citizens now 
concentrated in formerly white areas and the poor in former black areas.  
1.2.2 Post-colonial local government context  
Soon after independence in 1980, the central government led by Zimbabwe African National 
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) abolished the two racial tiers of local government / 
decentralisation (Matumbike 2009). Local government legislation which was enacted after 
independence separated the urban councils from rural councils. Local governance voting was 
changed to remove racial segregation but voting in cities was still qualified by ownership of 
properties in the urban areas. This disenfranchised the majority of black urban residents who 
did not own properties. 
By the late 1980s, universal suffrage voting was implemented in the local government 
elections (Kamete 2010: 200). The introduction of universal suffrage in local government 
elections in Zimbabwe removed the provision that voters were supposed to own a property in 
the council where they want to vote. It seems that immediately after independence ZANU PF 
was more preoccupied with consolidating central state political power hence the slow pace of 
reform in local government. This is clear from the fact that ZANU PF government never had 
a clearly pronounced policy
5
 on local government / decentralisation. Despite the lack of 
policy on local government, the ZANU PF government depended on acts of parliament which 
gave rise to local government in Zimbabwe. Policy pronouncements on local government 
were only made in the economic policies of the country. Most of the local government 
reforms in Zimbabwe are as a result of these broad national economic policy 
pronouncements. One such policy was the Economic Structural Adjustment Policy (ESAP) 
adopted by the Zimbabwean government in the early 1990s. It is important to note that 
independent Zimbabwe inherited decentralised local authorities from the colonial masters; 
what ZANU PF government did was to continuously tinker with the colonial model and acts 
of parliament on decentralisation so that they were are tailored towards the economic and 
political trajectory of the country. 
                                                 
5
 Policy in this study is defined as an outline of what a government or government ministry hopes to achieve and 
the methods and principles it will use to achieve them. It is different from laws/acts which set standards, 
principles and procedures to be followed. Laws and acts are enforceable and breaking them will result in 
prosecution in a court of law.  
 
 6  
 
1.2.2.1 Influence of economic policy on local government 
The influence of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Zimbabwe in the early 1990s 
resulted in the central government being forced to relinquish some of the responsibilities, 
powers and influence in local governance in return for funding (Chatiza 2010: 6). Before the 
introduction of SAPs in Zimbabwe, local government was highly centralised to the extent that 
all the funding was distributed by the national government and the national government was 
responsible for administering funds collected by the councils (Wunsch and Olowu 1990: 51). 
Multilateral aid organisations preferred to fund certain programmes under local government, 
thereby by-passing the central government bureaucracy (Kamete 2007). This created a 
devolved structure of local governance, but it was done in a way that left open a window of 
intervention for the central government with powers to override decisions taken by the local 
government through the minister or the president (Conyers 2003, Wunsch 2001: 277). There 
is still a provision whereby all the local governments’ development plans and budgets have to 
be approved by the central state. Legislation which is used for local government in Zimbabwe 
such as the Urban Councils Act of 2008, Rural District Councils Act of 2002 and the 
Regional, Town and Country planning Act of 1998 have a provision whereby powers are 
bestowed on the minister responsible for local government to fire elected councillors and 
mayors despite the fact that the minister is a political appointee. A detailed discussion of 
these acts is to be found in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The provisions discussed above cause local government to be subservient to the central state 
with local elected representatives afraid of going against the minister responsible for local 
government. This shows the unwillingness of the central state to transfer real power and 
autonomy to decentralised institutions. It has to be stated that decentralising in Zimbabwe 
was introduced at a time when the ruling party ZANU PF enjoyed a period of political 
dominance and there was a belief that the status quo or dominance was going to remain the 
same for the long term future (Kamete 2010: 196). The approach was to partially pass on 
administrative duties to the local government with the central government retaining overall 
supervisory control. Local government councils in Zimbabwe are not regarded as 
autonomous entities but as a form of sub-national government which is highly controlled by 
the central government. As will be discussed and supported by evidence later, local 
government in Zimbabwe is regarded as an instrument of the central state, not a local state / 
sphere of government with some autonomy in decision making. In such situations, the 
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question which arises is this: what will happen in the event of the local state being controlled 
by a different political party which has a different vision? 
1.2.3 Development of ‘unshared vision’  
During the first nineteen years in independent Zimbabwe (1980 - 1999), ZANU PF never 
experienced any significant opposition politically. During the first decade, the party tried to 
push the country towards a one-party state (Compagnon 2011). During this period, the ruling 
party ZANU PF and the state became indistinguishable (Bond and Manyanya 2003: 25). 
During the second decade, because of various pressures, the country was forced to adopt neo-
liberal
6
 democracy. The main push was the adoption of SAPs which are economic policies 
which thrive in the neo-liberal political environment. The adoption of the SAPs resulted in 
drastic changes to the government’s social protection system which involved state subsidies 
towards basic goods and services (Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009). The SAPs dictated that 
the government remove market distortions caused by price controls and subsidies and that the 
government reduce its expenditure and focus on creating an environment which enables the 
private business to thrive. These changes resulted in opening up of the Zimbabwean economy 
to the global economy. This resulted in an increased cost of living and unemployment as 
companies restructured so that they could compete globally (Mlambo 1997: 4). In turn, this 
generated various protests mainly in urban areas and the formation of a strong opposition 
political party, namely, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Compagnon 
2011). This changed the political landscape as the opposition political party, formed to lobby 
for a ‘NO’ vote during the constitutional reform process, won. It also 58 seats out of a 120 
member parliament seven months after being formed. The opposition political party created 
an Achilles heel for ZANU PF in urban local authorities. In response to the strong opposition, 
according to Bond and Manyanya (2003: 72), ZANU PF firmed up on centralising all 
possible power and putting political loyalty above everything else even in state institutions.  
The ‘Achilles heel’ of ZANU PF in local government surfaced when the whole spectrum of 
urban local government changed in 2002. The opposition MDC managed to win the majority 
of major urban councils (Harare, Gweru, Bulawayo, Masvingo, Chegutu and Mutare) in 
Zimbabwe. Scholars such as Kamete (2010: 194) suggest that this was as a result of 
                                                 
6
 Neo-liberalism is defined by McKinley (2006: 414) as being a practical global offensive of internationalised 
corporate and finance capital. 
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mismanagement and non-service delivery by ZANU PF. This thesis argues that the main 
reason why ZANU PF lost these urban local authorities had more to do with its rigid focus on 
national politics than poor service delivery at the local level. The capture of these cities by 
the opposition set the councillors on a collision course with the minister responsible for local 
government. It is important to note that the ruling party ZANU PF did not lose the national 
elections. This created a situation whereby the minister responsible for administering local 
government legislation was from the opposition party in the local government realm, but 
from the ruling party in the national government realm. An ‘unshared vision’ was created. 
The ruling party in local government was now seeking for approval and direction from its 
opposition political party. It is important to note that within this intricate relationship, the 
ZANU PF and MDC relationship was acrimonious and marked by violence
7
. There is a well-
documented history of acts of political violence between these political parties. Such a 
scenario motivated this research. This research will try to unravel the impact of this ‘unshared 
vision’ on local government service delivery and community/public participation.  
The impact of ‘unshared vision’ on administrative aspects of government requires careful 
analysis based on questions such as: a) What are the procedural aspects of decision-making 
and development as outlined in policy? b) What are the practical dynamics of decision-
making in a situation of ‘unshared vision’? Before these are closely interrogated it is 
important to spell out the thesis of ‘unshared vision’ in the first instance. This research 
portrays ‘unshared vision’ as the difference between political parties mainly in ideology, 
policy and practice.  
1.3 Objectives  
This study seeks to understand the decentralised nature of local government in Zimbabwe, in 
its political, socio-economic, cultural and state institutional framework context. It seeks to 
examine the impact of shared or unshared vision between the local and central government in 
the event that there are different political parties controlling the two spheres of government. It 
also seeks to examine the guarantees for service delivery and public participation (used 
synonymously with community participation) in decentralisation. This work examines the 
mechanisms which influence the outputs and outcomes of decentralisation in the City of 
                                                 
7
 This view is based on my personal experiences in the City of Harare in Zimbabwe. See also Kamete (2010), 
Bond and Manyanya (2003), Compagnon (2011), LeBas (2006) and Lindgren (2003). 
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Harare. This study does not take the processes of decentralisation at face value but believes 
that there are other underlying factors which influence these processes. This research 
specifically focuses on municipalities or councils as a unit of local government
8
.  
The complexity of this research is rooted in the fact that there is no substantive research 
which actually shows the level of service delivery before the advent of the current state of 
‘unshared vision’ in the City of Harare. This research seeks to map out the different levels 
and extent of ‘unshared vision’ in the politics of decentralisation of governance and service 
delivery. ‘Unshared vision’ refers to pragmatic party political stalemates as well as unshared 
vision in terms of the pursuit of the neo-liberal and socio-political agenda of development. 
The main hint to the latter is the reference to the previous impact of SAPSs as argued earlier. 
The research questions which have guided this research seek to solve systemic and practical 
puzzles related to citizen accountability.  
1.3.1 Research questions  
1. Does the Zimbabwean framework/model of decentralisation yield sufficient power to 
local authorities to enable them to deliver services in the event of unshared vision 
amongst governance stakeholders?   
2. What are the forms and outcomes of community participation in local government in 
Harare? 
3. How is accountability of local government to the citizenry and to the state feasible in 
the context of unshared vision? 
4. How can the local government be afforded sufficient autonomy in decision-making 
and practise? 
5. What is the impact of the democratic institutional framework on decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe? 
6. What strategies should be implemented to guarantee basic service delivery to the 
community in spite of disjuncture in vision? 
                                                 
8
 This unit of local government can also be referred to as decentralised institution, local state and local authority.  
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1.4 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is structured into nine chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which 
presents a brief context of the study. It also presents the objectives and research questions of 
this study. Chapter 2 presents a broad literature review of decentralisation. The literature 
review is mainly focused on the African context. It presents the state of decentralisation in 
Africa. The literature review is focused on the historical context, the nature of the state 
system and the how decentralisation is implemented in various state institutions in the 
African context. The final sections of Chapter 2 present the conceptual framework. The 
conceptual framework is centred on the state system and how decentralisation is implemented 
within the state system and institutions. 
Chapter 3 presents a description and the discussion of the methods used in this research. This 
chapter presents critical realism as the research philosophical approach adopted in this study. 
The chapter provides the research design, data collection and analytical methods used. 
Chapter 4 presents an analytical historical development of decentralisation in Zimbabwe. It 
presents the development of decentralisation from colonial era to the present. In the process 
of presenting the historical development of decentralisation, several signposts and events 
which influenced the current system of decentralisation are highlighted.  
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 present the empirical results and discussion of this thesis. Chapter 5 
presents the institutional framework and the various pieces of legislation which give rise to 
the current system of decentralisation in Zimbabwe. It describes the hierarchy of institutions 
controlling decentralisation. Chapter 6 presents and discusses how the various political 
contestations and disjuncture which have manifested themselves in the City of Harare. 
Chapter 7 focuses on governance, citizen accountability and public participation amidst the 
various contestations in the City of Harare, illustrated by a particular case history. Chapter 8 
presents the findings and discussion of the state of service delivery in the City of Harare. It 
describes the state of service delivery and discusses impediments to service in the City of 
Harare from the perspective of various stakeholders. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. It 
presents the summary findings and the core contribution and theoretical contributions of this 
thesis to decentralisation.  
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
“…the state rests on the notion that there should be a single, unified source of 
political authority for a territory, drawing upon the undivided loyalties of its 
population, operating in a well-organized and permanent way and directed towards 
the interests of the whole society”. (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009: 2) 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Ribot and Larson (2013) define decentralisation as the transfer of authority and responsibility 
or public functions from the central government to local government or private sector. The 
main function of local government according to Stoker (2002: 39) is to facilitate and help 
communities achieve their developmental objectives. Ribot (2002) defines decentralisation as 
“a realm of local autonomy defined by inclusive local processes and local authorities 
empowered with decisions and resources that are meaningful to local people”. The general 
belief by government implementing decentralisation is that it is at the local level that policies 
moulded at the central government level are implemented (Kamete 2003: 196). It can be 
argued that the reality of decentralisation is complicated: some governments believe they 
have autonomous local governments, some do not see the point of ‘faking’ autonomy at all. 
The definition of decentralisation brings to the fore two major aspects which will be 
examined in this study. The first issue is that in decentralisation there are two spheres of the 
state; the central state and the local state. The central state shapes the political and structural 
framework within which the local state operates hence this literature review focuses on 
examining the role of the central state in decentralisation and how it shapes the outcomes and 
outputs of decentralisation at the local level. I concur with Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009: 2) 
who aver that “…the state rests on the notion that there should be a single, unified source of 
political authority for a territory, drawing upon the undivided loyalties of its population, 
operating in a well-organized and permanent way and directed towards the interests of the 
whole society”. Within the state (whether central or local) there is an intersection of two main 
components of the state which are politics and administration. The political component of the 
state defines the vision of the state and is responsible for governing the state hence playing an 
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oversight role on state administrators. The administration of the state forms the bureaucratic
9
 
arm which is responsible for implementation and carrying out state programmes.  
The second issue highlighted by the definition refers to the role of the local state which is to 
facilitate and help local communities achieve their developmental objectives (service delivery 
function). This review will examine how the central state shapes the ability of the local state 
to perform its functions (delivery of services) at the local level. This literature review will 
examine the relations between the central state and the local state; the focus will be on 
examining how central state politics influences the operations of decentralised institutions. 
Focus will be on how the central state influences the developmental vision of the local state 
and how the local state responds. 
By discussing the central state and local state, there is a critical component which defines 
these states, that of governance. This study defines governance as the process of exercising 
power (Heller 2001: 132). In order to exercise power, the state has to create structures which 
assist it to govern. It is these structures which create the institutions which enable the state to 
exercise its power. It should be noted that governance is a dynamic outcome of social and 
political actors; therefore, if changes are demanded then it is those dynamics that should be 
addressed (Pierre and Peters 2000). Chabal and Daloz (1999) make the observation that states 
in Africa focus more on changing the actors in governance structures than on changing the 
structures. When the central state is decentralising it is ceding some of its governance 
responsibilities to the local state; hence, there is a transfer of decision-making powers to the 
local state. What is critical and will be examined in this literature review is the argument that 
governance is not so much about structures as it is about the interaction among central and 
local state actors.  
2.1.1 Scope of the literature review 
The scope of this review is to examine decentralisation within its context in Africa. The 
approach of this review is to gain a holistic understanding of decentralisation without 
focusing on one aspect of decentralisation. Previous studies in decentralisation focused on a 
particular aspect of decentralisation (fiscal, political or administrative) hence there is a dearth 
of literature which analyses decentralisation holistically. The objective of this review is to 
                                                 
9
 State Administrative officials in this thesis are also referred as bureaucrats. 
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examine all aspects of decentralisation and appreciate how they are influenced by central and 
local state relations. The strategy of this review is to examine holistically the state of 
decentralisation in the African context highlighting the challenges and successes and come up 
with a theoretical understanding tailored for this study and the African context.  
The review starts by defining decentralisation and examining several types of 
decentralisation. This is followed by a discussion on why different countries decentralise and 
a discussion of the impact of decentralisation on service delivery. A discussion on the impact 
of politics on decentralisation and the role of public participation in decentralisation precedes 
the conceptual framework. Discussion of the conceptual framework includes the various 
theoretical angles which apply to this study. The final section presents the synthesised 
conceptual approach to this study. 
2.2 Types of decentralisation  
Decentralisation is not about dismantling the central state and replacing it with local 
institutions; it is about strengthening local institutions so that they perform to the aspirations 
of the local communities. There are different aspects of the central government which can be 
decentralised. Decentralisation can occur in three ways, political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation. The three forms of decentralisation do not operate independently of each 
other; a perfectly decentralised local government must be made up of all the three forms of 
decentralisation.  
Political decentralisation involves the transfer of political authority from the central 
government to the local government. This can be in the form of policymaking and 
independent decision-making. Political decentralisation normally happens through local 
government elections in the form of democratic decentralisation. It can only be successful if 
there is a redistribution of adequate political power from the central government to the local 
government (Heller 2001: 136). Without adequate power, local government will be affected 
by over interference of the central government. There is a general agreement among the 
scholars that the ability of local government to work depends on the legal and financial 
powers allocated to it (Mabin 2002: 40).  
Administrative decentralisation is defined by Rondinelli and Nellis (1986: 5) as the transfer 
of responsibilities for planning, management, raising and allocation of resources from the 
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central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units 
or levels of government. Administrative decentralisation is sometimes referred to as 
deconcentration (Robinson 2007a: 7). Administrative decentralisation involves mainly the 
transfer of key management functions from the central government to the local government. 
It is normally accomplished through the assigning of more management powers to the 
appointed local bureaucratic officials who will perform the functions and are either 
accountable to the central government or local elected officials. In administrative 
decentralisation, there is no ceding of political power from the central state. The 
administrative officials at local government level only operate as an appendage of the central 
government.  
Fiscal decentralisation is the assigning of financial powers (in the form of grants and tax 
raising powers) from the central government to the local government (Robinson 2007a: 7). 
The financial powers are in the form of revenue collection avenues and strategies and power 
to do with expenditure decision-making. Local government authorities can use financial 
powers allocated to them to raise revenue through borrowing and selling water and electricity 
to the local populace. In cases where there are shared financial responsibilities between the 
central government and local government, a conflict is normally created as the central 
government is more worried about controlling expenditure whilst the local government is 
under pressure to deliver services (Lemon 2002: 11). The success of fiscal decentralisation 
depends on the allocation of adequate resources so that local government can execute their 
duties (Conyers 2003: 115). 
The three forms of decentralisation depend on the level of authority which is bequeathed to 
the local government by the central government. The level of authority assigned to the local 
government can be categorised into four types which are regarded as the four variants of 
decentralisation. Decentralisation can take the form of, devolution, delegation, 
deconcentration and privatisation. The four variants of decentralisation are described in detail 
below. 
2.2.1 Devolution 
Devolution is the transfer of authority to subnational governments. It gives autonomy to the 
subnational government. It requires that local government be given autonomy and 
independence and be clearly perceived as a separate level of government, over which central 
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authorities exercise little or no direct control (Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson 1989: 
75). Normally the authority is transferred through local democratic elections (democratic 
decentralisation) which are held within geographical boundaries. It confers authority on the 
subnational government to raise their own resources. Officials of the devolved structures are 
accountable to the local constituency mainly through local democratic elections. This type of 
decentralisation espouses the ideals of political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation.  
2.2.2 Delegation  
Delegation is the transfer of specific administrative and decision-making powers from central 
government to the local state (Ribot 2002: 1). Powers can be delegated to public corporations 
or parastatals. Delegation can be autonomous only in those aspects which are devolved. The 
accountability of the delegated local state rests with the central state. In this type of 
decentralisation the delegated local state does not have the power to pursue its own agenda or 
programmes mainly because all the authority rests with the central state. Delegated authority 
can be withdrawn at any time. The fact that power has been delegated means that it can be 
withdrawn at any time; therefore, there is a high probability that local state authorities 
operating on delegated authority are highly compliant with central state directives.  
2.2.3 Deconcentration 
Deconcentration is the transfer of responsibilities from the central state to regional offices. 
However, it has to be noted that no power is actually transferred to these regional offices. 
Powers still remain with the central state (Makumbe 1998: 8). The regional officers are only 
there to implement central state policies. Deconcentration acts as a means of exerting control 
in remote areas by the central state. The officials are appointees from the central state and 
they are accountable to the central state. In most cases where deconcentration has been 
implemented it has either hindered project implementation or decision-making at the local 
level as decisions have to be approved by the head office (Manor 1999: 5). In deconcentrated 
systems, the local community has no or little say in decision-making as local administrators 
tend to make decisions driven by the centre, therefore, accountability is upward rather than 
downward (Mansuri and Rao 2012). 
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2.2.4 Privatisation  
Privatisation occurs when central state divests itself of the responsibility for certain functions 
or the provision of certain goods and services (Makumbe 1998: 8). The central state will 
normally regulate the operation of these sectors but the actual fulfilment of these functions is 
left to the dynamics of market exchange. Privatisation can happen in two ways: through 
normal decentralisation processes whereby the state privatises some of its function and a 
situation where it occurs by default; resulting from the failure of the state to provide basic 
services (Oxhorn 2004: 6). Once privatised the state has no control over these enterprises. 
Most literature on decentralisation excludes privatisation as a form decentralisation on the 
premise that once privatised the tasks and private companies are now beyond the control of 
political systems.  
It is important to note that all types of decentralisation can manifest in one unit of the local 
state. In the case of Zimbabwe, it has to be noted that there are various aspects of 
decentralisation at play. There is a mixture of privatisation, devolution, deconcentration and 
delegation. The underlying factor in Zimbabwe is that the ministry responsible for local 
government retains an overall oversight role on most of the operations of local government in 
Zimbabwe.  
Broad conclusions can be drawn from the variants of decentralisation discussed below. It can 
be argued that any form of decentralisation which is not supported by steps to democratise at 
the bottom/local level is not genuine decentralisation (Manor 1999: 6). Genuine 
decentralisation focuses on giving sufficient power and financial resources to the local 
government so that it achieves its objectives without relying on the dictates and being at the 
mercy of the central government. As will be argued in this literature review there are also 
other various factors besides allocation of sufficient power (democratisation of the local state) 
and financial resources which influence whether decentralisation will reach its main objective 
of delivery the development aspirations of the local communities.  
2.3 Why decentralise? 
It is imperative to understand that the experiences and history of African governments are 
crucial in analysing the reasons for decentralisation. Decentralisation in each country is as a 
result of a combination of causes and factors. The nature of decentralisation during the 
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colonial period has a bearing on the shaping of decentralisation in post-colonial period in 
Africa. In the African context, most governments who came to power after independence had 
a socialist/Marxist ideology (Mamdani 1996). The level of decentralisation implemented by 
post-colonial governments’ shows that it was mainly a fusion of a Marxist/socialist approach 
and western models of local government systems installed by the colonial governments. In 
the African context during the colonial period, there were two main forms of decentralisation; 
the first one modelled along the British model of local government and the second tailored 
toward the French system of decentralisation (Ribot 2002: 4). The British colonisers 
introduced a form of indirect rule in their decentralisation model which Mamdani (1996) 
described as ‘decentralised despotism’. These two forms of decentralisation shaped most of 
the post-colonial decentralisation systems in Africa.  
Marxists believe that the colonial system of decentralisation was based on the politics of 
capital accumulation at the centre (central state) and the politics of production at the local 
state level. This form of state envisages a highly centralised government with powers and 
authority to control production at the local state level. This type of decentralisation, as 
implemented during the colonial period, was administrative decentralisation whereby the 
central government retains control and all authority. It was mainly used to suppress the 
natives and provide an efficient system to exploit and achieve the goals of colonial masters at 
the expense of the colonised. In Francophone and Anglophone Africa the colonial masters 
designed a system of governance which was dual in nature. The colonial masters had their 
own system of governance different from the one that governed the natives (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999). The system for the natives ensured that they were subjugated to their colonial 
masters and had no powers to make decisions.  
The colonial approach to decentralisation influenced the reasons why post-colonial 
governments decentralised. Colonial governments were authoritarian in nature and they used 
decentralisation as a tool to enforce their authoritarian rule. During the colonial period, 
decentralisation was used as a tool to rule the indigenous people and as a tool to maximise 
revenue collection (Makumbe 1998: 12). An analysis of colonial decentralisation shows that 
traditional governance systems in most colonial systems were converted to administrative 
systems which served the colonisers. The nature of colonial government resulted in a civil 
service (a bureaucratic arm of government) which sought to devise pragmatic ways of 
adapting the colonial directives to the administration of its subjects rather than a method of 
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‘inculcating new political and government habits’ (Chabal and Dalonz 1999: 12). The 
coercive nature of the colonial decentralised institutions delegitimised these institutions. It 
has to be understood that post-colonial governments in the early years treated the inherited 
(from colonial powers) governance institutions with suspicion and were preoccupied with 
matters of consolidating the power of the central state. They did not focus on serious 
decentralisation to the local level (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 3). The consolidation of 
governance powers by the central state resulted in a highly centralised state. Most post-
independence states viewed local and regional government institutions with disdain as they 
had been used by the previous governments to perpetuate the colonial agenda of subjugating 
the natives (Manor 1999: 19). Because of this, post-colonial states depoliticised local 
government structures to reduce their influence (Oyugi 2000: 16). In countries such as Ghana 
the central state went even further and banned political parties from contesting in local state 
elections. Other states reinforced their intentions and strategies for a strong state through 
recentralisation. Recentralisation was carried out through assigning service provision 
functions like health, education, housing etc. to the central state (Ribot 2002: 5). After 
independence, the colonial decentralised institutions became ‘de facto extensions of the 
ruling parties’ (Manor 1999: 36), who ran down the institutions resulting in dysfunction and 
decay.  
Socialist states by nature are highly centralised (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 1) and socialists 
believe that strong central state control is central to their political agenda (Midgley 1987: 8). 
This explains why most post-colonial states who received assistance during their struggle for 
independence from China and eastern European countries kept the colonial status quo of 
decentralisation (decentralisation which serves the political agenda of the central state) when 
they attained their independence. Why would they do away with a system which served the 
central state so well? A few examples of such countries that propagated socialist agenda are 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
A careful analysis of the literature on decentralisation leads one to postulate that the political 
ideology of the central state determines the reasons for decentralisation. In the African 
context, decentralisation was initiated by various stakeholders, including non-governmental 
organisations, international multilateral aid organisations and the ruling party itself. The 
reasons, as discussed below must be understood within the political, historical and socio-
economic context of the country concerned.  
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Several reasons have been put forward to explain why post-colonial states in Africa are 
decentralised. The first reason for implementing decentralisation is that it is viewed as a way 
of legitimising the central state (Lemon 2002: 18). In legitimising the state, the central state 
approach is to justify why the government should exist. Any disparity between what society 
expects from the state and what the state is capable of delivering undermines the legitimacy 
of the state and breaks down cordial and constructive relations between the state and the 
citizenry. It can be argued that in the context of developing countries, decentralisation plays a 
low legitimising role as compared to developed countries because developing countries have 
poor levels/record of service provision. In actual fact in developing countries decentralisation 
has a delegitimising impact as the state fails to provide services which are expected under a 
decentralised local government.  
Most African countries use decentralisation as means to maintain the status quo in society 
with its inherent inequalities while presenting itself as a legitimate conduit for the expression 
of all citizen demands. The focus on most decentralised states in the African context 
(Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Uganda and so forth) is on community/citizen participation in affairs 
of the government through decentralisation. The approach by these states to community 
participation was to include local communities in development planning hence the 
community has a sense of being involved in governing and setting the agenda of the state. 
However, within the process of community participation, there is very little emphasis on how 
the afforded participation is converted into improved service delivery. For this reason, 
decentralisation faces the risk of the opposition political parties capturing the same spaces 
afforded local communities, therefore, politicising the whole process of development 
planning.  
The third reason for decentralisation is that there is an assumption that decentralisation can be 
used as a developmental tool (Lemon 2002: 18). There is an assumption that the local 
state/decentralised institutions can be used to achieve real gains and defend real advances in 
development because it is designed in a way that it responds to the real needs on the ground 
rather than to profit or the ability to pay. The understanding is that it is at the local state that 
the policies of the central state are implemented therefore decentralisation acts as a catalyst 
for development at the local level. However, critics of this approach believe that the local 
state is simply an agent of the central state (Saunders 1984) which means that the failures of 
the central state will be mirrored at a local level.  
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The fourth reason for decentralisation is based on the argument that decentralised state 
experiences an increase in accountability and participation at the lower levels (Heller 2001: 
132). Accountability at the local level would be achieved in two ways: the local state will be 
accountable to the central state (upward accountability) and accountable to the receivers of 
the services the community (downward accountability). There is an assumption that this form 
of dual accountability increases the chances of service delivery. In this case, decentralisation 
is executed as a way of improving accountability in governance. The issue of accountability 
will be explored further later in this chapter.  
Several scholars critiqued the reasons for decentralisation. Some of the critiques are that 
decentralisation has been used as an instrument to deflect blame from the central state to the 
local state (Lemon 2002: 18). Deflecting blame is mainly effected through the offloading of 
what politicians controlling government call ‘expensive’ tasks onto lower levels of the state. 
The failure of the central state to execute the expensive tasks is as a result of increasing 
demands, slow economic growth and increasing corruption by politicians at all levels (Manor 
1999: 27). In the event of the lower levels of the state failing to execute those tasks the 
central state puts the blame on the doorstep of the local state despite the circumstances.  
Another critique for decentralisation is that it is viewed as a way of strengthening local 
democracy as compared to improving service delivery. The service delivery agenda of 
decentralisation is lost through the democratising local state as the main focus becomes 
strengthening democratic values as compared to improving service delivery (Robinson 
2007b: 1). Democratic decentralisation is viewed as an option which offers something 
resembling a free market economy which brings together ‘buyer’ citizens and ‘decentralised 
authorities’ sellers (Manor 1999: 28). Oxhorn (2004: 14) postulates that even though 
democratisation is the explicit reason for decentralisation in some countries, there is no 
guarantee that it will be achieved. Literature from African countries shows that most central 
governments see decentralisation as a way of holding on to power and strengthening their 
patronage systems (Chabal and Daloz 1999).  
The above reasons can be summarised into two main broad reasons for decentralisation, 
namely, governance and service delivery functions. It can be argued that some countries only 
decentralise as part of the central state’s approach to governance (especially states pursuing 
democratic governance system) and aim to include local communities in the affairs of the 
state. Some states use decentralisation as a tool to deliver better services to the local 
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communities; this reason has nothing to do with governance hence in some cases it negates 
issues to do community participation and other governance related functions. Some countries 
combine the governance and service delivery reasons when decentralising, resulting in a local 
state which attempts to strengthen its governance function and deliver services. In order to 
access the outputs and outcomes of decentralisation, it is important to assess the reasons why 
decentralisation was implemented in the first place. What is clear from the reasons for 
decentralisation is that the central state is key to decentralisation. The central state has the 
power to effect decentralisation hence the success and failures of decentralisation are greatly 
influenced by the nature of the central state. The ability of the local state to deliver its 
mandate, which is mainly to facilitate development at the local level, is highly dependent on 
the spaces and powers afforded to it by the central state.  
The varying motives behind decentralisation raise a challenge of evaluating the impact of 
decentralisation. It has to be noted that in the African context there is no one reason for 
decentralisation in one country. The reasons for decentralisation might be a combination of 
what is discussed in this section. There is a challenge in understanding the decentralisation 
process where the main objectives of decentralisation are ambiguous. It also appears that the 
history of a country (as colony or aggressor), the nature of political ideology and intensity of 
political competition can all influence the type of decentralisation adopted. The challenge 
which is faced by most scholars is: how do we evaluate/measure the success and failure of 
decentralisation? In an attempt to answer this question the section below explains the 
commonly agreed upon traits of decentralisation.  
2.3.1 Traits of good local government  
There are several factors which can act as evidence to show that the level of decentralisation 
is yielding results. These factors include openness, effective community participation, 
allocation of sufficient political powers and financial resources to local government and 
effective accountability frameworks. The success of decentralisation can be measured if these 
traits are evident in the decentralised unit and the broader state apparatus. 
Openness in decentralisation is achieved through the facilitating role of local government so 
that communities achieve their objectives. The major task of local government is to create a 
conducive environment in which there is a willingness to contribute, debate, develop shared 
vision and ensure that appropriate resources are used to achieve common goals (Stoker 2002: 
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33). Openness in local government creates the essence of effective community participation. 
If the local government is open, sincere and the communities are involved in decision-making 
then the communities feel that the local government is working for them and this brings 
success (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 13). 
The underlying factor in openness is that proper decentralisation must close the gap between 
local government and the local community (Lindell 2008: 1882), with effective community 
participation in the whole system of local government. It has to be noted that community 
participation must be effective and not tokenistic
10
. In most African governments 
participation has been measured using the frequency of community consultative meetings. 
Consultative meetings are not an end to community participation per se; what is important is 
to assess what influence the deliberations in these meetings has on advancing the 
development agenda of the local authority. Most scholars of decentralisation in Africa 
highlight the fact that the level of community participation is mainly in the form of tokenism 
which is not effective as the final say in decision-making rests with the state apparatus. The 
local community must own and control the process of community participation; state officials 
must not act as if they are doing the community a favour by opening up the avenues for 
community participation. Since most African states purport to be democratic, the principles 
of democracy advocate for citizens to be decision makers themselves not receivers of 
decisions made by state officials.  
Allocation of powers is crucial if local government is going to be successful. Local state 
structures which lack political power are bound to fail (Olowu and Smoke 1992). Any effort 
to decentralise must include the redistribution of political power. The local state need not 
necessarily be independent (autonomous) from the central state but must have sufficient 
political power so that they can function without unnecessary impediments. Given the nature 
of Marxist or socialist ideologies being pursued by most African states the issue of allocating 
political powers to the local state has resulted in contestations where the central state’s 
approach is to decentralise the powers and recentralise when it suits the agenda of the ruling 
party. It can be argued that the success of decentralisation in the African context has been 
greatly affected by the nature of vacillation between decentralisation and recentralisation. 
                                                 
10
 Tokenistic community participation is described by Arnstein (1969) as a form of participation which is 
characterised by any of the following: placation, consultation and informing.  
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This vacillation is mainly caused by the political agenda of the central state; hence, the local 
state finds itself operating at the mercy of the central state. 
In order to achieve political power within the local state, a precondition is to have a clear 
legal status/framework which enables the local state to be able to create its own vision and 
enforce it. The local state must also be equipped with well-defined political and financial 
powers and responsibilities (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 10). The legal and financial capacity of 
local government determine its effectiveness in delivering services (Mabin 2002). In the 
process of allocating power to local government, there is a need to make a clear distinction 
between the roles of political local government representatives and administrative officials. 
Local political representatives should primarily be involved in policy formulation and 
prioritisation of development projects. Administrative officials should primarily be 
responsible for technical aspects and managerial duties of the local government. Such clear 
separation of duties and responsibilities will enable effective accountability. What is missing 
in most literature on decentralisation is the examination of the role of central state power in 
decentralisation. A few scholars such as Conyers (2003), Olowu and Smoke (1992), 
Mamdani (1996), Sithole (2009), and Wunsch (2001) have examined the role of the central 
state in the broader decentralisation framework and found that the central state plays a critical 
role in the success of the decentralised institutions being able to perform their service 
delivery role. The majority of single dimensional literature on decentralisation places the 
blame for failing to deliver services on the decentralised institutions without examining 
properly the role and influence of the central state in decentralisation. This study will 
examine in detail the role of the central state in the broader scheme of decentralisation.  
The local state needs to be guaranteed powers to raise financial resources and control them. If 
the local state is starved of financial resources it will fail to carry out its programmes and its 
major function of service delivery. Mabin (2002: 40) stressed that for local government to 
achieve their objectives of better service delivery there is a need for guaranteed legal and 
financial capacity. However, in the African context, there is ongoing persistence by central 
government actors seeking to recapture (recentralise) authority and resources which were 
released during decentralisation (Wunsch 2001: 277). Recapturing usually occurs through the 
loopholes left during decentralisation and it is a recipe for failure of most local governments 
as accountability and community voices are lost during the process of recapturing. 
Recapturing of the local state by the central state, according to Crook (2003: 85), occurs in 
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situations where decentralisation was introduced with the main objective of enforcing a 
culture of patronage with local authorities which is controlled by the central state.  
The success of decentralisation depends on the mix of various factors such as democratic, 
fiscal and administrative aspects being incorporated into the decentralisation framework. It is 
worth noting that decentralisation takes place within a particular political context and, 
therefore, evolves differently in each country. In concluding this section, the question which 
needs to be asked is: does decentralisation improve service delivery? Literature available at 
the present moment does not show a clear answer to this question. The onus of this research 
is to answer this question. 
2.4 Service delivery and decentralisation  
Services which are provided by decentralised local states are in the form of education, water, 
health, sanitation, fire services, transportation, public infrastructure, housing and social 
welfare services. The local state acts as a microcosm of the central state in terms of its 
function. Literature shows that there is a greater focus on decentralisation as a tool for 
strengthening democracy than as a tool for improving service delivery. In the African 
context, most governments seem to view decentralisation as a way of affording governance 
powers to local communities. There is a lack of clear focus on decentralisation as a vehicle 
for improving local service delivery.  
The focus for most studies of decentralisation is mainly on participation and accountability; 
very few studies have their focus on the impact of decentralisation on service delivery. 
Scholars such as Conyers (2007) and Robinson (2007a) are of the opinion that there is no 
direct relationship between decentralisation and service delivery. They believe that service 
delivery benefits indirectly through increased effective participation and accountability. This 
view can be countered by the fact that the major reason for implementing decentralisation in 
most African countries is because the central state seems unable to / fails to deliver services. 
If the central state was efficient in delivering services to the satisfaction of the citizens, then 
decentralisation would have less prominence in the African context. However, the success of 
service delivery by the local state is not only related to the political powers and financial 
resources afforded to the local state by the central state. Some local states without these 
powers and operating under highly centralised state system deliver services better than local 
states enjoying some sort of autonomy from the central state (Ludeki 2004). These 
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observations show that service delivery is not only affected by the level of decentralisation 
but other factors also play a critical role in the ability of the decentralised institution to 
deliver services. I posit that failure or success of decentralisation must be measured by the 
level of service delivery after decentralisation. Care must be taken when measuring the 
success of decentralisation because factors such as the influence of actors in the central and 
local state have an impact on determining the ability of the local state to deliver services. My 
view is that material benefits of decentralisation delivered to the local communities should be 
at the forefront when considering the issue of decentralisation. 
The literature on decentralisation in Africa shows that there is a lack of comparative evidence 
to show that decentralisation improves service delivery. Robinson (2007b) observed that the 
available evidence is highly localised and cannot be generalised. A lack of baseline data to 
compare the level of services before and after decentralisation is the major challenge in 
understanding the impact of decentralisation. 
2.4.1 Relationship between decentralisation and service delivery 
When assessing the successes and failures of decentralisation one needs to examine the 
causal relationship between service delivery and decentralisation. This question has to be 
asked when assessing the success or failure of decentralisation: “Is this failure or success as a 
result of decentralisation?” This question must always linger when evaluating the impact of 
decentralisation. The example of Uganda is celebrated as a success of decentralisation in 
Africa but the success is mainly due to the massive injection of donor funds through 
Uganda’s Poverty Alleviation Action Plan rather than because of decentralisation (Conyers 
2007; Oyugi 2000; Kauzya 2007). Conyers (2007) emphasised that one should not blame the 
poor quality of service provision in many African countries on decentralisation as there are 
many other outside factors which affect the results of decentralisation. These factors include 
prevailing political context, design and implementation of decentralisation, the capacity of 
individuals and institutions, the balance of power at the local level, the socio-economic 
context and the available resources (Conyers 2007: 20). A country can embrace 
decentralisation but fail to realise service delivery. Conversely, a country can also attain 
service delivery at the local government level in a highly centralised environment (Ludeki 
2004: 19). 
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2.4.2 Impact of decentralisation and service delivery 
Several scholars of decentralisation in Africa (Conyers 2007; Oyugi 2000; Ribot 2002; Crook 
2003) are of the opinion that decentralisation has done little to improve quality, quantity or 
equity of public services in Africa. Lindell (2008) observed that in Mozambique 
decentralisation has failed to the extent that there is now an informalisation of service 
delivery. This situation is similar to Chad where the communities have to build their own 
schools because of the failure of decentralised institutions to deliver education (Fass and 
Desloovere 2004). The failure of decentralisation is not only exclusive to African countries; 
Robinson (2007b) observed that evidence from six Latin American countries shows that 
service delivery has worsened since the implementation of decentralisation. As discussed 
earlier decentralisation in most cases is instituted by the central state hence it can be argued 
that from the perspective of an objective researcher, decentralisation has failed to produce 
meaningful results but from the perspective of the central state actors decentralisation may 
actually be serving the purpose for which it was initiated even though it is failing to deliver 
services. This argument is based on the analysis of decentralisation during the colonial era; 
centralisation was meant to serve the interests of the colonial masters, not the local 
community.  
On examination of colonial decentralisation, one would reach the conclusion that it failed to 
deliver services to the local communities, but to the colonial masters it was a success as it 
ensured that the colonial masters benefited and resulted in the continuation of subjugation of 
the native population to the political benefit of the colonial masters. As will be discussed in 
the next section this researcher posits that decentralisation failures might not be as important 
to most African central states as political survival of the ruling party hence the argument that 
if decentralisation perpetuates the ruling party’s grip on power then it is regarded as a success 
by the ruling party.  
2.5 Decentralisation in Africa  
2.5.1 Rise of decentralisation in Africa 
A high level of urbanisation in African cities presents pressure on urban local governments to 
deliver basic services like housing, water, education, healthcare and so forth In the case 
where the local government has failed to provide the minimal basic services, communities 
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have resorted to the informal provision of these services (Lindell 2008: 1879). Current 
literature on local governance shows that most of the urban problems are caused by issues to 
do with decentralisation and governance models adopted by the central governments. In some 
cases, local government models were crafted by the ruling party with the mindset that they 
would never lose power (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 2). In such cases, the governance model 
has actors who are conditioned and primed to serve the interests of the central state not that of 
local state and local communities. Conyers (2003: 115) gives an example from Zimbabwe of 
decentralisation for local governance which was implemented with little effective power 
being decentralised to local state structures; in such situations, the local state has no ability to 
make independent decisions regarding the area it governs. Given the various challenges in 
decentralisation in Africa, I concur with Mutizwa-Mangiza (2000: 24) that most countries 
implemented decentralisation without assessing their context and experience. In fact, 
decentralisation is just one area of non-reflection by post-colonial states as they uncritically 
inherited colonial systems. 
Decentralisation in most African countries, such as Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe and so forth has failed to yield results on the service delivery front because of 
various factors. The expectation was that decentralisation was a magic bullet which would 
cure service delivery challenges in these countries. The reason for failure to deliver services 
was articulated by Conyers who said that the heavy influence of the central state in the 
African context resulted in the local government mirroring the conditions of the central state 
in all aspects (Conyers 2007: 27), therefore, the problems at the central state were transferred 
to the local state. The persistence of non-service delivery in decentralised African cities opens 
the possibility of opposition parties capturing the urban local authorities (Lemon 2002: 19) 
through democratic local elections. In Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana 
opposition political parties have capitalised on the failure of the central state to deliver 
services and captured some decentralised institutions, resulting in situations where the 
political party ruling the central state is different from the party ruling the local state. This 
situation presents a challenge in governance especially in countries which are highly 
centralised or have a tendency to use recentralisation as a political tool. 
Most African countries are highly centralised compared to western countries (Lemon 2002: 
23); this causes decentralised local state dynamics to be fraught with problems. There is a 
reluctance by central states in Africa to relinquish power to local government authorities. In 
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some cases decentralised responsibilities and functions have not been coupled with 
decentralised access to financial resources (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 2). A local government 
that depends heavily on the central state in terms of fiscal models is bound to face problems 
of poor funding and non-service delivery (Lemon 2002: 21). A heavy dependence might 
result in recentralisation of decentralised institutions or some of its functions. Many scholars 
(such as Olowu and Smoke 1992; Wunsch 2001; Lemon 2002) believe that in the African 
context, the ‘devil [of decentralisation] is in the detail’. The details of decentralisation are 
spelt out in the legal and policy frameworks which give rise to decentralisation. The legal and 
policy framework creates the structures and institutions which control these decentralised 
institutions. It is within these frameworks where duties, responsibilities and powers of the 
various actors are defined. In most cases where African governments have been 
decentralised, there was a window left for monitoring and supervising of local government by 
the central government. There is persistence by the central government to always monitor and 
intervene in local governments (Wunsch 2001: 277). The argument by the actors from the 
central state is that they have been given the mandate to carry the development aspiration of 
the whole country hence there is a need for continuous monitoring to ensure that the local 
state delivering services to its constituency. However, if the central state has to intervene then 
the intervention should be tailored in such a way that whatever intervention made should 
benefit the local community and not subvert local democratic processes.  
There is high dependence between local and central states in Africa. In some cases, 
decentralisation was implemented without decentralising fiscal resources and political power. 
Decentralising without financial resources is problematic and does not encourage 
development (Conyers 2003). Local states which depend heavily on the central states face a 
variety of problems. In situations where there is a heavy dependence, it is difficult for 
accountability to be ascertained. It becomes difficult for communities to determine who is 
accountable for what in the case of non-service delivery. Oyugi (2000: 20) concluded that 
decentralisation in the African context failed to spur democratic development management 
and efficient delivery of services. There is agreement by most of the scholars on African 
decentralisation that it is not a catholicon for underdevelopment. 
2.5.2 African democracy and decentralisation 
Decentralisation cannot be divorced from the prevailing political systems in Africa. The 
prevailing political factors will determine the impact of decentralisation on service delivery 
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and community participation (Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson 1989: 77). A variety of 
literature on decentralisation alludes to the fact that no matter how good and practical 
decentralisation is the socio-economic, cultural and political environment in which these 
models are applied determines their success. It is also prudent to analyse the role being 
played by actors in decentralisation as their actions contribute to the success and failure of 
decentralisation. It is imperative to examine the role being played by the liberal democratic 
institutional framework in Africa so that the success and failures of decentralisation can be 
understood in that context.  
2.5.2.1 African democracy  
African governments have adopted liberal democracy in large measure. In this thesis, 
democracy is defined as ‘respect for human rights, the rule of law and the existence of 
political institutions which are effective, accountable and enjoy legitimacy’ (McFerson 1992: 
244). In the African context liberal democracy manifests itself in the form of electoral 
democracy. The adoption of liberal democracy is based on the western theoretical framework 
of modernisation as a developmental approach to African countries (Chabal 2009: 6). Liberal 
democracy governments are installed through competitive elections, and the elections are 
required to meet certain standards so that they can be regarded as valid (Adetula 2011: 18). 
Elections are regarded in democratic terms as indicators of the relationship between state 
power and different groups in society. Elections are important as they legitimise state power. 
The main objective of democracy is to invest power in the people (McGowan 2012: 2). This 
form of democracy was induced through various ways by the neo-liberal Western world. It is 
important to note that before liberal democracy, some African countries had a background of 
socialism based on Marxist ideas (Midgely 1987). Marxism viewed decentralisation as a 
capitalist way of advancing a dual state thesis, where it divides the state into two centres, the 
central state which produces politics of production and the local state with politics of 
consumption cutting across classes at the local level (Saunders 1984). A summative analysis 
of Marxism shows that it views liberal democracy as a tool of wealth accumulation by the 
elites. This pinpoints the Marxist view of local government as a simple extension of national 
government and ensures a reproduction of the conditions under which capital accumulation 
can occur. Marxist advocates believe that there is very little expectation of decentralisation 
impacting positively on the life of the poor. Fung and Wright (2001: 6) argue that the 
government in a liberal democracy is the problem and not the solution. The process of 
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decentralisation seems entirely dependent on what the central state wants as compared to 
what the community/citizens want (Mukandala, 1998: 2). There is a well-documented history 
of African leaders and ruling parties being in continuous power from the end of the colonial 
era; this history is important in the analysis of decentralisation in the context that the central 
state determines the level of decentralisation. The argument is that in such situations 
decentralisation is tailored to perpetuate the grip on the state by the ruling party. It is folly to 
believe that the central state will legislate itself out of power without resistance, especially in 
the African context. 
The state institutional framework in most African countries does not support liberal 
democracy. There is a dearth of state institutional frameworks that actually support liberal 
democracy in Africa (McKinley 2006: 423). Post-independence African governments were 
interested in consolidating political power as compared to reforming government institutions 
so that they have a positive impact on the lives of the poor (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 3). In 
most African countries political and bureaucratic lines are blurred, unlike in the Western 
model of democracy where the bureaucracy (state institutional actors) cease to be an 
appendage of the central state but stick to the legal and professional distinctiveness of their 
roles (Chabal and Dalonz, 1999: 6, Edie 2003). In the African context there is no such type of 
bureaucracy; the public and the private sector sphere overlap. In most cases there is no 
marked distinction between the bureaucratic arm of the government and the ruling party; state 
structures might well be articulated but the main issue is how the actors perform their duties 
and their level of interaction with all arms of the state. Such a situation results in the creation 
of bureaucracy based on patronage and kleptocracy (Adetula 2011: 15). The government 
coffers end up being the feeding trough of the ruling party cadres. If the bureaucracy is an 
appendage of the ruling party then its decision making is likely to follow “hierarchically 
transmitted pulses” (Midgely 1987: 14) from the central state. This scenario is exacerbated by 
the fact that countries experiencing ‘democratic transition’ usually lack opportunities and 
mechanisms for public participation and consultation (Lindell 2008: 1882). If public 
participation is not effective, a huge gap between the local government and the community is 
created and renders decentralisation ineffective in achieving service delivery. 
2.5.3 Influence of democracy on decentralisation 
With the advent of democracy, there was a push for countries to adopt free market economic 
principles. The free market economy agenda resulted in the reduction of government 
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expenditure on social services. Liberal democracy is described as synonymous with the free 
market economy (McKinley 2006: 416). The creation of free market economies was 
accomplished through the agency of multilateral aid organisations whose bias was that 
African countries should adhere to Western political conditions (Adetula 2011: 11). 
Structural adjustment programmes were used by multilateral aid organisations as a tool to 
reduce government expenditure through decentralisation in the form of privatisation. In terms 
of decentralisation, multilateral aid organisations’ objectives were to reduce the influence of 
the central state and increase the powers of the private sector on service delivery (Heller 
2001: 132). 
Privatisation of basic services resulted in increased cost of basic services and goods leading 
to increased unaffordability of these services amongst the poor (McKinley 2006: 417). The 
adoption of these strategies by developing countries was supposed to be a way of initiating 
development in these countries. However, the question which has to be asked is: can the poor 
achieve development through capitalism? McKinley (2006: 424) contributed to this debate by 
asking the question “how can the poor majority realise a different non-capitalist society by 
defining and ring-fencing their struggles with [in the context of] institutional frameworks of 
capitalist representation?” The failure of the state to successfully impose the required 
conditions for liberal democracy to flourish resulted in the government being unresponsive to 
the needs of the poor. If the central government is unresponsive to the needs of the poor it is 
likely that decentralised institutions will not be responsive to the needs of the local poor 
people either.  
Some would argue that the state has been too successful in imposing liberal democracy to the 
extent that it has relinquished its developmental role. This argument must be viewed in the 
context of the policy and practice of neo-liberal democracy in Africa. Neo-liberalists ascribe 
the failure of SAPs as being a direct consequence of the excessive concentration of both 
economic and political power in the hands of a few state personnel (Leftwich 1993: 609). The 
failure of SAPs can be ascribed to the fact that there was a failure to understand that liberal 
democracy under capitalism was mainly concerned with changing the institution of political 
representation rather than changing the economic and social institutions which impact on the 
lives of the poor in Africa. 
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2.5.4 Multilateral aid organisations and decentralisation 
The influence of multilateral aid organisation came through the influence of neo-liberal 
restructuring which pushed for political decentralisation. This was in response to the failure 
of the central state particularly in the African case (Dauda 2006: 292). Multilateral aid 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Bank (WB) and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) started shifting their focus 
from financing central state projects in response to the failure of central planning (Olowu and 
Smoke 1992: 1). They started propagating the advancement of a free market economy based 
on the assumption that the private sector and the local state would be more likely to provide 
better services than the central state. In the case of Zimbabwe, the WB and USAID, instead 
of providing their funding through the central ministry responsible for housing, funded the 
City of Harare directly in relation to the Urban I and II housing developments (Matumbike 
2009).  
According to Mutizwa-Mangiza (2000: 24), because of the pressure exerted by multilateral 
aid organisations, many African countries implemented decentralisation without even 
assessing their own experiences and their socio-economic-political contexts. This researcher 
has seen very little literature which shows that multilateral organisation directed states to 
decentralise but the literature shows that neo-liberal circumstances created by multilateral aid 
institutions forced African states to decentralise. The underlying factor in terms of neoliberal 
political reform is the pressure to curb central state spending. As central states in developing 
countries reduced their growth and the scope of their own activities in response to economic 
realities and donor pressure, they increased their influence and strengthened local states. This 
had a direct influence on central states implementing cost recovery measures at the local state 
level on services which the local state provided to citizens. This scenario was evident during 
the implementation of structural adjustment policies in Ghana where decentralisation was 
encouraged as a way of reducing central government spending (Kyei 2008).  
Multilateral aid and non-governmental organisations believed that decentralisation had two 
benefits – promotion of democracy and increase government efficiency because it brings 
government closer to the people (Van De Walle 2009: 16). Most Western-funded 
nongovernmental organisation channelled their aid with an emphasis on local community 
projects and community participation (Clayton 1998). This was being done under the pretext 
of developing democracy in developing countries (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 1). The 
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economic context of developing countries made them ‘grudgingly’ accept the precondition 
for international aid. This has caused half-hearted attempts to decentralise in the African 
context (Dickovick 2003). It can be analysed that the problem of attempts to recentralise 
which is prevalent in most decentralised African countries emanates from the initial 
reluctance of central states to decentralise. Bratton (1989) observed that in Kenya, Uganda 
and Zimbabwe non-governmental organisations preferred to directly channel their 
interventions to communities because the state was regarded as inefficient, overdeveloped 
and laden with political baggage.  
It is evident; therefore, that multinational organisation played a great role in decentralisation 
in the African context. The fact multilateral aid organisations and non-governmental 
organisations were Western-funded meant that they supported and propagated politics of neo-
liberalism which encouraged decentralisation under the theme of a democratic framework. It 
can be argued that the transition of African states from being one party states and pursuing 
socialist ideology to neoliberal capitalism has not been viable (Onimode 1988: 3). 
2.5.5 Democratic institutional frameworks and decentralisation accountability 
The success of decentralisation depends upon the level of accountability. Accountability is 
defined as “the obligation to explain and justify conduct” (Pollitt 2003: 89). This implies that 
there is an obligation by the actors in public office to account for and justify their actions. 
Accountability plays a critical role in the delivery of services in local government and 
involves the monitoring of individuals in public office. According to Ribot (2002: 29), 
accountability does not end with accounting and justification of actions but also includes an 
enforcement component which ensures that oversight includes the capacity to apply sanctions 
to other institutions and agents within the state  
In order to understand accountability in decentralised institutions, it is important to examine 
how one can acquire public office. In institutions of governance, there are three ways of 
acquiring public office: appointment which is based on merit; elections which are based on 
public preference (councillors or political representatives fall into this category); and 
inheritance (rural traditional leaders fall into this category) (Sithole 2009: 78). The method by 
which someone is appointed to the public office has a great influence on how that official 
accounts for his/her actions whilst in office. 
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The institutional framework of liberal democracy government dictates two forms of 
accountability. The first form is horizontal accountability which involves actors within the 
state system being enabled to hold to account and apply sanctions on other actors within the 
state system. A good example is when public officials/bureaucrats are accountable to elected 
representatives (Chabal and Dalonz 1999: 14). The second form of accountability is vertical 
accountability where elected representatives are accountable to and can be sanctioned by, the 
public through elections or recall. For a proper democratic state to flourish accountability 
must be central to the state structures (Ribot 2002, Baker 1999). As referred to earlier, liberal 
democracy in Africa shows that in most cases there is an absence of meritocracy in the 
appointment of public officials. With the absence of meritocracy, public officials tend to offer 
their allegiance/accountability to the political party or individuals who appointed them 
(Olowu 2001). This situation creates antagonism between local elected representatives and 
public officials. Crook and Sverrison (2001: 32) highlighted the fact that the problem of poor 
accountability is not only a problem of African states but is also prevalent in the so call 
‘consolidated democracies’. This argument concurs with the view by Manor (1997: 7) that 
accountability can be difficult to obtain even where there is substantial democratisation at the 
local level. 
A good example of the state creating situations which result in accountability challenges is 
the practice of cadre deployment practised by the African National Congress (ANC), the 
ruling party in South Africa (Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001; Tshishonga 2014). 
African National Congress cadres are deployed in critical bureaucratic/public municipal 
positions. The question which has to be asked is: who will the cadre be accountable to in the 
event that there is the capture of the municipality by opposition parties? In such a situation it 
is obvious that the relationship between elected representatives and the bureaucrats will be 
strained. Does the strained relationship increase accountability or affect it in a negative or 
positive way? Tshishonga (2014) observed that the deployed cadres do not only complicate 
accountability but also have a negative impact on services delivered as some of the deployed 
cadres are not properly qualified. This issue will be explored further in the discussion of the 
findings of this study.  
In the African context where many of the states are not able to fund their own programmes, 
the dependence on external state actors or agencies to fund their budgets creates further 
challenges with regards to how accountability is practised. Ribot (2002) points out that in 
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such situations it is difficult for the state actors to be accountable to the citizens because the 
external funders require the state to account primarily to them. This situation weakens other 
lines of accountability within the state institutional frameworks which in most cases are 
already fragile (Therkildsen 2001: 8). In the event of failing to deliver services/development 
to its citizens, the state is likely to blame the funders.  
Elected local representatives are normally elected through local government elections. In 
most African countries local elections are a microcosm of the national elections. The 
microcosmic nature shows vicious polarity between the ruling party and the opposition. In 
most cases the relationship between the ruling party and the opposition is acrimonious. 
Because of this political polarity between the ruling party and the opposition parties some 
countries such as Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Uganda, and Ivory 
Coast and so forth have descended into civil wars or civil disorders. In Zimbabwe, the battle 
for control of local government is mainly between political party representatives and 
independent candidates who have little chance of winning the elections. Institutions for 
community participation can be regarded as pseudo-participation institutions. Participation in 
these institutions is only tokenism as they are open to manipulation by the political elite 
(Lemon 2002: 6). The nature of electoral democracy means that after the elections citizens 
have very little further input on how their communities are governed (Bishop and Davis 
2002: 12). Despite all the problems with participation, the key question to be asked is: does 
full participation have a positive impact on service delivery or are there other factors that 
determine the quality of service delivery?  
The nature of the politically acrimonious relationship between political parties forces the 
electorate to choose candidates not because of their expertise, but because of the political 
party which they represent. Previous research which I conducted in Harare shows that 
residents bemoaned the poor quality of local government elected representatives. If local 
government representatives are appointed through elections the question to be asked is: are 
elected representatives accountable to the electorate or the political party which they 
represent? Whose policies are these representatives going to implement or advocate for? In 
such cases, the probability is that service delivery becomes a secondary issue as the primary 
issue is winning political battles.  
The issues discussed above show that decentralisation in the African context is controlled not 
only by how good the decentralisation model is, but by factors such as political, socio-
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economic, and cultural context/environment. Heller (2001: 136) said that no matter how good 
and practical decentralisation is, the socio-economic, cultural and political environments in 
which these programmes are implemented ultimately determine their success. 
2.6 Public Participation and decentralisation  
Public participation is a very important concept in decentralisation as it is regarded as the 
driving force for better governance and service delivery. Gaventa and Valderama (1999: 7) 
define public participation as the exercise of power by different actors in the spaces created 
by the interaction between citizens and local authorities. In this thesis, public participation is 
defined as a process whereby citizens claim the right to participate in informing decisions 
which affect their lives and well-being (Draai and Taylor 2009). Public participation entails 
the redistribution of power from the state to citizens as a core element of a democratic 
governance system (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). Through decentralisation, state institutions 
create local platforms for interaction with citizens. It is, however, important to note that the 
spaces for participation are controlled by state institutions and can influence the outcomes of 
public participation.  
In the African context, the main objective for decentralising is “bringing government closer 
to the people” (Makumbe 1998). There is an emphasis on the policy framework of involving 
local communities in decision-making. The argument is that effective public participation 
will improve the efficiency of public institutions, that it will make decentralised institutions 
more accountable, and that it will deepen democracy (Gaventa and Valderama 1999: 4). In 
order to understand various forms of participation strategies and their effectiveness, 
Arnstein’s ladder of participation is discussed (Figure 2). The ladder of participation provides 
a useful benchmark against which to measure the degree of and quality of participation in 
decentralisation. The ladder describes a continuum of participation from manipulation (non-
participation) to citizen control (citizen power). The proposition for the ladder of 
participation is that the democratic states must aim to achieve citizen control which means 
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Figure 2: Ladder of Participation 
 
Source: Arnstein 1969 
In decentralised institutions it is critical to assess the level of participation and how effective 
it is. In the African context a lot of attention has been paid to strengthening accountability 
and responsiveness of government institutions through institutional reform but very little has 
actually been done to implement effective public participation. In countries such as Uganda, 
Tanzania, Chad and Zimbabwe public participation can be regarded as tokenistic and is used 
as a platform to mobilise the electorate by the ruling party (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Mansuri 
and Rao (2012) contended that main democratic theories place more emphasis on the 
representative component rather than public participation component of democracy. In the 
African context, there is an emphasis on stability of the state at the expense of adhering to 
other democratic principles. Most countries in Africa practise tokenism as a form of 
participation, where participation is performed in order to tick certain boxes (McKinley 2006; 
Chabal and Dalonz 1999). This form of participation is not effective and not ideal if the 
citizens are to achieve full control of state decision-making processes. Hingels et al. (2009) 
noted that it is not the volume of participants but how effective is the process of participation 
in terms of incorporating decisions of the citizens in government institutions. The authors 
highlighted the example of Nazi Germany and other eastern European countries which 
practised mass participation but without the necessary democratic or beneficial consequences. 
 
 38  
 
This shows that the gap between the rhetoric of participation and the reality of effective 
participation is wide.  
There are various processes for participation in the African context. Most countries have 
adopted a representative form of democracy. Participation in representative democracy 
manifests in citizens engaging in political parties and voting in national and local elections 
(Hingels et al. 2009: 3). It is important to note that voting occurs periodically and what is 
critical to understand is what happens between elections; do citizens have the power and 
opportunity to influence decisions between elections? Several studies have tried to answer 
this question but the answers vary depending on the country. However, the underlying 
general agreement is that on the African continent there are few attempts by governments to 
achieve full citizen control of public decision-making processes in decentralised institutions.  
The challenge for decentralised institutions is for them to achieve full citizen control. 
Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) noted that for citizen control to be achieved there is a need for 
a change of perception on the part of citizens from being ‘users and choosers’ to being 
‘makers and shapers’ of interventions and services. Gaventa and Valderama (1999) identified 
citizen education and awareness building, training of officials and alliances with civil society 
and advocacy as crucial for full participation and citizen control.  
Through decentralisation, the central state brings government closer to the people. For this 
objective to be properly achieved there is a need for the decentralised institutions to craft 
public participation policies which ensure that local communities over which they preside 
have the power to make decisions and hold public officials accountable. Without effective 
public participation within the local state, there is a chance of replicating and mirroring the 
same problems which the central state is trying to rectify by decentralising.  
2.7 Conceptual framework 
Using the research paradigm of critical realism as a starting point this research seeks to adopt 
a conceptual framework which exposes the mechanisms which drive decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe. Critical realism envisages that the researcher finds out what produces change, 
what makes things happen, what allows or forces change and presumably, what blocks 
desirable change (Kitchen and Tate 2000:15). In essence, critical realists posit that reality is 
not only what can be observed empirically but other factors that are intangible which 
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influences reality (Sayer 2000). Bhaskar (2008) support this argument by observing that 
scientific activity involves setting up controlled conditions to ascertain the existence of 
postulated causal mechanism. Furthermore, if scientific enquiry is set like this, then the 
enquirer will observe what the postulated controlled conditions seek to observe; hence the 
lack of objectivity in the enquiry. The meaning of this is that scientists do not cause the 
activation of causal mechanisms but can only provide conditions for the empirical 
observation of their working (de Souza 2014). In this case, critical realists argue that there is 
an interdependence of individuals and society; hence a realist enquiry takes place within an 
open system that is synonymous with social systems (Williams et al 2016). When examining 
the issue of decentralisation, especially in Zimbabwe, it is important to use an appropriate 
conceptual framework which provides appropriate conditions for the observation of how the 
centre-local relationship in Zimbabwe plays out in the event of unshared vision.   The 
methodological approach and conceptual framework must guarantee the empirical 
observation of the various components of decentralisation, which are; fiscal, political, 
administrative, actors and institutional arrangements in the City of Harare.  
When examining the issue of unshared vision in a decentralised local state, the onus is on the 
researcher to unravel all mechanisms which affect decentralisation. Critical realists argue that 
a social object’s structure is therefore comprised by internal social relations that possess 
specific capabilities, powers and tendencies to act in a certain way under particular conditions 
(Roberts 2014). This view is pertinent to the holistic study of decentralisation as a critical 
realist approach will focus on examining the internal capabilities, power and tendencies of 
decentralisation. It only through this approach that actors, policy frameworks and political 
context are examined together to give a holistic view of decentralisation in the City of Harare. 
Critical realism and its suitability for this study will be further discussed in detail in the next 
chapter.  
The majority of the literature on decentralisation uses a single dimensional analysis of 
decentralisation which analysed separately the political (Olowu and Smoke 1992; Wunsch 
2001; Kamete 2003), administrative (Conyers 2003, 2007) and fiscal (Chatiza 2010; Ekpo 
2007) aspects of decentralisation. This is not helpful if one wants a holistic understanding of 
the mechanisms driving decentralisation in a specific country. The single dimensional 
analysis does not capture the complex changes associated with decentralisation measures, 
involving political, economic, administrative, social and cultural elements which often 
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interact simultaneously. This study foregrounds the political system and its actors because of 
the understanding that the political system and its actors have a bigger influence on the 
success and failure of decentralisation. The approach I am taking in this research is to 
examine how the political system and its actors shape the centre-local relationships taking 
into cognisance its influence on the state and its actors. The literature on the influence of 
politics, the state and its actors in centre-local relations has largely been underrepresented in 
decentralisation studies. This research conceptualises decentralisation as being a broad 
phenomenon which is affected by various factors which are not only limited to forms of 
decentralisation.  
This conceptual framework is based on the premise that decentralisation takes place within a 
particular political, socio-economic and cultural context and, therefore, evolves differently in 
each country (Dauda 2006: 292). I also acknowledge the influence of the actors within and 
outside the state system on decentralisation. In this thesis, the actors are defined as 
individuals or institutions with the ability to influence the processes of the state system. 
Actors can either be political parties, public officials, international aid organisations, civil 
society organisations or private individuals. It is important to examine how these actors 
manipulate decentralisation for their own benefit. According to Saito (2008) actors examine 
problems and issues based on their knowledge and capacity, and act accordingly hence 
influencing the outcomes of decentralisation.  
It is imperative to dig deeper and unravel other dimensions, linkages and mechanisms 
controlling and shaping decentralisation in Zimbabwe. The main argument I am putting 
forward for this conceptual framework is that what is being seen as decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe is a façade and, therefore, it is more important to move from surface structures of 
decentralisation to the underlying mechanisms by which decentralisation is operationalised. 
As discussed in the literature review there are various factors which have a direct influence 
on the success or failure of decentralisation. Various factors such as the political system, in 
this case, neo-liberal politics, democratic participation, state institutional frameworks and the 
structural aspects of decentralisation are crucial in gaining an understanding of how 
decentralisation in the African context works. Alongside these factors, there is another critical 
factor which is the influence of actors who are “locked into a series of intertwined battles 
over, resources, meanings and institutional legitimacy and control” (Long 2001).  
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Instead of focusing on decentralised institutions only, this study is based on a holistic analysis 
of the political, socio-economic and cultural context in which decentralisation is at play. The 
reason for taking this approach is the belief that the degree of decentralisation is largely 
dependent on the type of political party system and democracy in the country (Riedl and 
Dickovick 2014: 3). The basis of this approach is that decentralisation does not play out in a 
vacuum hence the understanding of the context plays a critical role in the process of 
evaluation of the impact of decentralisation on governance and development in the 
decentralised community. In the process of analysing the contextual environment of 
decentralisation, the focus is directed at the state, its politics and the various actors who are 
involved in governance. As stated earlier, the actors include political parties, bureaucrats, 
civil society and the general community members. It is these actors who shape and influence 
the outcomes of decentralisation in various countries in Africa as they are not passive but 
active participants in the process of decentralisation.  
This study is based on how the institution of the state is defined and how the actors influence 
the processes and outcomes of decentralisation. The way the state is structured has a great 
bearing on how decentralisation plays out especially in the African context. As a departing 
point, Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009: 2) define the state as resting on the notion that there 
should be a single, unified source of political authority for a territory, drawing upon the 
undivided loyalties of its population, operating in a well-organized and permanent way and 
directed towards the interests of the whole society. The critical components of the state are 
government (political arm) and the civil service (administrative bureaucrats / public officials). 
Although there is a debate on what can be defined as the state, there are some areas of 
concordance in defining the state. The areas of concordance are that the state involves a 
unified political authority over a territory, the state is permanent and its interests are directed 
at the members of the society. The fact that the state has authority over a territory brings to 
the fore an important facet of the state which is governance. In simple terms, to govern is to 
exercise power (Heller 2001: 132). Governance is made up of two distinct classes of people, 
namely, the ones exercising power (governors / the state) and the governed (society). In the 
process of governing the state seeks to create conditions for ordered rule and collective active 
citizenry (Stoker 1998).  
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2.7.1 Unshared vision in decentralisation 
The definition of the state assumes that the state is a single and unified political authority. 
The issue of ‘unshared vision’ under investigation in this study reflects a form of disjuncture 
in which is when the state as the political authority controlling the central state is different to 
the political authority controlling the decentralised institution. In this case, the state ceases to 
be unified. Assuming that the state is a single and unified political authority poses problems 
especially in the African context where there is a very thin line and in some cases no line, 
between the state and the ruling party (Chabal and Daloz 1999). A few examples of this 
disjuncture within the state are Kenya where the opposition won the local elections in the city 
of Nairobi, South Africa where the opposition won the local government elections in Cape 
Town and subsequently the Western Cape Province and Zimbabwe where the opposition 
political parties have won the majority of urban local government elections since 2002. The 
capture of the local state by the opposition caused disjuncture within the state as it is no 
longer a single unified political authority. In developed countries, this disjuncture is not a 
major issue as disjuncture is countered by the strength of the overall political system and the 
attitude of state actors (Kamete 2007). However, in the African context, Botswana is an 
example of the problems associated with disjuncture in the state. In Botswana in areas where 
the opposition captured local municipalities, the central state used a provision allowing for 
specially elected councillors (appointed by the central state) to bolster its position and in 
some cases to reverse the opposition majority (Riedl and Dickovick 2014: 19). Disjuncture 
can be exacerbated by personality clashes and political ideological differences between the 
political elites controlling the central and local state (Kamete 2007: 41).  
It is important to note that the Zimbabwean state is a unitary state which is devoid of 
intermediate state components such as provincial governments which mean that decentralised 
institutions in Zimbabwe operate only within the parameters and powers defined by the 
central state. Dickovick (2007) argued that most studies in decentralisation focus on the 
central state and the decentralised institutions neglecting the intermediate state institutions 
such as provincial governments. In non-unitary states decentralisation tends to weaken the 
intermediate state and strengthen the central state. With regards to the context of this study, 
Zimbabwe, the issue of the central state weakening the intermediate state does not apply at 
least for the moment as the quasi-federal state which appeared in 1980 was appointed by the 
central state hence it was a willing appendage of the central state as it serves at the pleasure 
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of the central state. The adoption of the new constitution in Zimbabwe in 2013 ushered in a 
slightly stronger quasi-federal state
11
 but it has not been implemented hence the issue of 
unshared vision is between the central state and the decentralised institutions (local 
authorities). 
The majority of post-colonial African states never meant to follow democratic state system 
but one has to agree that democracy was adopted because of donor and economic pressure 
(Olowu and Smoke 1992: 2) which steered most of the African countries from their political 
ideology of ‘socialism’ and in some cases one party state political systems. The 
implementation of democracy in Africa was accomplished without taking into consideration 
the client-patron nature of the state; hence, democracy in the African context is closer to a 
client-patron relationship – a form of relationship where the state resources are used to solicit 
political favours (Chabal and Daloz 1999). This has a strong impact on how the state 
institutions and their actors view issues of governance. It is important to examine the context 
on which the democracy was adopted in Africa and how this influenced decentralisation. 
2.7.2 Post-colonial African states 
Most post-colonial African states did not adopt democracy as their ideology instead, they 
tried to reform the state to conform to Marxist and socialist ideology at independence. 
Pursuing the socialist ideology resulted in most post-colonial African states being highly 
centralised because the socialist ideology enforces the collective ownership of the means of 
production and this can only happen through the state (Midgley 1987: 6). According to 
Boone (2003: 358), the post-colonial governors created state institutions that entrenched and 
enhanced the state’s political authority and extractive powers. The fact that the state was 
regarded as the agent of ownership and means of production for the people resulted in the 
post-colonial state in African being involved in the economic and developmental activities in 
the country. In the African context, the central state is also seen to be the primary initiator 
and implementer of development (Midgley 1987: 6). In terms of decentralisation, socialist 
ideology perceives the local state as being a mere extension of the central state (Lemon 2002: 
18). This belief influenced how decentralisation was institutionalised and operationalized in 
countries which once pursued socialist ideology. Centralisation of the state led to the 
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 The quasi-federal state (Provincial Council) will be discussed in detail Chapter 5 
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personalisation of politics and the development of authoritarian rule in Africa (Crook 2003: 
80). Because of personalisation of politics, decentralisation was implemented in such a way 
that the local state is ever dependent on the central state so that it bolsters the political 
ambitions of the central state. This is consistent with the Marxist perspective that state 
reforms occur because governors see these as a way of entrenching their economic and 
political interests (Long 2001).  
In former African socialist countries which adopted democracy, there are ongoing attempts 
by the central state to try and recapture the decentralised local state and its resources 
(Wunsch 2001: 277). Because decentralisation was implemented by central state actors / 
political elites with vested interests, various loopholes were left which will allow the central 
state to have a say in the future vision of the decentralised local state. In some cases, there 
have been attempts to recentralise through using these loopholes. The argument put forward 
by the central state in recentralising is that it is at the local state where development 
interventions are implemented hence there is a need for the central state to have control of the 
local state so that it can pursue the national developmental agenda. It can be argued that the 
continued attempts to recentralise are as a result of the central state pinning its development 
vision on the local state given the fact that the central state views itself as the final institution 
which carries the vision for development. This can explain why the constitution, acts of 
parliament and decentralisation policies have loopholes. This enables the central state to 
intervene. The interventions are favourable for the ruling party to use to its political benefit. 
In the event that the political party controlling the local state has a different development 
agenda for the local state, a disjuncture is created. In Zambia, a study by Dauskardt (2004) in 
Kitwe shows that central state interventions caused the local authority to lose its autonomy 
and thereafter it became reluctant to make decisions. 
2.7.3 State politics and decentralisation in Africa  
The post-colonial state was set in such a way that it dismantled the colonial legacy and 
political system which served the colonial government. In the process of dismantling the 
colonial legacy, the state institutions which were used and abused by the colonial state were 
reformed through the appointment and secondment of politically connected individuals 
whose responsibility was to further the interests of the new ruling party (Thomson 2000). In 
other words, it can be said that the post-colonial government just substituted colonial actors 
with new ruling party actors in state institutions who furthered the interests of the ruling 
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party. There was no urgency of reforming the state institutions so that the institutions could 
be depoliticised. Clearly, it was not in the interest of the post-colonial government to 
dismantle a system which could consolidate and perpetuate its hold on power (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999: 14). This process affected the nature of and influenced the partiality of state 
institutions and the civil service. This, in the end, resulted in the overlapping of the civil 
service public sphere and the private political sphere. The opposition political parties and 
their supporters operated in an environment which was narrowly prescribed by the ruling 
party (Joseph and Pinkney 1999: 240). This tilted the political contest heavily in the ruling 
party’s direction. 
It can be argued that the post-colonial state was based on clientelism. A clientelistic state is 
defined as a form of state (patron) which gives state favours in the form of civil service jobs, 
and economic benefits in the distribution of public sector resources through contracts and 
projects (Thomson 2000). In return for the material benefits the client mobilises political 
support and loyalty to the patron (Bratton and Van De Walle 1997). Wantchekon (2002: 61) 
argued that clientelist politics are most attractive in conditions of low productivity, high 
inequality and starkly hierarchical social relations. In Africa, ruling parties of countries such 
as Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Kenya used the local state for patronage purposes 
and to consolidate their political power (Crook 2003: 81, Branch and Cheeseman 2009). In 
the case of Zimbabwe, the client-patron relationship was built over a long period where the 
post-colonial government pursued a socialist and version of the one-party political system. A 
study carried out by Wantchekon (2002) in Benin shows that because of the clientelist nature 
of politics voters voted for public representatives based on what they could offer them in 
return, in this case, the promise of public sector jobs. In some countries such as South Africa, 
the client-patron relationship is reinforced by ruling party policies which deploy party cadres 
to top civil service jobs at the expense of meritocracy. In summary, the success or failure of 
decentralisation is heavily based on the influence of political factors (Rondinelli, McCullough 
and Johnson 1989: 77). 
Client patron relationships do not advance the principles of decentralisation as the 
decentralised institutions created under such conditions owe their allegiance to the central 
state / ruling party (patron), not the local communities which they are supposed to serve 
(Wunsch and Olowu 1990). Keating (1995: 129) rhetorically asked the following question:  
in such a situation, is the local state an agent of the central state or is it an expression of the 
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local community? Patronage within the state entrenches superiority of the power holders over 
the administration / civil service of the state (Sithole 2009: 48). In such a situation the 
governed find themselves deprived of spaces to hold the governors accountable for their 
actions. This deprives society crucial means of control over decisions which affect them. The 
impact of client-patron relationships is not only on accountability but also on the quantity and 
quality of service delivery as the individuals appointed to state public office may not be the 
best for the position (underqualified or unsuitable) therefore unable to perform their duties. 
This, in turn, negatively affects the level of service delivery.  
2.7.4 Neoliberal approaches to decentralisation in Africa  
Neoliberalism in the African context was introduced as a package of democratic reforms by 
international institutions. Neoliberalism argues that underdevelopment is caused by 
government policies that distort economic incentives, inhibit the market and work against 
economic development (Gilpin 2001: 311). Neoliberalism seeks to create a free market 
economy with an emphasis on economic growth. In the process of converting the 
‘Marxist/socialist’ to democracy, significant pressure was put on the state and authoritarian 
African governments to reform and embrace multiparty elections (Adetula 2011). The 
pressure was in the form of carrot and stick (Eddie 2003: 118); countries willing to reform 
were rewarded with increased access to international finance and aid for their budgets from 
donors, those which resisted experienced isolation and received no budgetary support. The 
presumption was that if democracy worked in developed countries it would also yield 
positive results in Africa (Kalu 2004: 528). The objective of the push for democracy was to 
ensure that African states followed the model of Western democracy. African one-party states 
and authoritarian governments were expected to be transformed overnight and adhere to 
Western bureaucratic structures and procedures (Chabal and Daloz 1999). This was not 
achieved, mainly because of poorly developed state institutions and weak democratic culture 
(Adetula 2011: 13). In the process of democratising the African states, elections were 
regarded as a fundamental tool which could transform the African state and make it 
compliant with the Western ideals of democracy.  
In the African context, there has been an obsession with holding acceptable elections which 
are normally used as a measure of democracy. What is missing from this obsession is the 
understanding of the underlying context on which voting patterns emerge. McKinley (2006: 
42) highlighted the problem of obsessing on elections in the following statement: 
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“…elections have become the political background of those with access to capitalist 
patronage and where electoral choice is reduced to different sheds of grey. Democracy and 
fair elections need a neutral state which the African highly centralised state never provided. 
McKinley (2006) makes the observation that in most cases in the African context it is evident 
that democratic elections are not enough in that citizens are now relying on social movements 
as an avenue of expressing themselves on issues to do with development. In electoral 
democracies, between elections, communities have little say or control over what their 
representatives do or their developmental agenda (Arblaster 1987: 84).  
Democratisation did not result in improved political systems, but in an effort to present 
reformed democratic governance systems, most the African governments created a 
democratic façade which hides the real political system of patronage beneath it. This 
highlights the pitfalls of democracy in Africa; although democracy’s intention is to create an 
environment where issues and policies are contested, genuine victory is only possible if all 
the actors agree to abide by the rules (Kalu 2001: 529). As described earlier, there is no clear 
distinction between the ruling party and the central state so the ruling party has access to state 
machinery and resources for patronage purposes; hence, the electoral playing field is not 
level. It seems the main objective of African political elites is to use democracy as a means to 
political power (Ake 1993). 
The same rhetoric on multi-party elections is also evident in decentralisation whereby 
decentralisation is used as “theatre pieces to impress or appease international donors” 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 474). Elections of this nature are not sufficient for a country to be 
called democratic (Breytenbach 1996). What is clear is that democratic decentralisation in the 
African continent did not create an accountable local government system or sort of the 
powers that would encourage democratic decentralisation (Ribot 2002: 71). What is clear is 
that the African governments created institutions which are accountable only to the central 
state instead of the ordinary citizens.  
In the process of democratisation, most African countries adopted the SAPs which were an 
economic policy package imposed by multilateral organisations. The aim of SAPs was to roll 
back the state’s involvement in the economy. The implementation of SAPs had the effect of 
shrinking the patronage largesse through the reduced civil service and privatised parastatals. 
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According to Thomson (2000: 188), this caused declining legitimacy
12
 and growing political 
instability especially in the urban areas, thereby opening the door for strong opposition to 
capture the urban councils / municipalities through the democratic avenue of elections. The 
economic situation also resulted in the intensification of rent-seeking and patronage-based 
politics hence the fierce resistance of opposition political parties (Van De Walle 2006: 212). 
The capture of the urban councils or municipalities by the opposition resulted in two centres 
of power being created; one at the central state level and another at the local state level 
thereby creating a situation of unshared vision.  
2.7.5 Democratic institutional framework 
As discussed previously, neoliberalism was brought about by multilateral aid organisations 
which had a stranglehold on government policy making processes. Neoliberalism creates 
institutional frameworks which support it. The success of neoliberal politics is heavily 
dependent on the institutions it creates for its success. In the African context, the institutional 
framework context does not always support decentralisation and is open to abuse by the 
central government (Adetula 2011: 15). Chabal and Daloz (1999: 3) echo a critical view that 
the state in Africa has not been institutionalised hence there is no distinction between political 
parties, the society and the state. Others scholars such as Adetula (2011: 11) reinforce Chabal 
and Daloz’s view by saying that the state in Africa is an empty shell which is devoid of an 
impartial civil service.  
Democratic institutions enhance democratic competition; they also mitigate the chances of 
personalising administrative issues into political conflicts (Kalu 2001: 539). In the African 
context, state institutions are highly politicised to the extent that separation between state 
institutions and ruling party are blurred which is not the case in viable democracies. If lines 
are blurred the ruling party will be dependent upon government institutions for its political 
survival (Chabal and Dalonz 1999: 6). In such situations political office is no longer a 
privilege but an entitlement. This results in democratic participation being token participation 
as one political party controls the state. It has to be noted that state institutions should 
enhance democracy not impede it. I posit that the development of the state lies with the 
establishment of a strong civil service which is separated from the pressures of society and 
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 In Zimbabwe state legitimacy started declining in the 1990s when SAPs were implemented (Hammar 2005). 
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political parties. Appointment to the civil service needs to be based on merit, not political 
loyalty or patronage. 
2.7.6 Democratic participation in the context of decentralisation 
The state is not complete without actors like ordinary people, the private sector, international 
stakeholders, political parties and civil society. These actors are responsible for holding the 
state and political parties accountable for their actions through various democratic 
instruments such as elections. The state does not serve itself but its citizens; hence the need 
for citizens’ involvement in the issues of the state through active citizenry Active citizenry 
ensures that citizens are makers and shapers rather than just users and consumers of state 
services (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). The involvement of civil society and citizens in the 
issues of the state in a democracy is called democratic participation / active citizenry. This 
participation affords communities an avenue to participate in choosing their representatives in 
government (Young 2000: 130). An active citizenry is important as it helps form better 
citizens who are conscious of their rights to participate in state decision-making processes. In 
decentralisation, active citizenry is very important in the sense that the objective of 
decentralisation is to bring government closer to the people (Makumbe 1996). 
Decentralisation calls for increased participation of citizens in activities of the state which 
traditionally formed part of the public sphere (Gaventa and Valderama 1999: 4).  
This study seeks to examine how the issue of citizen participation plays out in the event of 
disjuncture in the state. The specific questions to be answered are: What are the forms and 
outcomes of community participation in local government in Harare? How is accountability 
to the citizenry by the local state feasible in the context of unshared vision? The assumption 
is that citizens find themselves caught amidst the political battles between the local state and 
central state with the result that their opinion and decisions on how the local state should 
function are discarded by both the central and the local state.  
2.8 Conclusion  
The objective of this research is to examine the effectiveness of these institutions, not only in 
supporting the values and principles of democracy but to focus on understanding the impact 
of the institutional framework and various actors on decentralisation. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, the research area, the political system is shifting from a highly centralised 
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socialist leaning form of government to a neoliberal political system bordering on 
dictatorship. How the state has evolved and how accommodative it is in relinquishing power 
to local communities during decentralisation needs to be carefully examined. It is also 
imperative to analyse how the state institutions and the various actors have transformed from 
being centrally controlled to being decentralised. One of the challenges of this study was to 
design a research methodology to examine the various components which influence the 
outputs and outcomes of decentralisation. The most suitable approach was deemed to be 
critical realism. The next chapter presents the research methodology of this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
“Social scientists are obligated to use the findings of context-based enquiry to change 
the social world in such a way as to bridge the gap between knowing and doing which 
should in turn lead to emancipation”. Bhaskar (1989: 90) 
3.1 Introduction  
In order to understand the methodological approach described in this chapter, it is pertinent to 
reiterate the objectives of this study so that the methodology presented here is understood in 
its context. This study seeks to understand the nature of local government in Zimbabwe, in its 
political, socio-economic, cultural and prevailing state political context. It seeks to examine 
the impact of potential ‘unshared vision’ in local and central government spheres in the event 
that the political parties controlling the two spheres of government are different. It also seeks 
to examine the guarantees on service delivery and community participation in 
decentralisation. The approach to this study is to specifically focus on the municipality or 
council as a unit of local government hence the focus on the City of Harare.  
The study also seeks to map out the different levels and extent of ‘unshared vision’ in the 
politics of decentralisation of governance and service delivery. The ‘unshared vision’ in 
terms of this research refers to the pragmatic party political stalemates as well as unshared 
vision in terms of party political differences in ideology, policy and practise. The study is 
mainly focused on understanding the mechanism controlling decentralisation in the City of 
Harare and to examine whether differences in which political parties control the central and 
local state have any impact on how the decentralised institution operates and its outcomes.  
This chapter begins by outlining the philosophy of research adopted for this study which is 
critical realism. It then outlines the study context, research design, sampling and sampling 
methods, and data collection methods and data analysis. The later sections of this chapter 
discuss the limitations and delimitations of this study. There is also a section which deals 
with the reliability and validity of the data.  
3.2 Research philosophy 
The research approach to decentralisation until recently has focused on the various 
components of decentralisation (fiscal, political and administrative), separating these as if 
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they are closed and completely isolated from each other in local authorities. This is because 
decentralisation is not confined to one discipline, hence varying approaches to its 
understanding. The approach to decentralisation was to examine it in an ‘objective’ way and 
some of the studies employed approaches which only focused on the system of 
decentralisation (legal set up and the policy framework) in Zimbabwe. Scholars such as 
Chakaipa (2010), Coutinho (2010), Helmsing et al (1991), Mtisi and Nicol (2003) and 
Chitsike (2000) pursued this kind of approach in decentralisation. Such studies portrayed the 
actors as rational professional individuals who act according to the confines of legal and 
policy frameworks hence these studies treated the actors involved in decentralised institutions 
as objective not subjective. This study will take an approach which goes beyond the legal and 
policy framework of decentralisation in the City of Harare; the approach is aimed at 
examining the subjectivity of the actors in decentralisation and their influence on the 
outcomes of decentralisation.  
The approach to this study is guided by the quest to achieve a holistic understanding of the 
dynamics of decentralisation in local authorities in Zimbabwe with a special reference to the 
City of Harare. Based on past studies on decentralisation it is acceptable to argue that 
decentralisation in the African context is marked by fluidity and unpredictability. Approaches 
to decentralisation which are successful in one country are not necessarily successful in 
another country; studies in Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe revealed that despite following 
a similar model of decentralisation the outcomes are different. It only seems logical that new 
directions in decentralisation research should point towards alternative philosophical 
approaches that aim to simultaneously critique orthodox approaches as well as give voice to 
the silent and marginalised stakeholders in decentralisation.  
In order to achieve the objectives of this research, the paradigm of critical realism is adopted 
as the analytical/philosophical basis of this research. Critical realism was introduced by Roy 
Bhaskar in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Potomaki 2003). Bhaskar (1986) argued that 
social scientists must be critical when explaining social practices, and this critique gives 
social science an emancipatory grapheme. Criticism brings to the fore the possibility of a 
better social reality as it exposes illusions and contradictions in social reality (Sayer 1997). 
While traditional theory is oriented only to understanding or explaining society, critical 
theory is a social theory that is aimed at critiquing and changing society as a whole (Sayer 
1997). According to Bhaskar (1989: 90), “social scientists are obligated to use the findings of 
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context-based enquiry to change the social world in such a way as to bridge the gap between 
knowing and doing which should, in turn, lead to emancipation”. 
The adoption of critical realism philosophy in this study enabled the researcher to address the 
high level of vicissitude in decentralisation. According to Kitchen and Tate (2000: 15), 
realists want to find out what produces changes, what makes things happen, and what allows 
or forces changes. Critical realists believe that there are many dimensions of social reality – 
the surface dimension we see and the other layers we cannot see. Egbo (2005: pg? ), 
emphasised this by pointing out that the philosophy of critical realism transcends surface 
appearances and aims to reveal enduring social structures that ratify special interests and the 
status quo in society. It is imperative for critical realists to dig deeper and unravel the other 
dimensions and mechanisms (causality) controlling social reality. In order to achieve this, 
there is a need to penetrate the surface layers of social reality and unearth the underlying 
relationships that determine the real characteristics of decentralisation in the City of Harare. 
Following the tenets of critical realism, the aim of this research is to unravel decentralisation 
as informed by institutional practice and politics, as well as context or circumstances.  
The main argument of this research is that what is being seen in decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe is a façade,  and that there are many dimensions or mechanisms that control 
decentralisation that are not visible. The current social reality in decentralisation is as a result 
of processes and practises that are hidden beneath this facade. It is, therefore, important to 
move from surface structure of decentralisation to the underlying mechanisms by which 
decentralisation is maintained. If decentralisation has to be examined under the philosophical 
framework of critical realism, then it can be assumed that reality in decentralised institutions 
is constructed from the struggles of those with power in society. This could mean that 
decentralisation serves the interests of those in power because they manipulate and condition 
other actors involved in decentralised institutions to accept their reality as correct. This in 
turn creates a false consciousness which people accept as being natural. Consequently, they 
unconsciously reproduce the social structure that governs them (Long and Long 1992). It is, 
therefore, the responsibility of the researcher to employ research methods which enable 
examination of the various factors and mechanisms of decentralisation; and how these 
factors, ideologies, and mechanisms shape the outcomes of decentralisation. The main 
argument is that the actions of the actors cannot be explained by structural logic alone.  
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3.2.1 Research context 
The background of the research area, Zimbabwe and the City of Harare is fraught with 
political polarity. Several academic and media reports have highlighted Zimbabwe as a 
dictatorial state with various instances of abuse of power and political violence meted out to 
those with different political views mainly during the election period. Makumbe (2009: 9) 
agrees with this perspective, saying: “Confronted with the inevitable prospect of losing 
political power, since early 2000 the ZANU-PF regime has transformed Zimbabwe into a 
fascist state where the rule of law is not only selectively applied, but new and effectively 
draconian legislation is generated and used as a tool of repression”. From personal experience 
in Zimbabwe, there is fear within the general public to discuss politics in public. In most 
cases, people are afraid of showing their political allegiance/preference, even during the 
period of calmness. The main reason why people are afraid is that they do not want to be 
labelled as belonging to a certain political party. Political labelling can result in political 
violence during election periods and exclusion from ruling party initiated activities. Even 
political paraphernalia like T-shirts of certain political parties are not worn publicly, there is a 
local saying in Shona which says “Hembe dzemusangano ndedzekurara nadzo kwete 
kufamba nadzo pachena” which, loosely translated, means that political paraphernalia is only 
good as pyjamas, and it is not to be displayed in public. There is also a general suspicion that 
the majority of the senior local and central state officials are politically partial and support 
ZANU PF. What is not clear is whether they are actually ZANU PF or do they just put a 
façade to save their jobs? In this context, my research design had to be cautious in terms of 
ethics and, in particular, confidentiality of responses, and safety of respondents. In addition, 
the design had to deal with how to minimise political bias or plain reservation of responses 
for fear of politics.  
3.2.2 Research design  
In order to achieve the objectives of this study under the theoretical framework of critical 
realism, mixed methods were employed in this study. Although mixed methods were used, 
this study was heavily influenced by qualitative methods. As a critical realist, the argument 
for this approach was that unlike quantitative methods, qualitative methods refuse to bury the 
‘voice’ of the of the research subjects beneath the piles of anonymous standardised data 
(Roberts 2014). Therefore, the quantitative data that was collected was not used to generalise 
the study, but to triangulate and bolster the rich qualitative data collected.  
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The mixed method approach provided a platform in this research to use “multiple sources of 
information from multiple approaches to gain new insights” (Axinn and Pearce 2006: 1) into 
how decentralisation operates in the City of Harare. The quantitative component of the 
research involved the collection and analysis of demographic and related data from the 
councillors. The reason for collecting this data is that previous research on decentralisation in 
the city of Harare cited lack of skills, experience, and advanced educational qualifications as 
the reasons for the failure of local authorities to deliver services. This data was used for 
triangulation purposes with the in-depth inquiry component of the study. The qualitative 
aspect of the study focused on unravelling the mechanisms driving social reality in 
decentralisation. The qualitative in-depth inquiry was aimed at various stakeholders involved 
in decentralisation in Harare. The aim was to examine and gain an understanding of why 
stakeholders act in a particular way.  
A combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques in this study reveal the illusions, 
contradictions and areas of concordance (through triangulation) of perspectives in the 
understanding of the mechanisms influencing social reality in the City of Harare. As will be 
highlighted in the results and discussion chapters, the mixed methods approach managed to 
remove the façade covering the mechanisms driving decentralisation in the City of Harare. 
This study confirmed the view of Axinn and Pearce (2006: 27) that by using mixed method 
approaches that integrate different types of data collection methods, investigators have a 
greater opportunity to both discover and document the mechanisms responsible for a 
particular causal relationship, such as those involved in decentralisation in the City of Harare  
The study was divided into two parts. The first part was descriptive/ exploratory in nature. 
The exploratory phase of this research explored the historical development and context of 
decentralisation in Zimbabwe. This phase was made up of three main time periods: the 
colonial period, post-colonial (1980-2001) and the advent of unshared vision (2002-present). 
The focus was on service delivery, governance functions and the developmental agenda of 
the local government in Zimbabwe. These functions were explored while focusing on the 
relationship between central government, local government and local citizens in Harare.  
The second part of the research was the interpretive phase. The objective of the interpretive 
phase was to interpret the relationship between central government, local government and the 
local community in Harare. The interpretation was done in a streamlined way by focusing on 
only two functions of local government in Zimbabwe, namely, development (service 
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delivery) function and governance function. The rationale for selecting these two main 
functions is that governance defines the official and unofficial procedure of administering 
decentralisation and the development function defines the service delivery which is the end 
product of decentralisation. In the process of examining outputs or outcomes of 
decentralisation and testing whether it works, specific cases of governance and service 
delivery were observed and discussed.  
3.3 Sampling 
Sampling was designed after careful consideration of other studies on decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe. The approach by several studies in decentralisation is to focus on the 
decentralised institution (local authority) as a unit of study without considering other 
stakeholders who are not within and who act outside the decentralised institution but have a 
critical influence on the affairs of the institution. This approach in most cases fails to examine 
and present a holistic approach to decentralisation. Research in decentralisation should not be 
focused only on the local authority as the ability of local authorities to deliver services must 
not be isolated from the influence of national state politics and the residents who are the 
receivers of the services.  
This study took a slightly different approach to investigating decentralisation by including a 
variety of stakeholders in decentralisation. The target of the study was not the decentralised 
institution alone but the broader system, framework and actors of decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe. The focus was not only to focus on the current system of decentralisation but also 
the historical context of decentralisation. As revealed in this study the historical context of 
decentralisation played a major influence on the current system of decentralisation.  
3.3.1 Sampling methods  
This study adopted a purposive sampling technique to create a qualitative sample. In 
purposive sampling, the goal is to select a sample relevant to the research objectives. A 
purposive sampling procedure was applied to the senior officials from central state and local 
state, residents of Harare and civil society. The objective was to sample officials in these 
institutions who are responsible and influence the operations of the City of Harare. Within the 
City of Harare, the target was senior officials from the following administrative departments: 
Town Clerks’ office, Corporate Services and Housing, Finance, Harare Water, Works, Health 
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Services, and Human Capital and Public Safety. The approach was to target those officials 
who sit on the city’s Council Committees and are responsible for governance and service 
delivery functions within the city. All the elected City of Harare councillors were included in 
the final sample. Data collection from the central state was targeted at the officials from the 
ministry controlling local government in Zimbabwe. The approach focused on those officials 
responsible for supervision of urban local authorities in Zimbabwe.  
The sampling for the residents of the City of Harare was done through infusing aspects of 
quota sampling into purposive sampling. Quota sampling can be defined as a method of 
choosing participants with certain characteristics. The objective of residents’ sampling was to 
capture a sample which represented the socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of the 
population of the City of Harare. The objective was not to generalise the research findings but 
to acquire an in-depth understanding of the residents’ views on governance and development 
/ service delivery in light of how vision is shared. The residents were chosen according to the 
ward which they come from. Gender representative was taken into consideration in the 
selection of the residents’ sample; the objective was to strike a balance between males and 
females. The targeted residents were those of voting age, particularly those with the ability to 
speak on behalf of their households and communities. The strategy was to divide the electoral 
wards into high income, middle income and low income. The sample size was determined by 
the level of theoretical saturation. Purposive sampling was used to select the civil society 
organisations which are involved in governance and service delivery in the City of Harare. 
During the exploration of this study, it was discovered that they are two main civil society 
groups which purport to represent the residents of Harare in local government.  
There was no need to apply any sampling techniques for the quantitative aspect of the study 
as the target population was all the 46 City of Harare councillors. The objective was to 
administer the questionnaire to all the councillors thereby collecting demographic and related 
data. Within the questionnaire, there were also open-ended questions which were not 
analysed as quantitative data but as qualitative data. From the total population of the City of 
Harare, certain councillors were selected for in-depth inquiry using the following criteria: 
councillors who were chairpersons of council committees, political affiliation and their 
position in the party hierarchy. The summary of the total sample for this study is presented in 
Table 1.  
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3.4 Data collection methods  
To achieve the objectives of this research, there was a need to collect data from both primary 
and secondary sources. Understanding decentralisation in Harare required the collection of 
the following textual data for analysis: 
 National government policy documents;  
 National legislations on local government; 
 Council committee minutes;  
 Council meeting minutes;  
 Local government policies of political parties represented in the City of Harare 
council; and  
 Central government directives documents. 
These documents were used to ascertain the practical manifestation of decentralisation at 
local and national level. Journal and newspaper articles also provide another critical source of 
data for this study.  
3.4.1 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data from administrative officials, elected 
local ward representatives and local community samples (See Annexures B and C). At central 
and local state level the focus for the in-depth inquiry was administrative officials who were 
responsible for service delivery and governance functions. It was also necessary to evaluate 
their views on governance coordination in the decision-making process and their relationship 
with the elected councillors. The interviews were mainly conducted with senior officials who 
interact with the councillors and those who are the link between the City of Harare and the 
ministry of local government. For the purposes of confidentiality and ethical considerations, 
the specific department which the senior officials represented were not identified in the 
findings section because of the sensitivity of the responses. Instead, a general term of ‘senior 
administrative official’ was used.  
Local ward councillors in the City of Harare are crucial to the operations of the city. They are 
an integral part of the governance structure and are a link between the city and the residents 
of Harare. Since this research focuses on ‘unshared vision’ (2002-present), it was imperative 
for this research to collect data from the current representatives so that a clear understanding 
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of ‘unshared vision’ in local government could be achieved. The target was to collect data 
from the local elected representatives using a semi-structured questionnaire (see Annexure 
A). In-depth interviews were conducted with Harare City council committee chairpersons 
since they were likely to provide information on the impact of decentralisation on the 
performance of specific mandates.  
Residents of the City of Harare were sampled for an in-depth inquiry. The initial strategy was 
to recruit residents who were part of community leadership in various wards. The recruitment 
strategy was supposed to have been done through referral systems by the elected ward 
councillors. The initial justification for the use of local elected ward councillors was that they 
are knowledgeable of their wards, so they understand the social movements and community 
leaders with views which represent their communities. During fieldwork I discovered that 
residents in wards were not organised in forums or social movements, instead, the ward 
councillors were referring me to party political ward structures. Social movements are 
important in the sense that they act as avenues where prodemocracy skills and attitudes are 
learnt (Matte and Bratton 2007: 198; Sachs 2003). A decision was made to not have an in-
depth inquiry with political party ward leadership because of their potential bias. A new 
strategy was developed to carefully select residents who were knowledgeable and conscious 
about the issues of governance in the City of Harare. During the selection, a conscious effort 
was made to maintain a fair distribution of the selected sample across the low, middle and 
high-income areas. The target was not to quantify the data collected but to get an in-depth 
understanding of community perspectives on decentralisation and unshared vision in Harare. 
The instrument which was used to collect data from the local community members was a 
semi-structured interview schedule.  
3.4.2 Focus groups 
It is important to note that I also considered using the focus group approach in soliciting 
community views but decided not to pursue it for the following reasons. It is important to 
note that the level of political polarity in Zimbabwe between the ruling party and the 
opposition is so high that people are not willing to show which party they actually support in 
public. From personal experience, people will only show their political party preferences one-
on-one when they are with people they can trust. I was doubtful that a focus group on issues 
to do with governance would yield anything more than potential conflict. After careful 
consideration of context, I was not prepared to take the risk. Another consideration was that 
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by virtue of discussing politics in a focus group with a variety of people I could not guarantee 
confidentiality and the safety of the participants in the focus group setting hence I made a 
decision to pursue individual in-depth individual interviews with the residents.  
Data was collected from in-depth interviews with civil society groups operating in Harare. 
The civic groups in Harare are in the form of resident associations and resident trusts with a 
focus on governance and service delivery issues both at local and national government level. 
Thus, a balance of perspectives from formal governance structures as well as interest groups 
from civil society was solicited. Field observations also complimented the various sources of 
data collected for this study. Tables 1 and 2 show the various sources of data collection and 
compare the targeted and realised interviews.  
Table 1: Sample for structured instrument  
Name of stakeholders  Target responses Actual responses 
MDC councillors  40 33 
ZANU PF Councillors 6 3 
Total (structured instrument) 46 36 
 
Table 2: Semi structured interviews sample 
Type of Respondent  Target responses Actual responses 
Chairpersons of committees (Councillors) 5 5 
Civic organisations:    
HRT
13
 1 1 
CHRA
14
 1 1 
Administrators:    
Ministry of Local Government  3 4 
City of Harare  7 5 
Community Members:    
High density (low income)  5 12 
Middle density (Middle income) 5 8 
Low density (High income) 5 9 
Total interviews  32 45 
 
Some challenges were experienced when doing fieldwork especially with getting hold of 
councillors for the administration of the structured questionnaire. The target was to 
administer the structured questionnaire to all the councillors in the City of Harare but only 36 
were willing and had time for the structured interview. It is important to note that most of the 
                                                 
13
 Harare Residents Trust. 
14
 Combined Harare Residents Association. 
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administrative officials were not comfortable with the recording of the interview despite the 
assurances of confidentiality. The main argument which one official offered is that the 
research topic was too political and the general perception is that people were not prepared to 
discuss political issues with strangers let alone being recorded while doing so. Most of the 
administrative officials were of the opinion that the research topic was important as it had the 
potential to inform decision making on decentralisation in Zimbabwe hence their interest in 
participating in the study.  
3.5 Data analysis  
Data analysis for this study was guided by critical realism methodology which aims at a 
detailed description of ideology, circumstances, context and dynamics of decentralisation, in 
order to understand how the observed events can be explained (Bygstad and Munkvold 2011: 
3). The first step for data analysis was to describe the structures of decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe and place them in their context i.e. the socio-economic, political and cultural 
environment. The second step of data analysis was to describe the mechanisms
15
 which lead 
to certain outcomes in decentralisation, bearing in mind that the outcomes of mechanisms are 
contextual, meaning that a mechanism may produce a certain outcome in one context but a 
different outcome in another context (Smith 2008). This understanding has been the main 
characteristic of decentralisation in Africa where similar structures and policy frameworks of 
decentralisation are producing different outcomes in different countries because of the 
differences in context. This view influenced how data in this study was analysed.  
Since this study adopted a mixed methodology, the challenge was to balance data analysis 
methods. According to Mouton (2001: 105), data analysis involves breaking up the data into 
manageable themes and patterns, trends and relationships in order to understand it. The 
approach in this study was to analyse the quantitative and qualitative data separately. The 
approach was to later combine the analysed data during the interpretation phase of the 
analysis. Quantitative data was analysed through the use of descriptive statistics. Data from 
structured questions was coded and entered into Excel spreadsheet. Frequencies and 
summaries were then produced mainly on demographic data, experience, educational 
                                                 
15
 A mechanism, thus defined, refers to a constellation of entities and activities that are organized such that they 
regularly bring about a particular type of outcome, and one can explain an observed outcome by referring to the 
mechanism by which such outcomes are regularly brought about (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). 
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qualifications of councillors, gender, political affiliation and so forth This made it possible 
for me to have an understanding of the current description of the governance composition and 
structure of the City of Harare.  
Qualitative data analysis was guided by the philosophy of research of critical realism and of 
holism. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, the approach adopted was that data 
was analysed during data collection where it was organised and evaluated and then used for 
further data collection. This process was repeated until saturation was achieved. The 
advantage of using this method is that it “allows the researcher to refine, confirm and test the 
validity of the conclusions drawn so far, establish commonalities and eliminate cases, leading 
to a degree of consistency” (Sarantakos 2012: 345). The final refined analysis was prepared 
after completing all the data collection. The main approach for analysis was interpretative 
analysis being careful to not merely replicate the façade of the social reality of 
decentralisation in Zimbabwe.  
In order to achieve the objectives of this research through critical realism, popular approaches 
to qualitative data analysis data coding were not used. Coding data decontextualizes and 
fragments data, therefore distorting the richness and complexity of the data produced during 
interviews. I adopted the process of indexing segments of the data collected. Indexing is 
defined as the process of assigning several non-exclusive index codes brought up in the 
interview (Crinson 2001). This ensured that the data was analysed in its context and was not 
fragmented. During the final analysis, care was taken to ensure that the interpretation of the 
data combined both the quantitative and qualitative data. In chapter 7 a case study is 
presented to examine public participation within the context of budget formulation process in 
the City of Harare.  The case study adopted a research design which ensured that various 
sources and methods were used to collect data from different social actors. The data 
collection methods used include; observations of budget consultative meetings, document 
analysis (both primary and secondary) and unstructured interviews with city officials and 
residents. Data collection was done in a systematic way; the first step was to perform a 
document analysis from both primary sources and secondary sources. The documents 
analysed include City of Harare pre-budget statements, actual budget, public participation 
policy, City of Harare election reports, and local government policies which have an impact 
on the affairs of the City of Harare directly and indirectly.  
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 After document analysis, the second step was to conduct observations of the consultative 
meetings. In order to address the issue of validity, this researcher used an observation 
schedule with predetermined key components for observation these components were mainly 
descriptive. I also recorded my reflective information during the observations. The 
observations were also done covertly so there was no procedural reactivity amongst the 
respondents. During the observations, this researcher also managed to identify to participants 
for the in-depth unstructured interviews which were conducted after the consultative 
meetings.  The target was to interview at least 3 attendees of the consultative meetings per 
ward. The researcher also purposefully selected those who did not attend the consultative 
meetings and asked them only two questions which are: why did they not attend the meeting 
and what was their opinion on the budget consultation process? Data analysis was done using 
the same strategy employed in the broad study.  
3.6 Limitations and delimitations  
In cognisance of the political situation in Zimbabwe, the major limitations of this research 
were related to the political polarity and a tendency of secrecy by the state. The thrust of this 
research design was to find research methods which would produce valid findings amidst 
political polarity and the reluctance to discuss politically orientated research topics. In a 
perfect democracy, focus group discussions amongst Harare residents would be an ideal 
method of collecting data from community members. In the case of this research, although 
focus group discussions even on mere service delivery issues were not suitable as they would 
have exposed the respondents to probable political labelling and persecution. There is a 
general trend in Zimbabwe whereby most of the citizens are not comfortable discussing 
politics in the presence of strangers or in public. I adopted individual interviews as the best 
approach for data collection as it afforded me the opportunity to build trust with interviewees 
so that they could respond to the research questions with confidence.  
In relation to local council representatives, previous research conducted in Zimbabwe on 
decentralisation tried to use focus groups as a method of data collection amongst councillors 
but this did not yield results. Councillors failed to turn up for scheduled focus group 
discussion. I opted for a questionnaire as an instrument of data collection amongst councillors 
because this approach afforded them the opportunity to fill in their responses privately at their 
own convenience. The questionnaire was designed in such a way that it collected highly 
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structured data and but also contained open-ended questions which elicited semi-structured 
data. The option of self-administering the questionnaires was acceptable to 22 councillors. In 
some cases, telephonic interviewing was used to clarify responses from self-administered 
questionnaires. In cases where I administered the questionnaire, I used the opportunity to 
probe further on open-ended questions thereby producing rich qualitative data and a deeper 
understanding of decentralisation in the City of Harare.  
A major limitation for researchers who do not have a proper background of the political 
system in Zimbabwe is that most responses from councillors are subjective since there is 
blame game between political parties hence most of the responses on face value absolves the 
political party represented by the respondent. To overcome this challenge and ensure the 
validity of the study, I adopted a strategy of conducting interviews after reviewing relevant 
secondary texts. This enabled me to probe using questions which unmasked the reality 
underlying the party political mantras. My background also played a critical role as I am able 
to speak the local language and had been a resident of Harare city for nearly ten years, 
therefore, understood the context underlying the responses.  
3.7 Conclusion  
Research on decentralisation in the African context should be tailored towards understanding 
the context in which decentralisation was implemented. There is a need for a holistic 
approach to decentralisation if the mechanisms influencing decentralisation are to be 
understood and impacts ascertained. Approaches which focus on particular aspects of 
decentralisation can be explored but one should be aware that there are other factors which 
influence the outcome of that aspect of decentralisation. This researcher is of the opinion that 
the best philosophy of research when holistically examining decentralisation is critical 
realism. The influence of central state politics must also be acknowledged when designing 
methodologies for decentralisation research. It is also important to ethically ensure that the 
respondents’ safety and confidentiality are assured especially in political environments 
characterised by high political intolerance.  
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CHAPTER 4 : A HISTORY OF 
DECENTRALISATION IN ZIMBABWE 
“By contradicting and destabilising African Councils the liberation struggle 
(essentially ZANU PF as de facto appropriator of a national process) installed 
structures around which early independence local government reforms were built. 
This sowed the seeds of party political appropriation of local government” (Chatiza 
2010: 5). 
4.1 Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is to provide the historical background and context of Zimbabwe as 
a country and how local government developed over the years. The chapter also examines 
how governance in Zimbabwe evolved from precolonial Zimbabwe to the present day 
governance structures. The focus is mainly on examining how the selected and specific 
events influenced the development of local government. The approach in this chapter is not to 
provide a detailed history of Zimbabwe, but to focus on significant developments which 
influenced the current processes and actors in local government. The first part entails an 
examination of the Zimbabwean state from the period of colonisation up to the present 
moment. The second part is a critical analysis of the events which have shaped the present-
day local government system in Zimbabwe. Throughout the chapter, I will argue that the 
present status of decentralisation in Zimbabwe was shaped by the country’s history. 
4.2 Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe  
Before the advent of colonialism, the present-day geographical area covered by Zimbabwe 
comprised of two powerful states. The last precolonial Shona state  was preceded by the   
Monomotapa state / empire which was in existence from 15
th
 century to the 18
th
 century 
(Pikirayi and Vogel 2002).   The empire was a Shona state stretched from the Zambezi River 
in the north to the Limpopo River in the South. The state also stretched eastwards to the 
Mozambican shores (Nyangoni 1978: 15). The Monomotapa state had its headquarters at 
Great Zimbabwe. The state was sustaining itself through peasant agriculture, mining, hunting, 
and trade (Auret 1990: 68). The state was also trading with the Portuguese who were 
domiciled on the shores of Mozambique. The state which succeeded the Monomotapa state 
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was the Rozvi state, which was also made up of mainly Shona. According to Arrighi and Saul 
(1973: 183), these states were highly centralised; with the King as the head of the state, 
residing at the headquarters of the state. The King was supported by various chiefs, whose 
responsibility was to help the King to rule. The chiefs were responsible for various tribes 
located across the kingdom. It is important to note that the traditional leadership formed a 
critical part of the religious beliefs of the Shona (Auret 1990). The chiefs and kings were 
regarded as the custodians of the Shona religious beliefs; hence traditional leadership and 
governance were synonymous with religious beliefs. It was during the Mfecane
16
 that the 
disintegration of the Rozvi state started. The Ndebele migrated from present-day South 
Africa and settled in the southwestern part of present-day Zimbabwe (Nyangoni 1978: 15). 
The Ndebele were led by Mzilikazi, a commander who had helped Shaka to establish the 
Zulu Kingdom (Phimister 1988).  
The Eastern part of the Rozvi state was cut-off from the present day Mozambican shores by 
another group moving away from South Africa during the Mfecane.  This group was led by 
Soshangane. The Rozvi state found itself sandwiched between states which were mainly 
known for their raids in the Shona occupied area. Because of the disintegration of the Rozvi 
state, the Ndebele overran several chieftainships and extracted tribute from them and the 
Shona became vassals. According to Bourne (2011: 6), ‘the Ndebele were extremely brutal in 
their raids on the Shona villages, slaughtering adults, enslaving children and capturing cattle 
and supplies’. The death of Mzilikazi in 1868 saw his son Lobengula ascending to the throne. 
A few years later, in 1890, the white settlers, through Cecil John Rhodes’ British Southern 
African Company (BSAC), tricked the King of the Ndebele, Lobengula to sign a mining 
agreement (Karumbidza 2009). Rhodes used the agreement as a tool to colonise not only the 
Ndebele state but also the areas occupied by the Shona. The territory colonised by Rhodes 
was named Southern Rhodesia or Rhodesia.  
4.3 Colonial period  
The colonial period in Rhodesia stretched from 1890 to 1980.  During the initial stages of 
colonisation until 1923, Rhodesia was under the administration of the BSAC.  Thereafter, the 
administration was handed over to an elected council which was led by a governor, Sir John 
                                                 
16
 A period of war and migration in Southern Africa (Hamilton 1995) 
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Chancellor (Nyangoni 1978). Rhodesia was governed by a governor until 1965 when the 
colony declared itself independent from Britain through the unilateral declaration of 
Independence in 1965. Like all the colonial states in Africa, the natives (blacks) had no 
voting rights and suffered from racial discrimination and disqualification from certain 
economic activities (Matumbike 2009). Inequality was entrenched through the enactment of 
several taxes for example dog, hut, dipping, poll taxes and so forth (Native Councils Act of 
1937). These were not easily accepted by the black natives of Rhodesia. Several 
chieftainships resisted these taxes but were subdued by the colonial government. The Budya 
people, who were living in the present day Mtoko district, resisted paying the taxes and were 
punished severely through the burning of their villages and crops, and taxes had to be paid 
with seized cattle and goats. The chief of this area, Chief Gurupira, was also fined additional 
cattle, and forced to supply 500 men to work in the mines (Phimister 1988). 
The taxes levied on blacks served two purposes; firstly, to fund the colonial administration 
(mainly serving the interests of the whites); and secondly, to compel blacks to  seek 
employment in mines, farms and industries controlled by the colonial masters; hence solving 
the problem of labour, as blacks were otherwise not willing to work for whites (Arrighi and 
Saul 1973: 184). The fact that it was the able-bodied males who temporarily migrated to seek 
employment meant that the influence of traditional leaders (chiefs and headmen) was 
reduced; leaving them to preside over mainly women and children
17
. This diminished their 
role as traditional leaders in resisting the colonial masters. The system was destructive to 
African family life and traditions (Bourne 2011). The migration of black males into urban 
areas encouraged a social change amongst Africans which threatened the authority of 
traditional leadership in Rhodesia.  
Another important issue was the introduction of Christianity through the early missionaries 
who were against the native traditional beliefs. The missionaries regarded the traditional 
African customs and practices as paganism. According to Auret (1990), the Shona were more 
amenable to being converted to Christianity; thus eroding traditional leadership in colonial 
Zimbabwe. The status of traditional leadership was also reduced by the colonial 
administrators who forced the traditional leaders to represent the interests of the colonial 
                                                 
17
 Culturally the Shona and the Ndebele are patriarchal, e.g. men are expected to lead in public in issues to do 
with religion, governance and household / homestead decisions although these issues are normally discussed 
with everyone in the household.  
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masters. Traditional leaders who refused were deposed and compliant leaders were installed 
instead (Chatiza 2010). While there are various cases/examples of the resistance by 
traditional leaders to colonial rule, they were not successful as they were not united and lived 
geographically far away from each other (Nyangoni 1978). It is important to note that the 
Shona and the Ndebele did not have a cordial relationship because of the periodic raids which 
were carried by the Ndebele among the Shona chiefs.  
The first large-scale resistance war was ignited by a Shona chief who refused to pay tribute to 
King Lobengula citing that he was no longer his vassal since he was now under the laws and 
rules set by the colonial settlers (Knight-Bruce 1892). In return, King Lobengula sent his 
army to punish the chief; causing disruption on settlers mining and other economic activities. 
The Shona chief protested to the colonial government who responded by ordering the 
Ndebele warriors to leave,  but they refused and clashes ensued, resulting in Lobengula 
suffering casualties (Nyangoni 1978). The impact of this was that during the Ndebele 
rebellion in 1896, all the colonial settlers were driven out of Matebeleland. However, this did 
not happen in the areas occupied by the Shona. The Shona chiefs, who were victims of 
Ndebele raids, were reluctant to join as the dominance of the Ndebele threatened a repeat of 
raids and brutality of the Ndebele warriors (Phimister 1988).  
It is also important to note that the Chiefs controlling the southern parts of the present day 
Zimbabwe were frequently raided, hence their relationship with the colonial settlers was 
better than with the Ndebele (Beach 1986). Because of this history, the Shona chiefs 
responded individually; making it easier for the colonial settlers to crush the resistance. It is 
important to note, that across the Shona chiefdoms the resistance was being spearheaded by 
religious leaders known as spirit mediums. Shona resistance ended when the spiritual leaders 
were executed. The whole process ultimately alienated the traditional leaders from their 
subjects (Pasteur 1999: 32). It can be argued that the traditional leadership lost its place in 
leading the resistance against colonial masters, and became pawns of the colonisers to further 
their interests.  
Colonial economic disenfranchisement and racial and land segregation led to a new resistance 
which was now centred on the urban blacks who were feeling the impact of colonial, racial, 
and other discriminatory laws.  They then mobilised themselves into an armed struggle which 
lasted from 1966 to 1980 (Nyangoni 1978). While the struggle was not being spearheaded by 
traditional leaders, they did, however, play a critical role in the guerrilla warfare waged by 
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the natives against the colonial administration (Auret 1990). The main objectives of the 
armed struggle were to reclaim land from white commercial farmers, end racial 
discrimination; thereby opening up not only the political space, but also access to 
opportunities for the natives in Zimbabwe. The struggle was backed by communist China, the 
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and eastern European countries; thus 
carrying a Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideology. The expectation was that the new 
government was going to remodel its state around Marxist-Leninist Socialism (Davies 1988). 
The struggle for independence also saw a split in ZANU which started when  disagreements 
on strategy emerged, and ending up being fashioned along tribal lines. While ZANU PF 
emerged from the split as the party which was more easily identified with the Shona, ZAPU 
emerged as more aligned to the Ndebele. During negotiations for independence, these 
political parties participated individually.  
The armed struggle led to a negotiated settlement and elections in 1980. The ZANU PF won, 
with Robert Mugabe as the leader. The fact that independence came as a result of negotiated 
settlement, meant that the new Zimbabwe adopted a negotiated constitution. The negotiated 
constitution resulted in the new Mugabe government inheriting the colonial system of 
government with minimal changes. Of note was the issue of property rights which were left 
intact; thereby limiting land reform (Bourne 2011). The implication was that the government 
infused the capitalist economic policies of the colonial government with a few socialist 
interventions. This rendered the Mugabe government as reformist instead of socialist (Davies 
1988).  
4.3.1 Colonial local government system 
The colonial era in Zimbabwe contributed in one way or the other to the development of the 
current local government system. As discussed earlier, Zimbabwe was under British colonial 
and settler rule from 1890 to 1980. There are events which happened during the colonial and 
post-colonial period which were critical in formulating the current local government 
institutional framework. The aim of presenting the historical background is to explain the 
major events which influenced the current dispensation of local government in Zimbabwe. 
The focus is only on those historical events that influenced the current system of local 
government. I argue that it is important to historically contextualise local government in 
Zimbabwe for an understanding of the mechanisms driving local government.   
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The colonial history of Zimbabwe shows that the first urban council was set up in 1891. This 
was the Salisbury Sanitary Board (Makumbe 1998). Salisbury is now known as Harare and is 
the capital of Zimbabwe. The Town Management Ordinance of 1894 saw the establishment 
of more sanitary boards such as the Bulawayo and Victoria
18
 Sanitary Board. These Sanitary 
Boards were being set up in those urban areas where the Settler Pioneer Column made 
stopovers when they arrived in Zimbabwe during colonisation. During the setting up of urban 
areas, the colonial government, through the Municipal Ordinance of 1897, defined urban 
areas as areas inhabited by at least 25 non-Africans
19
, of which half are supposed to be male 
employed in industries; not in agriculture (Wekwete 1987: 4). This definition disregarded 
precolonial cities which were already there before the arrival of the white settlers. The 
colonial urban and rural councils (Sanitary Boards) were mainly governed by applying racial 
segregation policies which treated the blacks as second class citizens with no apparent rights 
to chart their own developmental agenda. The colonial government created two systems of 
government, with the whites having a self-governing system, and the native population 
having a different system (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). The colonisers designed a self-
governing system of local government for themselves and a separate system for the native 
black population. While blacks in Zimbabwe suffered social and political exclusion in local 
government, whites enjoyed self-governance (Chatiza 2010: 3). The existence of local 
government in black areas in colonial Zimbabwe, as deduced from the Native Councils Act 
of 1937, was mainly as a result of the need by the colonial government to ensure that black 
areas continued to be subservient to the white colonial government. The main objective of the 
local government in black areas was to facilitate the extraction of resources which in turn, 
benefited the colonial government. There was no intention of initiating real development in 
the black inhabited areas (Matumbike 2009: 5). The system ensured that both in urban and 
rural areas, black residential areas were set up with a view to supplying labour to white areas. 
The main objective of the colonial powers was to control and subjugate the natives through a 
perverted system of local government. There was unwillingness to let local authorities 
become spaces which local communities could use to gain power and independence 
(Prud’homme 2003: 18) 
                                                 
18
 Present-day City of Masvingo. 
19
 Non Africans referred in this case were whites. 
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4.3.1.1 Colonial rural local government 
Local government in rural areas started in 1923 with the establishment of Native Councils 
which were responsible for the political administrative function of black areas (Mutizwa-
Mangiza 1991). This was in response to the BSAC relinquishing its administrative powers. 
The Native Councils Act of 1937 gave birth to Native councils which were composed of 
traditional leaders, chiefs, headmen and black nominees nominated by the traditional leaders. 
As discussed earlier, traditional leaders were expected to be compliant to the demands of 
colonial administration. Non-compliance was punishable by removal from traditional 
leadership position or fines. It has to be noted that the traditional leaders did not have 
absolute power over the areas that they presided over, but were mere proxies of white 
administrators.  Hence decision making was not within their reach but a preserve of the white 
administrators. Besides the native councils, white rural areas were governed through a Road 
Committee, which was responsible for facilitating the development of roads and other related 
infrastructure in the white rural areas (Matumbike 2009). The impact of Road Committees 
was that white rural areas were developed with better roads and infrastructure compared to 
black rural areas. This resulted in uneven development, thereby entrenching inequality. Until 
1966, white rural areas were still being governed through Road Committees. The Rural 
Councils Act of 1966 resulted in the formation of councils which were specifically for white 
commercial farmers (Matumbike 2009: 9).  
In rural areas, the local government was divided into two institutions according to racial lines. 
Various land segregation acts enacted during the colonial period namely, Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930, Land Tenure Act of 1969 and Land Husbandry Act of 1951, 
meant that whites and blacks lived in different areas.  While the whites mainly occupied 
prime land which was used for commercial farming and mining, blacks were compelled to 
live in areas which were reserves and made up of marginal land not suitable for agriculture. 
While, on the one hand more than one million Africans were allocated only 28 million acres 
of land, on the other 48 million acres of prime land was allocated to 50 000 white settlers in 
Rhodesia (Bourne 2011). This created inequality between white areas and black areas. The 
approach of the colonial government to white areas was that of facilitating development and 
optimising their economic activities (Nyangoni 1978). Infrastructure in black areas was 
barely available, and where it existed it was for facilitating the extraction of natural and 
human resources for the benefit of the colonial government (Feremenga 2005: 341). In black 
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areas, the approach was one of conquest and subjugation. The introduction of various pieces 
of legislation such as Land Apportionment Act of 1930 (barred blacks from owning land in 
urban areas), Land Tenure Act of 1969 and Land Husbandry Act of 1951 (unpopular land 
management legislation),  were not designed to ensure development but to ensure that black 
areas supplied labour to white areas and cities. Since blacks were allocated unproductive land 
in rural areas they were forced to supplement their agricultural production through selling 
their labour in white areas. The levying of various taxes in black areas further exacerbated the 
situation. It can be argued that the colonial period saw the emergence of local government as 
a form of deconcentrated governance system;  tailored in such a way so that the institutions 
which it created resembled the white supremacist nature of the white colonial government 
(De Valk and Wekwete 1990: 88). The emerging system of local government was there to 
consolidate colonial central state power. 
What is important to note is that both in rural and urban areas, the white areas and black areas 
were governed separately; with the  black rural areas being governed through African 
Councils under the Ministry of Native Affairs. These Councils did not have any power to 
influence social and economic development issues in their areas; rather they were blunt 
instruments aimed at colonial political administration (De Valk and Wekwete 1990). The 
overall authority and power in the rural areas were in the hands of the District Commissioner 
who was appointed by the central government. In order to further colonial white interest the 
district commissioners were always white during the colonial period (Matumbike 2009). The 
government’s magistrates and police also worked towards this end (Beach 1986). This system 
was different from other British colonies elsewhere in Africa where a system of indirect rule 
using traditional authorities to govern, was applied (Bourne 2011).  
Traditional leaders also played a critical role in propping up the colonial government by 
acting as proxies of the colonial government. In colonial Rhodesia, traditional leaders were 
assigned small judicial and tax collection duties. Traditional leaders were ‘perverted’ to serve 
the needs of the colonial government (De Valk and Wekwete 1990: 88). Those who did not 
conform to the dictates of the colonial government were dethroned and replaced by docile 
compliant leaders. As discussed earlier, traditional leaders initially offered resistance, but 
because there was no coordinated resistance those who resisted were deposed, assassinated or 
fined heavily. Chief Makoni was deposed, defeated and executed when he launched 
resistance against the colonial government (Phimister 1988). As discussed earlier, the impact 
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of missionary education also eroded the power of the traditional leaders as they lost some of 
their religious reverence because of the spread of Christianity. An analysis by De Valk and 
Wekwete (1990) shows that by 1977, three years before the end of colonial era, about 50% of 
all councillors who were part of the African councils were appointed on the basis of being 
nominated by traditional leaders.  It can be assumed that docile traditional leaders will always 
recommend docile blacks to be councillors of the African Councils. However, while, they 
exuded docility in their dealings with the colonial administration, they harboured resentment 
of the colonial system; resulting in the majority of traditional leaders supporting the 
guerrillas/freedom fighters morally and materially during the armed struggle (Nyangoni 
1978).  
During the colonial period, there was no platform for blacks in rural areas to engage with the 
government in a meaningful way, because the relationship was that of the oppressor and the 
oppressed. Furthermore, the district commissioner represented the oppressor and the black 
rural dwellers represented the oppressed; the interaction was that of master and servants. 
Blacks were expected to be thankful even though they were fed crumbs from the colonial 
government table. According to Chatiza (2010), this type of relationship resulted in 
widespread resentment of the whole system of local government; thereby spurring black 
nationalists to use the discriminatory system of local government as a rallying point during 
the liberation struggle. The African Councils, and what they represented, became the target of 
attack during the liberation war by the nationalists. “By contradicting and destabilising 
African Councils the liberation struggle (essentially ZANU PF as de facto appropriator of a 
national process) installed structures around which early independence local government 
reforms were built. This sowed the seeds of party political appropriation of local 
government” (Chatiza 2010: 5).  
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the appropriation of local government is even 
present today, where local government is being used as a political tool to further the interests 
of the person wielding it. The view of ZANU PF is that local government must be 
accountable and must be used to further the agenda of central government. The events in the 
colonial rural areas had a major influence on how the new post-colonial government shaped 
its local government policies. The approach in post-colonial Zimbabwe was to make local 
government subservient to the central government and to some extent the ruling party 
(evidence of this will be discussed in the later sections of this chapter). Ironically, the post-
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colonial government was influenced by the approach taken by the previous colonial 
government since there were no intentions to make local government in the rural areas 
autonomous.  
4.3.1.2. Colonial urban local government 
During the colonial period, the same system of local government which was prevalent in the 
rural areas was at play in the urban areas. Therefore, urban areas resembled cities that were 
divided along racial lines; effected through the enactment of various pieces of legislation. The 
present day City of Harare was granted municipal status in 1897 through the Municipal 
Ordinance (Matumbike 2009: 11). Since Blacks were not considered permanent residents of 
urban areas, they were not afforded services that were on par with those provided for whites 
in the cities (Feremenga 2005: 344). Africans were also regarded as uneducated, backward, 
apathetic, and hence unable to make their own decisions. This led to the colonial government 
not providing Africans with the avenues to make decisions on their developmental 
aspirations.  
The passing of the Urban Areas Act of 1947 brought changes to all the urban areas in 
Zimbabwe. The act denied housing to unemployed blacks, put the responsibility of black 
workers housing on the shoulders of their employers, and categorised all females as minors 
who in addition, were not allowed to access housing without marriage (Raftopoulos and 
Mlambo 2009: 94). The Land Apportionment Act, which was amended in 1961 to 
accommodate the growing black population in urban areas, led to the development of black 
townships which were located far away from white areas and the city centre (Patel 1988: 21). 
The employers provided free housing for their employees which they had to vacate upon 
termination of employment; further  perpetuating inequality in terms of access to housing and 
introduced the issue that blacks were temporary residents of the city (Masvaure 2015). 
In 1973, the Urban Councils Act brought about changes to how the cities were governed. The 
act further entrenched racial segregation in the cities through the creation of African 
Advisory Boards which were responsible for the affairs of the blacks. The board created to 
give advice to the council on issues affecting black areas. The cities were divided into two 
areas; one for whites, where they enjoyed self-governance, and the other, which was 
governed by the African Advisory Board, was for blacks. The city council's representatives 
were elected using two distinct voters’ rolls, the white voters’ roll and the Advisory Board 
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Voters Roll. The councils’ white voters roll was made up of all white property owners, 
business owners and every white person who been resident in the city for at least three years. 
The Advisory Board Voters Roll was made up of blacks who either owned or rented 
accommodation and blacks who owned businesses in African areas (Chatiza 2010).  
What was peculiar about the voting system in cities was that the whites voted for direct 
representatives who sat on the council and made decisions, whilst the blacks voted for a 
representative who sat on the African Advisory Board. The board’s responsibility was to give 
advice, giving advice resulted in lack of accountability and acceptable decision making as 
advice can be accepted or rejected. The urban councils’ finances were also divided into two, 
one for white areas and the other for black areas. 
During the colonial period urban blacks did not have a direct say on how development was to 
be effected in their areas. In both urban and rural areas that were occupied by blacks, there 
was an increasingly centralised and authoritarian nature of local government. However in 
white Rural Councils and urban white areas there was a degree of autonomy in terms of how 
their areas were governed (Stewart, Klugman and Helmsing 1994: 5). In both rural and urban 
areas there was no active participation by blacks in the local government system. As 
discussed previously, the abuse of the local system in Zimbabwe by the colonial government 
created a deep resentment of the system of local government by liberation political parties 
and influenced how the post-colonial government dealt with local government reform. It is 
clear that the system of local government during colonial times created socio-economic and 
political inequality among different races. My personal observation shows that the inequality 
is still prevalent in all the urban areas in Zimbabwe. There was no effort to enforce good 
governance, democracy and advancement of blacks. Instead black people were expected to be 
passive recipients of services rather than initiators of the development process.  
4.4 Post-colonial period  
At the dawn of independence in 1980, one would expect the new Zimbabwe to become a 
fully socialist country with some traits of communism because of the support from eastern 
European countries and China. However, this did not happen. The land promised to the 
peasant farmers in the crowded rural areas was never redistributed with urgency. According 
to De Valk and Wekwete (1990), the struggle for an independent Zimbabwe was spearheaded 
by radical Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideologies which were against the preservation of the 
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interests of a minority. Makumbe (1998) argued that independence ushered in new governors 
who did not dismantle the colonial governance system. As a result, power was not restored 
entirely to the traditional leaders, but remained in the hands of the highly centralised state. At 
the present moment, Zimbabwe has around 250 traditional chiefs who are spread across the 
various rural districts and still regarded as the custodians of the customary law and practises 
(Makumbe 2010: 88). At independence, traditional leadership was stripped of the small 
judicial and tax collection duties which were then assigned to community courts and Rural 
District Councils respectively (Makumbe 2010). It is important to note that pre-colonial 
traditional leadership represented an independent form of authority; based on its own form of 
legitimation informed by customs and religion (De Valk and Wekwete 1990: 12) Traditional 
leadership, even in postcolonial Zimbabwe, is still appointed/ approved by the ministry 
responsible for local government. Traditional leaders also receive salaries from the central 
government (Alexander 2004). This means that traditional leaders are likely to support the 
government of the day. The approval and remuneration of traditional leadership by the state 
negatively affects the legitimation of the office of the traditional leaders. This argument is 
supported by Makumbe (2010: 92) who stated that the main reason why ZANU PF roped in 
traditional leaders in post independent Zimbabwe was that it felt it was losing power; hence 
the need to use the general acceptance of the traditional leader by the Zimbabwean population 
to its advantage.  
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the first decade of independence was mainly 
focused on addressing the inequalities created during the colonial period. There was social 
and infrastructural investment in rural and urban areas (Wekwete 1990). Since independence 
and after the new constitution was negotiated, the ZANU PF government was reluctant to 
make wholesale changes. Therefore, only a few reforms that aimed to address inequality were 
implemented, such as the use of government subsidies on basic services and goods. It was a 
period of political consolidation by the new government (Feremenga 1990). The second 
decade of independence resulted in the government shifting focus from addressing inequality 
to growing the economy and adopting policies that were aimed at transforming the state into 
a free market economy. The government found itself adopting Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs) tailored by international financiers IMF and WB (Mlambo 1997) to fund its national 
budget. While the pre-independence economy was tailored to support a small portion of the 
population (mainly whites), after independence, there was a need to find more resources to 
cater for the majority of the previously disadvantaged population. The Zimbabwean economy 
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couldn’t generate these resources, hence the adoption of SAPs. The adoption of SAPs 
resulted in the removal of subsidies as SAPs dictated that government reduce its expenditure. 
During the initial years of adopting SAPs, favourable economic growth was achieved but it 
was at the huge cost of increasing poverty. Discontent and protests started in urban areas and 
culminated in the formation of a stronger opposition party, the MDC, in 1999 (Bond and 
Manyanya 2003).  
The formation of a stronger opposition resulted in ZANU PF being challenged politically at 
the national level and also at the local government level. Nationally ZANU PF won 62 of the 
120 contested parliamentary seats in the general elections in 2000, while the MDC won 58 
seats. This was unprecedented in the sense that up until then ZANU PF had enjoyed a more 
than 90% majority in parliament. ZANU PF’s seats in parliament were boosted to 92 seats by 
a constitutional requirement which mandated the president to appoint extra 20 members of 
parliament; and an additional 10 seats were reserved for provincial governors. At the local 
level, ZANU PF lost all the major urban areas in Zimbabwe; resulting in the ruling party 
mainly controlling on the rural local authorities. In response to the strong opposition ZANU 
PF increased its grip on the central state and branded the MDC as a project of the imperialists 
with the objective of destabilising the state. The ruling party used this as a justification to use 
state institutions to fight the opposition political party (Bond and Manyanya 2003). This sets 
the scene for this study where the ruling party was using the state institutions to fight a 
powerful opposition in local government institutions.  
4.4.1 Post-colonial local government system 
In order to understand the post-colonial government in Zimbabwe, it is important to divide 
the post-colonial period into two eras, the first decade of independence (from 1980-1990) and 
the post-1990 era. The first decade of independence marked several reforms which were 
aimed at addressing the dual system of local government which was installed by the colonial 
government. It was also a period of consolidating political power by the new post-colonial 
government. The post-1990 era of Zimbabwe saw the influence of global players in local 
government in Zimbabwe which shaped the current local government institutional 
framework. 
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4.4.1.1. The first decade of independence  
The end of the colonial period in 1980 saw the central government focusing on local 
government as a sphere for promoting socio-economic development and addressing social 
inequality created during the colonial era. The approach of the new post-colonial government 
was to focus on national issues first and then address the issue of urban and rural councils 
(Kamete 2003: 193). According to Wekwete (1994: 43) the long-term goal of the new 
government at independence was that of transforming a capitalist economy to a socialist one. 
Various pieces of legislation and policy directives were designed to address the rural and 
urban colonial imbalances of local government. The post-colonial government treated the 
rural and urban local government differently. In order to analyse the post-colonial local 
government effectively, it is prudent to separate the rural local government system from the 
urban one.  
4.4.1.2. Post-colonial rural local government  
Immediately after taking over power the ruling party ZANU PF government made changes to 
the local government structure in rural areas. The changes were tailored towards a 
representative democracy which was implemented nationally at independence. The first 
action was the passing of the District Councils Act (1980), which enabled the amalgamation 
of the 220 African Councils into fifty-five district councils (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1990). This 
process was aided by the introduction of adult suffrage in voting for council representatives 
(ward based councillors). Voters were able to directly elect councillors to a district council. 
Traditional leaders were no longer nominating representatives of the council but were now ex 
officio members of the district councils (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). The removal of the 
traditional leaders’ powers was in response to their previous docile relationship with the 
colonial government. In rural areas, it was a first attempt to introduce participation of the 
voters into how their areas were governed. Even though rural residents were now 
participating in local government through the election of decision-makers, active 
participation was not necessarily achieved, since real participation is  a function of many 
other factors and not simply the election of decision makers (to be discussed in subsequent 
chapters).  
In terms of rural governance, post-1980 local government was initially coordinated by the 
ruling party local committees and cells; thereby playing the function of the state in the rural 
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areas. This was mainly because of the lack of trust between the new government and the 
bureaucratic officials who were installed by the colonial government (Alexander 2004: 196). 
The party committees shouldered the responsibility of distributing aid, reconstruction and 
communication with the central government; thereby bypassing the traditional leadership 
(Makumbe 1998). This type of involvement of the party committees can be used to interpret 
the political thinking of the new ZANU PF government. The socialist ideology of the post-
colonial government emphasised state control in all spheres of government; indicating an 
agenda of crafting a highly powerful centralised government. Although the government was 
under a parliamentary democracy, the actions of the central government (funding model, 
decision-making model, and direct control of local government by the central state) were 
aimed at creating a one party state with very little separation of responsibilities between the 
government and the ruling party (Compagnon 2011: 8). Ultimately, this approach had a 
greater bearing on the form and outcome of decentralisation in Zimbabwe.  
A very interesting fact is that it was only in 1988 that the new government, during the 
passing/enactment of the District Councils Act of 1980, incorporated the Rural Councils 
(councils responsible for rural white areas) into district councils. The practical 
implementation of the Rural District Act of 1988 only occurred in 1993, because of a conflict 
on how the resources and boundaries of the new system were to be aligned (Alexander 2004: 
196). The same system of local government which was used by the colonial government 
remained intact in white rural areas for thirteen years after the colonial era ended. The 
implication of not amalgamating the white area councils into district councils was that the 
black farm and mine workers remained disenfranchised, with no right to vote; despite the fact 
that they were the majority in these areas. This served to further perpetuate the colonial 
legacy in the new ‘independent’ Zimbabwe. The white Rural Councils, comprising mainly of 
commercial farming and mining areas, had a direct and important contribution to the national 
economy. These councils, unlike the black District Councils, retained their autonomy and 
independence. They were not dependent on central government resources. According to 
Stewart, Klugman and Helmsing (1994), the District Councils only managed to raise 15% of 
their revenue, while the rest was supplemented by the central state through sector ministries 
and government grants. This resulted in a parent-child relationship between the central state 
and District Councils (Matumbike 2009: 19).  
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In 1988, through the passing of the Rural District Council Act of 1988, the post-colonial 
government amalgamated the District Councils and the Rural Councils; forming the Rural 
District Councils (Stewart, Klugman and Helmsing 1994) which resulted in well serviced and 
resourced white areas being joined with poorly serviced and resourced black areas. The 
disenfranchised farm and mine workers gained voting rights which changed   the governance 
composition of former white Rural Councils as blacks were now in majority. They now had 
the opportunity of electing leadership resembling/representing their demographics. According 
to De Valk and Wekwete (1994), full amalgamation was only completed in 1993. 
During the first decade of independence in Zimbabwe, local government reform in rural areas 
was not a priority. As the new government was ushered in, its main objective was to 
consolidate political power first. Despite the piecemeal pieces of legislation to promote the 
end of racial discrimination in rural areas, the government did not commit to affording rural 
areas autonomy in local government. The central state retained the power to determine the 
development path which the rural areas were to take.  This resulted in local government in 
rural areas in the post-colonial era largely addressing bureaucratic directives from central 
government (Makumbe 1998: 39). Makumbe (1998) also noted that appointed officials at 
district councils were exercising more authority than elected representatives, because they 
were linked to the central government and were knowledgeable about the available resources.  
The central state failed to provide effective avenues for communities to be involved in 
decision making by not empowering the District Councils with resources. The various sectors 
had no ability to make decisions with financial implications at district level without 
consulting the parent ministry (Matumbike 2009). Thus the district council became just a talk 
shop, without any power and resources to implement its own decisions. It is evident that local 
government in rural areas remained centralised. 
4.4.1.3. Post-Colonial urban local government 
The initial step in the urban areas in Zimbabwe was the amendment made to the Urban 
Councils Act to address racial segregation in cities. The government approach was that of 
“growth with equity” as stipulated in the government’s 1981 economic policy Growth with 
equity: an economic policy statement published by the Government of Zimbabwe.  The post-
colonial state pursued economic growth, coupled with policies which were meant to address 
inequalities created by the colonial capitalist system. However, several scholars agree that the 
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ideological and political rhetoric of growth with equity was not transformed into practical 
turnabout of the political economy of the country (for example, Wekwete 1994; Makumbe 
1998; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009). 
In urban areas, the voting rights were amalgamated under a single adult suffrage (Matumbike 
2009). This means that for one to vote in the urban local government elections one needed to 
have attained 18 years of age and be resident in the concerned urban local authority area. The 
amalgamation resulted in the creation of one voters’ roll for each and every urban council; 
thereby discarding the colonial practise of dual voters’ roll and Advisory boards. According 
to Kamete (2003: 201), the reason that ZANU PF granted the universal suffrage in urban 
areas was because they wanted to stamp their political authority in divided urban areas; 
resulting in  composition of the city council changing with the majority of the representatives 
now coming from formerly black areas. This meant that they had more power to decide on 
the decisions regarding development and revenue accrued in the City of Harare (Matumbike 
2009). The post-colonial era also saw affluent blacks moving from townships to the affluent 
formerly white suburbs.  
The structure of urban councils from 1980 to 1990 was set in such a way that councillors 
were elected per ward and their term of office was for two years (Urban Councils Act 1980). 
All the urban councils were headed by a ceremonial mayor who was elected by the 
councillors during their first council meeting. According to the Urban Councils Act of 1980, 
the management of the urban councils was left to the Town clerk, whose position was 
equivalent to that of a chief executive officer in a private company. An interesting 
development in centre-local relations occurred in the City of Gweru in 1985, where the 
ministry of local government dismissed the ceremonial mayor (who was from the ruling 
ZANU PF); citing insubordination. In response to the dismissals, the ward councillors 
resigned en masse in solidarity with their mayor (Kamete 2003). This shows that the 
dismissals did not only start with the ascendance of the opposition in local authorities.  
With regard to the revenue of the urban areas, during colonial era, black areas in towns and 
cities were paying service levies instead of rates (Urban Councils Act 1973). This meant that 
the revenue emanating from the black areas were less, and not designed to cover the cost of 
proper service delivery (Coutinho 2010). At independence, the new government removed the 
financial divisions according to race in cities, thereby consolidating the revenue base for the 
whole urban area. However, black areas continued paying service levies instead of rates; thus 
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reducing the financial capacity of the urban areas and resulting in inadequate revenue for a 
proper service delivery (Matumbike 2009). This was further compounded by the socialist 
ideology of the government of not allowing urban councils to charge cost recovery rates for 
service delivery (Coutinho 2010). Consequently, the ability of the urban councils to maintain 
their infrastructure and provide better services was severely compromised. 
During the first decade of independence the relationship between the decentralised urban 
local authorities and the minister of local government can be regarded as cordial, However, 
the central government retained the colonial authority of approving levies and all the rates 
charged to the residents by these councils, as well as the approval of the cities’ annual 
budgets. The central ministry introduced a precondition that residents’ views on the budget 
should be elicited, before the annual budget is presented (Kamete 2003). However, there were 
no clear mechanisms to check if the consultation process was effective or mere tokenism. 
Centralisation of the decision-making process was also compounded by the amendment of the 
Urban Councils Act in 1995, which was   aimed at curbing abuses of council finances by the 
councillors and ensuring that certain decisions regarding council finances be approved by the 
local government ministry before implementation (Wekwete 1990). This could be seen as the 
continuation of centralisation of local government in Zimbabwe; leaving urban local 
authorities as mere deconcentrated structures or a field office of the ministry of local 
government.  
During the first decade of independence, local government was not effective. This was 
because the central state was too centralised to the extent that no substantive power was 
shared with local authorities. Rural local authorities depended on the central state for 
leadership and resources. Too much power was bestowed on the Minister of Local 
Government, to the extent that she/he could change the whole system at her/his will. The fact 
that communities/residents were not given the opportunity to participate actively in local 
government, resulted in local government institutions implementing the developmental 
aspirations of the central state, and not those of the people.  
4.4.2 Post-colonial provincial local government in Zimbabwe  
Significant developments in decentralisation were introduced in 1984 through a government 
policy document; termed the Prime Minister’s directive and authored by the then Prime 
Minister, Mr Robert Mugabe (Wekwete and Mlalazi 1990). This directive introduced two 
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new components to how the state was to be governed. While the first change was the 
introduction of provinces in Zimbabwe, the second introduced the notion of public 
participation in development planning.  
The directive further served to divide the country into eight provinces and in the process 
created an office of a provincial governor who was not only a political appointee of the 
central state, but also  the delegated head of government at the provincial level; reporting 
directly to the president (Government of Zimbabwe 1984). The office of the governor was 
equivalent to the office of a cabinet minister. The directive also created provincial councils 
which were legislated by the enactment of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act in 
1985. The provincial councils were mainly made up of appointed officials from various 
ministries and district councils. The main duty of the provincial council was to coordinate 
development planning in the relevant province (Wekwete 1994). 
The component of participatory planning was structured in such a way that it created a 
hierarchy of command from the village level to the national government level, with lowest 
structure of participatory planning being the Village Development Committee (VIDCO), 
followed by the Ward Development Committee (WADCO), and the District Development 
Council (DDC). The VIDCOs and WADCOs were formed by elected representatives in 
villages and wards respectively, with the expectation that the elected representatives were 
expected to prioritise issues in their committees. The expectation was that these structures 
would meet bimonthly and deliberate on developmental issues. The DDCs would consolidate 
the views from the lower structures and produce a district development plan which was then 
forwarded to the provincial council. It is important to note that the DDCs were made up of 
councillors. The majority of the members came from central government line ministries 
(Stewart, Klugman and Helmsing 1994) and who served in the council as deconcentrated 
authority with no binding decision-making authority.  
The major problem with the provincial setting was that it was more of a deconcentrated 
structure which depended heavily on central government funding for its programmes. This 
funding was not even structured in the form of grants, but rather was channelled through 
central government line ministry programmes; resulting in decision making for development 
being dictated centrally, instead of by the provincial and lower structures. The second 
problem was that the ideology of the ruling party envisaged a powerful central state; which 
resulted in the ruling party capturing these newly created structures for their own political 
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ends (Chatiza 2010, De Valk and Wekwete 1994). As alluded to earlier this was exacerbated 
by the channelling of government communication and programmes through the ruling party 
structures during the earlier years of independence. Therefore, the provincial council cannot 
be regarded as a structure which exuded the principles of democratic decentralisation because 
it was under the direct control of the central state through the provincial governor and the 
central government line ministries.  
4.4.3 Post 1990 local government in Zimbabwe  
In the early 1990s, Zimbabwe found itself implementing a raft of economic policies 
prescribed by the international financiers IMF and the WB, in the form of SAPs. This policy 
package was called the Economic Structural Adjust Policy (ESAP). The major justification 
for their adoption was that because the state was not raising enough revenue to finance its 
socialist developmental approach, it had to approach international lenders such as the IMF 
and WB.  This change in economic policy had an impact on decentralisation in several ways,  
namely;  ESAP prescribing that government reduce its expenditure through various reforms 
like cutting the civil service staff, removing subsidies on transport, health, basic foodstuffs, 
education and so forth, and privatising state parastatals, removing protectionist market 
policies, and decentralising local government. 
The impact of the multilateral funding and presence of  aid organisations was that they 
enforced decentralisation by funding decentralised institutions directly, as compared to 
channelling their funds through the central state (Conyers 2003). A good example of this is 
when the WB funded a housing programme called Urban I and Urban II directly.  The reason 
for direct funding was their perception that the central government was inefficient and would 
not use the funds effectively. The state was compelled to grudgingly decentralise, even 
though local government institutions were not given autonomy; and avenues for future 
control of decentralised institutions were left open for the central government through the 
ministry responsible for the local government, to intervene in local government affairs 
(Kamete 2003).  
During the post-1990 period, the objectives of decentralisation changed from addressing 
inequalities to focusing on two major areas: Firstly, to reduce the role of government/state in 
the economy (Makumbe 1998) and prime local government to produce institutions that 
created the necessary environment for the private sector businesses to thrive; and secondly,  
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to reduce government expenditure, especially of the central government in the provision of 
services. While this resulted in greater responsibility falling on local government to provide 
service delivery in the City of Harare, there was no increase in financial resources; resulting 
in a decline in services being provided and poor maintenance of infrastructure (Coutinho 
2010). The objective of SAPs was to roll back the state, create an enabling environment for 
private business to thrive and transfer its service delivery duties to the private sector; mainly 
because the  perception was that the state was corrupt and inefficient, and therefore not a 
suitable vehicle for effective service delivery (Mlambo 1997). Ironically, the adoption of 
SAPs transferred some form of power and responsibility to the urban local authorities, which 
in turn led to the creation of semi-autonomous institutions of local government in urban 
areas.  
In 1995, in response to the principles of SAPs, the central state amended the Urban Councils 
Act to change the position of mayor from being a ceremonial to an executive position, and 
elected directly by the voters. A closer analysis of the amendment shows that this was not 
reciprocated by the reduction/realigning of the powers of the town clerk, therefore creating 
two centres of power in one local government institution. To reiterate, the town clerk position 
is a meritocracy and professional position.  According to the Urban Councils Act, the town 
clerk is the head of administration/bureaucracy at urban local authority level. In principle, the 
mayor was supposed to be the political leader of the local authority and provide policy 
direction for the local authority. The executive mayoral model empowered the mayor with 
policy making and implementation powers; thereby marking the beginning of an antagonistic 
relationship between the three stakeholders, the mayor, the town clerk and the central 
government in the event of the executive mayor coming from the opposition political parties. 
Interference from the Minister of Local Government resulted in the first executive mayor in 
Harare only being elected in 2002; long after the election of mayors in other cities such as   
Chegutu and Masvingo (Munzwa and Wellington 2010). This interference will be discussed 
in detail in subsequent sections of this thesis.  
The first executive mayor of the City of Harare and a number of elected councillors were 
dismissed and replaced by government-appointed commissioners (Chatiza 2010). These 
dismissals were effected with no evidence of proper consultation with residents; but done 
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under the guise of protecting residents’ interests
20
. What can be deduced from these actions is 
that since the council was dominated by the opposition, the dismissals served as constant 
attempts by the central state to recapture the city. These actions further indicate that in reality, 
little effective power was actually decentralised to the institutions created in urban local 
authorities. The major challenge to decentralisation was that the Urban Councils Act 
bestowed too much power on the central government appointed minister; instead of the 
decentralised institutions (Makumbe 1998). The act bestowed upon the minister powers to re-
assign responsibilities of local authorities without consulting the local authorities and the 
residents, who feel the brunt of the impact of these decisions.  
It is important to note that for over two decades, from 1980 to 2000, the ZANU PF 
government never faced any strong opposition and was in total control of all the urban and 
rural local government authorities (Raftopoulos 2000). Nationally it was also dominant, with 
above 95% majority in parliament. When the Urban Council Act was amended in 1995, there 
was a belief that the status quo would continue in perpetuity. Strong opposition in post-
colonial Zimbabwe only started in 1999 with the formation of the MDC. In the year 2000, the 
opposition’s strength was felt, when it mobilised the national electorate to vote “No” in the 
constitutional referendum. The “No” votes won the referendum and in the same year the 
opposition won 58 parliamentary seats out of the 120 contested seats (Raftopoulos 2002: 
414). It is significant to note that most of the opposition seats were in the urban areas. Most 
scholars  (Matumbike 2009, Compagnon 2011, Bond and Manyanya 2003 agree that the 
reason why the opposition won in urban areas was because of ESAP and bad economic 
management which increased the cost of living, retrenchment, and unemployment. The 
responsibility was placed squarely on the shoulders of the ZANU PF government for this 
(Kamete 2003).  
In 1996, the first executive mayor of the City of Harare, from ZANU PF, was elected to serve 
a five-year term from 1996 to 2001. In 1999, because of corruption and poor service delivery 
in Harare, the council led by the mayor was suspended and dismissed by the Minister 
responsible for local government (Thomson Commission Report 1999). He became the 
second mayor to be dismissed before the opposition took control of urban areas in Zimbabwe. 
                                                 
20
 This is my personal opinion formulated whilst I was still a resident of Harare at the time when the mayor and 
councillors were dismissed.  
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The elected councillors were then replaced by a Commission; appointed by the Minister of 
Local Government to run the affairs of Harare. The head of the commission was in fact the 
deputy of the dismissed mayor and previously from the MDC, but had defected to ZANU PF 
when appointed to be the chairperson of the commission
21
.  
According to the Urban Councils Act, the Commission was supposed to be only a caretaker 
council for six months to allow new councillors to be elected. However, the Commission 
ended up running the affairs of the city of Harare until 2002. The ZANU PF, by virtue of its 
control over the Ministry of Local Government, was pushing its agenda by illegally extending 
the mandate of the commission.  
The legality of the Commission was challenged in court and a high court judgement in 2001 
was passed instructing the Registrar General
22
 and the President to pronounce election dates 
for the Harare City Council. This judgement was disregarded and not adhered by the ZANU 
PF until 2002, when local government elections were finally held in Harare. The opposition 
(MDC) swept all wards and the executive mayorship. By the end of 2002, the MDC was 
controlling all the major cities and urban areas in Zimbabwe, with the   ZANU PF being 
relegated to rural local authorities. What was significant was that during the post-2002 
period, the opposition was controlling the seat of local government in Harare. The ensuing 
frosty relationship between the opposition and the ruling party led to dismissals of several 
executive mayors and councillors by the Minister responsible for local government (Kamete 
2003).  
An assumption can be made that, since executive mayors were bestowed with executive 
powers over the local government authorities, this situation resulted in ZANU PF (ruling 
party) facing challenges in exerting their central authority on local government authorities; 
especially those urban authorities controlled by the opposition. An analysis of revenue 
                                                 
21
 This information is common knowledge to people who were residing in Harare during that period. 
22
 The Registrar General (a public office under Ministry of Home Affairs) was responsible for running elections 
in Zimbabwe and was a custodian of the voters roll before the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was established 
in 2004. The Registrar General is a civil servant with birth and death registration as the main duties. In terms of 
running elections and preparing the voters roll; the Registrar general was supervised by the Electoral 
Supervisory Commission. The Registrar is appointed to this post by the President of Zimbabwe. Thus, during 
the period that they were responsible for the voters’ roll and elections (up until 2004), one can see that a 
situation of conflict was possible if their election related decisions went against the central state.  
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sources reveals that urban local authorities have a better revenue base than rural authorities; 
thus making them lucrative for central state control if it is driven by patronage.  
Various amendments to the Urban Councils Act of 2008 resulted in loopholes through which 
the central government could change the system of local government. For example, the Act 
gave the Minister of Local Government power to decide whether a specific urban local 
authority should have a ceremonial or executive mayor.  The Minister was able to replace 
executive mayorship with ceremonial mayorship which was part time and had reduced 
powers and functions. Perks, such as salary, mayoral accommodation, and assistants were 
removed along with the day-to-day monitoring of council business. The argument I am 
putting forward here is that the reversion to the ceremonial mayorship was a way of dealing 
with opposition-dominated urban local authorities and their powerful executive mayors. The 
result was that the town clerk was now the sole holder of executive powers and he/she 
reported directly to the Ministry of Local Government. All these changes were implemented 
by the central state without any consultation with the residents, political parties, civil society, 
and urban councillors (McGregor 2013: 788). Furthermore, they were designed and 
implemented by a ministerial appointee who was not elected by the urban people who would 
be feeling the impact of these changes.  
Another example is that the Minister could use his/her power to control/intervene in local 
authorities. The Minister had the power to decide whether to appoint special interest 
councillors for local government authorities after every election (Urban Councils Act Section 
4 A). The Act mandated the Minister to appoint 25% of councillors for each local authority as 
special interest councillors. These amendments had the effect of diluting the powers of the 
opposition in local authorities by boosting the numbers of the ruling party councillors. These 
appointments did not conform to representative democratic principles, since it was the 
Minister who had the sole responsibility of appointing these special interest councillors’.  
The 2008 harmonised
23
 elections were inconclusive and negotiations through the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) resulted in a coalition government; with ZANU 
PF controlling the executive presidency (McGregor 2013). This created a state made up of 
two competing political centres of power and a disjointed state. The distrust between central 
                                                 
23
 Harmonised elections included Local government, parliamentary and presidential elections all at once.  
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state political players was evident in some of the ministries. A good example is the Ministry 
of Home Affairs which had two co-ministers simultaneously- one from the MDC and the 
other from ZANU PF. The local government ministry remained under the control of ZANU 
PF. It is important to note that in democratic developed countries like the United Kingdom, 
strong political parties result in the improvement of the efficiency of decentralisation 
(Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007). 
The 2008 local government elections results were interesting, because the opposition not only 
won the majority of urban local authorities, but also managed to gain entrance into rural local 
authorities by gaining seats in rural local authorities. The table below shows the proportion of 
local government authorities in 2008.  
Table 3: 2008 local government election results  




 ZANU (pf) Total 
Urban  27 2 1 30 
Rural  15 2 43 60 
TOTAL  42 4 44 90 
Source: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (2008) 
It is clear that even though the central government was a coalition, the opposition parties to 
ZANU PF controlled the majority of the local authorities by a slight margin. One would have 
imagined that, since there was a shared responsibility centrally, the centre-local relationships 
would have improved. This did not occur as more councillors and mayors were being 
suspended and fired on various allegations. The animosity between the ZANU PF controlled 
Ministry of Local Government and opposition controlled local authorities did not abate 
(Jonga and Chirisa 2010). This defined a long period of unshared vision and frosty centre-
local relations. The coalition government ended in 2013, when ZANU PF won both the 
presidential and parliamentary elections with more than two-thirds majority. In urban local 
authorities , the opposition MDC still dominated all major cities and towns, but failed to gain 
ground in the rural areas.  
The government of national unity ushered in a significant change to decentralisation, in the 
form of a new Constitution which was adopted in May 2013. Chapter 14 of the new 
Constitution deals specifically with decentralisation. In the course of this research the Urban 
                                                 
24
 Mainstream opposition party after 2005 split headed by Tsvangirai  
25
 Smaller splinter opposition from the mainstream MDC headed by W Ncube  
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Councils Act, Rural District Act and all the other acts responsible for local government were 
not yet aligned/repealed in accordance with the new Constitution. In essence, there is a very 
little change in centre-local relationships since the enactment of the new Constitution. The 
purpose of this section was to give a glimpse of the events which gave rise to the current 
institutional framework. A detailed analysis of centre-local relationship in Harare since 2002 
to the present moment will be presented in detail in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 : DECENTRALISATION 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN ZIMBABWE 
 “Local democracy implies that local government, like governments at upper levels, 
has a process of collective self-determination as its normative core”. (Haus and 
Sweeting 2006: 267). 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter seeks to examine the institutional framework of local government in the context 
of the Zimbabwe’s constitutional and policy framework. By institutional framework, I mean 
the state institutions and process which guide and control local government in Zimbabwe. 
This chapter will closely examine questions related to which acts of parliament or 
constitutional provision are available for local government in Zimbabwe, what institutions are 
responsible for various tasks and activities of local government and, the relationship between 
the political set up and local government in Zimbabwe.  
As stated in Chapter 1, this research was conducted during a transitional constitutional period 
in Zimbabwe. The new Constitution, adopted in May 2013, incorporates decentralisation as a 
fundamental tenet, and not merely an Act of Parliament, as was previously the case. 
However, it is obvious that local government in Zimbabwe is still being administered under 
the previous Acts of Parliament which are yet to be repealed/aligned in accordance with the 
new Constitution. In reality, the impact of the new Constitution is still to be felt in local 
government in Zimbabwe. The constitutional transitional period does not lessen or affect the 
impact and contribution of this study to decentralisation. It is very fundamental to present the 
current institutional framework as it is, and then use the results to highlight areas where in 
reality/practically the local government system is lacking. However, a full evaluation of the 
legal implications of the new constitutional dispensation falls outside the scope of this study.  
Hence, this chapter examines the institutional framework of local government that is based on 
the old local government system; and which was in place when this study was embarked 
upon.  
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5.2 State arrangement of local government in 
Zimbabwe  
There are various stakeholders which make up the local government system in Zimbabwe. 
These stakeholders are: the president of the country, the Ministry of Local Government, the 
parliamentary portfolio committee on local government, elected ward councillors (Councils), 
local authority’s administrators, provincial councils, political parties and the citizens and civil 
society. The interaction of these stakeholders is complicated and at times there is a 
duplication of roles.  
Local government in Zimbabwe derives its mandate from Chapter 14 of the new Constitution 
which sets out the main objectives of local government as follows: 
 Local government is aimed at the preservation of national unity in Zimbabwe and 
the prevention of all forms of disunity and secessionism;  
 Encourage the democratic participation in government by all citizens and 
communities of Zimbabwe; and  
 Ensure the equitable allocation of central resources and the participation of local 
communities in the determination of the development priorities within their areas.  
(Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013) 
In order to achieve the abovementioned objectives, the Constitution further states that there 
must be devolution of power and responsibilities to lower tiers of government. It is important 
to reiterate that pre-2013, local government / decentralisation was not enshrined in the 
Constitution. For thirty three years after colonial rule it was being administered by an act of 
parliament which was at the mercy of being amended by the majority party in parliament. 
The current Constitution advocates for three tiers of local government in Zimbabwe which 
include, provincial councils, urban local authorities (of which the City of Harare is one) and 
rural local authorities. These tiers as well as the layers of governance are depicted in Figure 3 
below. After careful examination of the institutions in the light of various policies and Acts as 
well as the constitution, I have sought to depict the layers of governance as in Figure 3. This 
serves to take stock of structures as they emerge from the current state of affairs yielded by 
current Acts and the Constitution.  
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Figure 3: The system of local government in Zimbabwe 
 
5.2.1 Provincial and metropolitan councils 
The Constitution stipulates that governance systems are devolved into various tiers of local 
government; these are provincial councils, metropolitan councils, urban and rural councils. 
While provincial and metropolitan councils play the same role, provincial councils govern 
over vast areas that include rural and urban areas. There are ten provinces; two of which are 
urban metropolitan provinces which are Harare and Bulawayo metropolitan provinces. The 
composition of a provincial is as follows:  
 All the members of National parliament whose constituencies fall within the 
geographical area of the province;  
 The mayors and chairpersons of urban or rural local authorities found in that 
province; 
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 The senators elected from that province;  
 Ten persons elected by a system of proportional representation after national general 
elections; 
 Two senator chiefs elected from the province; 
 The president and deputy president of the National council of chiefs if their traditional 
areas fall within the province concerned; and  
 All the women members of National Assembly elected in that province  
The chairperson of the provincial council is elected at the first sitting of the provincial 
council from a list of two people supplied by the political party which gained the most 
National Assembly seats or votes. 
The composition of metropolitan councils is slightly different. The mayor of the largest and 
the second largest metropolitan city are automatic members of the council and occupy the 
position of the chairperson and vice chairperson, respectively. Since metropolitan areas are 
not under traditional leadership, the president and deputy president of the National Council of 
Chiefs are not part of the metropolitan councils. The provincial and metropolitan councils are 
accountable to the residents of their province and central government through the Ministry of 
Local Government. Informally it is expected that members of the provincial or metropolitan 
councils are also accountable to their political parties. The Harare metropolitan province is 
made up of two major municipalities; which are City of Harare and City of Chitungwiza. It is 
important to note that the provincial and metropolitan councils are not yet operational as of 
March 2016. 
In terms of the Constitution, the function of the provincial and metropolitan councils is 
mainly to drive social and economic development in their provinces. Therefore, development 
planning and implementation of government programmes are part of the overall 
responsibility of provincial councils. Other functions include:  
 Planning and implementing social and economic development activities in its 
province; 
 Co-ordinating and implementing governmental programmes in its province; 
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 Planning and implementing measures for the conservation, improvement and 
management of natural resources in its province; 
 Promoting tourism in its province, and developing facilities for that purpose; 
 Monitoring and evaluating the use of resources in its province; and  
 Exercising any other functions, including legislative functions that may be conferred 
or imposed on it by or under an Act of Parliament. 
(Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013) 
It is important to note that three years after the enactment of the Constitution in 2013, neither 
of these councils are operational or functional; mainly because of the absence of an Act of 
Parliament that would have the effect of implementing this constitutional provision. What is 
interesting is that after the 2013 elections, the President of Zimbabwe appointed Ministers of 
State (political heads) for each of the ten provinces. If the councils were operational this 
would have resulted in a duplication of roles as the Chairpersons of the councils are also 
supposed to act as political heads of the province. It is possible that these appointments may 
be an attempt to dilute the powers of provincial and metropolitan councils; controlled by the 
opposition political parties. It may also be a way of bringing back the office of the provincial 
governor which was abolished when the new Constitution was adopted. Prior to 2013, the 
provincial governors were appointed by the president and enjoyed cabinet authority.  
The setup of provincial councils indicates an attempt by the new Constitution to create a 
devolved federal state. In this case, the Constitution does not advocate for full devolution of 
power, as the central state still has considerable power to change the agenda of the provincial 
councils. This argument is supported by the fact that at the present moment the provincial 
councils’ budget comes from the central state. Even if the provincial councils can come up 
with viable socio-economic development programmes, they will have to convince the central 
state to agree; since it controls the funds to implement projects. It seems the provincial 
councils are only expected to ensure that central state programmes are implemented in their 
provinces. One can therefore foresee that without proper decision-making powers, provincial 
councils will be characterised as a deconcentrated form of central government.  
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5.2.2 The role of Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National 
Housing  
The Ministry responsible for Local Government is in fact the Ministry of Local Government, 
Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH)
26
. It is the Ministry responsible for 
leading the development and management of the local government sector, and for 
representing the sector’s interests at national and sub-national levels, in relation to other arms 
of government. It uses five acts of parliament which are the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29: 
15), Rural District Councils Act (Chapter 29: 13) Provincial Councils and Administration Act 
(Chapter 29: 11), Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 29: 11), and the Regional and Town 
Planning Act (Chapter 29: 12). However, these Acts are not yet aligned to the new 2013 
Constitution hence, some sections of these Acts are not compliant with the new constitution.  
The Ministry is headed by a cabinet minister
27
 who is a political appointee from the ruling 
party. The administrative arm of the Ministry is headed by a Permanent Secretary who is a 
civil servant with the responsibility of implementing government policy and heading the 
ministry’s bureaucrats and appointed by the President. Beneath the MLGPWNH permanent 
secretary, there are directors who are responsible for urban local authorities, rural local 
authorities, and traditional authorities
28
. They deal directly with urban and rural local 
authorities, provincial councils and traditional leaders and perform supervisory functions over 
local authorities.  
One would expect policies or guidelines which would define how centre-local relationships 
are regulated. Ministry of Local Government officials interviewed during fieldwork admitted 
that the Ministry has never had a policy or guidelines manual on local government post-1980. 
Directives and Parliamentary Acts which are deemed binding and meant to be complied with, 
are used as substitutes for policy in situations where the Ministry has to intervene in local 
authorities (Machingauta 2010: 144). The officials admitted in interviews, that at times they 
had to resort to amending the Acts in order to clarify or deal with certain issues, raised by 
local authorities. As will be discussed later, the absence of clear policy frameworks on local 
                                                 
26
 Referred to as the Ministry of Local Government or Ministry in this thesis. 
27
 From 2002 to August 2015 the Minister of Local Government was Ignatius Chombo. 
28
 Since the cabinet reshuffle in September 2015, Traditional Authorities now fall under the Ministry of Rural 
Development. 
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government has led to several challenges and poor development of decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe. It has resulted in a ‘planning on the go’ approach; where ad hoc, piecemeal policy 
references and solutions are created to troubleshoot issues related to decentralisation.   
The Minister of Local Government has powers over the all the local government institutions; 
for example, the powers to dismiss elected councillors and mayors. As discussed earlier there 
is evidence to show that the Minister has in the past exercised these powers, and dismissed 
several mayors and councillors; without any attempt to canvas the views of the residents who 
actually voted for the councillors. This presents a situation whereby the Minister, a political 
appointee, dismisses elected councillors; contradicting the principles of democratic 
representation. It is clear that the Minister’s wide ranging powers can be used as a tool to 
enforce the policy directives of the central government by dismissing councillors who do not 
conform to central government’s directives.  This situation further complicates centre-local 
relations. The various interventions by the Minister of Local Government in the City of 
Harare will be discussed in the next chapter.  
5.2.3 The local government board  
The local government board is an institution created by the Urban Councils Act (2008) whose 
main function is approving the appointment or discharge of councils’ senior employees. The 
functions of a Local Government Board are as follows: 
 To provide guidance for the general organization and control of employees in the 
service of councils;  
 To ensure the general well-being and good administration of council’s staff and the 
maintenance thereof in a high state of efficiency;  
 To make model conditions of service for the purposes stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) 
for adoption by councils;  
 To make model regulations stipulating the qualifications and appointment procedures 
for senior officials of councils;  
 To approve the appointment and discharge of senior officials;  
 To conduct inquiries into the affairs and procedure of councils; and 
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 To exercise any other functions that may be imposed or conferred upon the Board in 
terms of this Act or any other enactment. 
(Urban Councils Act of 2008) 
 
Although the intention of the board is plausible, its set up is problematic. The Minister of 
Local Government has powers to dismiss members of the board, which compromises its 
independence. The powers bestowed upon the board for approval of appointment and 
discharge of senior council employees is problematic in the sense that the council as the 
employer has no final say in the affairs of its senior employees who are decision makers. In 
proper democratic decentralisation, the local authorities must have the power over their 
senior administrative staff. The fact that the appointment or dismissal of senior staff has to be 
approved by the Local Government Board means that local authority employees feel that they 
are more accountable to the Ministry of Local Government since it appoints the Local 
Government Board than to the local elected representatives. In some previous situations the 
City of Harare’s elected councillors recommended the dismissal of the Town Clerk but the 
board did not approve of the dismissal. In such situations an appointed authority is exercising 
authority over an elected authority, which is not ideal for democratic decentralisation (this 
case will be discussed further in the next chapter). One can argue that the board can be used 
as an instrument by the Minister of Local Government to have control over who gets 
appointed to urban local authorities. The local Government Board does not have jurisdiction 
over rural local authorities as the chairpersons / chief executive officers are appointed directly 
by the Ministry of Local Government.  
5.2.4 Urban local authorities  
Zimbabwe has different types of urban councils. They are classified hierarchically from the 
largest to the smallest, namely; cities, municipalities, town councils, and local boards. There 
are thirty two urban councils in Zimbabwe. An urban local authority is made up of two types 
of officials; the administrative officials and elected representatives (councillors). The 
administrative component of the urban councils is headed by the Town Clerk and the elected 
representative component is headed by the ceremonial mayor. The elected representatives are 
elected from the electoral wards which are in the urban area concerned. All voters in wards 
are eligible to participate in the election of their ward representative who is called a 
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councillor. The councillors serve a term of five years. Since ward councillorship is regarded 
as a part-time occupation, there is no salary. Councillors only receive allowances to 
compensate them for the time they spend on council business. The ceremonial mayor is also 
regarded as a part-time employee who is remunerated for his time.  
Councillors are responsible not only for policy formulation and political direction of the local 
authority, but also have executive powers
29
 to implement their decisions. The role of the 
administrators of the local authority is to implement policies and bylaws formulated by the 
council. In order to execute their duties effectively, committees made up of councillors are 
formed. The City of Harare has the following eight committees:  
 Finance and Development Committee; 
 Human Resources and General Purposes Committee;  
 Audit Committee;  
 Procurement Board Committee;  
 Environmental Management Committee;  
 Education, Health, Housing, Community Services and Licencing Committee;  
 Business Committee; and  
 Information and Publicity Committee.  
Each urban local authority can decide on how many committees they wish to form. The 
committees usually perform oversight roles in the local authority’s several departments.  
Urban local authorities are expected to raise most of their revenue from rates, levies, and 
taxes. The bulk of the urban authorities’ income comes from selling water and property rates 
levied on residents and businesses. Prior to 2002 and the onset of the many economic 
challenges in Zimbabwe, urban local authorities received yearly grants from the central state. 
These grants eventually ceased. As a result, they are now expected to raise the majority of 
their revenue on their own. Urban local authorities are also allowed to borrow from the open 
financial market. This is only possible with the approval of the central government. 
Borrowing from international and local finance providers has been used as a way to finance 
                                                 
29
 These powers are always a source of contestation between local authorities and the central state. 
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capital (infrastructure) projects in most urban local authorities (Matumbike 2009). The 
economic decay has affected most urban local authorities’ credit worthiness. Hence,   they are 
no longer able to borrow at favourable interest rates (City of Harare 2014a, Budget 
statement). Without access to central government grants and cheap international finance, 
most of the infrastructure in urban local authorities have decayed, and construction of new 
infrastructure has been stunted (Chatiza 2010). A scrutiny of most urban local authorities’ 
budgets shows that the central government is not contributing towards their budgets, because 
central government expects local government to be self -sufficient in financing its 
programmes.  
Accountability in urban councils is achieved in two ways: Firstly, urban councils are directly 
accountable to the central government through the Ministry of Local Government. The Urban 
Councils Act makes provision for direct Presidential intervention in the affairs of the urban 
councils. Secondly, the local authorities are accountable to the residents of the geographical 
area covered by the local authority. This form of accountability is mainly directed at the 
elected councillors. The representative democracy in Zimbabwe stipulates that the voters 
elect the councillors and the councillors act on behalf of the voters. What is not stipulated is 
whether the councillors have to consult on each and every decision the council takes, and 
whether they can apply their own discretion to make decisions on council matters. The role of 
voters after elections is also not clear. Historical evidence shows that in Zimbabwe the ballot 
box is the only effective tool which voters can use to express their views. They then have the 
opportunity to vote out councillors that are not performing to their expectations.  
In addition to the above, elected councillors are also accountable to the political parties they 
represent. This creates a difficult conundrum regarding the accountability of the local 
authority to the Ministry of Local Government if the local authority is controlled by a 
different political party. Political parties by nature need to enforce their policy and 
ideological influence on institutions they control. The system of accountability in local 
government is open to clashes between the ruling party and political parties controlling local 
authorities, in the event of differences in political ideology and vision. One example of 
accountability is the participatory budgeting process which will be discussed in detail in 
subsequent chapters. The participatory budgeting process is as a result of a ministerial 
directive to all the local authorities in Ministry of Local Government Circular 3 of 2012. In 
accordance with this directive local authorities are accountable to local communities through 
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consultation during the budget formulation process. Local authorities are also accountable to 
the Ministry of Local Government which is responsible for approving the final budget.  
The administrative component of the local authorities is accountable legally to two 
stakeholders. Internally, they are accountable to the elected councillors who provide 
oversight, policy and political leadership. The assumption is that this relationship should not 
raise any challenges as the roles of both the councillors and administrators are clearly 
stipulated in the various acts which provide for urban and rural local authorities. However, 
the findings of this study indicate that the relationship between the councillors and the 
administrators is not cordial, but frictional. The administrators are also accountable to the 
central government through the bureaucratic arm of the Local Government Ministry. This 
form of accountability is a major cause of policy discordance in situations where the ruling 
party is different from the political party controlling the local authority. A study by Mohmand 
and Cheema (2007) in Pakistan showed that accountability in decentralisation needs to be re-
examined as downward accountability is more favourable than upward accountability.  
5.2.5 Rural local authorities  
The Rural District Councils Act of 2002 provides for the administration of rural local 
authorities. In terms of this Act these local authorities do not have a mayor as the political 
head, but rather a chairperson selected by the elected ward councillors, who are elected from 
the common ward voters roll. Sectoral district heads of various national ministries, the private 
sector, civil organisations and traditional leaders also form part of the rural local authorities. 
The administrative side of the Rural District Council is headed by the Chief Executive 
Officer who is appointed by the councillors, with the approval of the Minister of Local 
Government. The central government through the Ministry of Local Government is also 
represented by the District Administrator, who performs the role of chief advisor, 
implementer, and regulator of the council. From 1980 to 1993 the district administrator also 
performed the role of the Chief Executive Officer of the Rural District Council. Unlike urban 
councils, rural district councils can only borrow money from central government. It can be 
argued that rural local authorities are a deconcentrated structure of the central government. 
However, they also enjoy less autonomy as compared to urban councils. 
The budget of rural local authorities is funded by the central government through various 
sector ministries. Rural local authorities, unlike urban local authorities, lack the revenue base 
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as they have very few rateable properties. In addition, very few of their residents can actually 
access levied water, which contributes large chunks of revenue in urban areas. The revenue 
which rural local authorities earn is not sufficient for the local authority to carry out its 
programmes; hence the bulk of their revenue comes from central government. Matumbike 
(2009) suggests that rural local authorities raise only about 15% of their overall budget.  They 
depend financially and politically on the central government which in turn impacts on their 
actual the level of decentralisation. Therefore, where funding comes from the sectoral 
ministry, it is utilised specifically for certain projects, which are usually determined by the 
central government. It is clear therefore that local authorities have no control on what projects 
should be funded; leaving them subservient to the central government in all aspects.  
5.2.6 The Role of councillors  
It is important to explore the role or functions of councillors in local government in 
Zimbabwe. It is very interesting to note that despite legislation on local government, there is 
still no clarity on the functions of councillors. The closest document which stipulates the 
functions of councillors is the Handbook for Councillors (2013); which is a document with no 
legal standing. The Handbook is used for the induction of new councillors. The role and 
functions of the Mayors and Deputy Mayors are clearly stipulated in the Urban Councils Act. 
It seems that councillors also derive their roles from the broad functions of local authorities
30
 
and the legally stipulated roles of the various committees in which they serve. The absence of 
clearly defined roles of councillors in legislation may result in councillors performing duties 
that are not assigned to them. According to the Handbook for Councillors (2013: 21) the 
duties of councillors are as follows: 
 They represent the residents in their ward during council meetings. They must source 
opinions from the residents and also provide feedback from the council meetings. 
 They are mandated to attend council committee meetings and debate issues on the 
agenda. The debate must benefit the whole council not their wards only. 
 Councillors are also expected to attend full council meetings and debate issues on the 
agenda. 
                                                 
30
 Section 198 of the Urban Councils Act of 2008 and the Second Schedule. 
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This lack of clarity and absence of clearly defined roles has been the cause of contestation 
between councillors and administrators; which will continue if not dealt with. The 
consequences of this situation will be elaborated upon in the following chapter.  
5.3 Autonomy in Local government in Zimbabwe  
The notion of autonomy, in this study, is conceptualised as freedom from higher powers; 
having the capacity for developing or expressing local identity in local authorities (Pratchett 
2004: 359). To achieve autonomy there is a need for local government to be given a legal 
standing which allocates specific powers that are distinct from the central state powers. These 
powers must enable the local authorities to formulate and execute their own policies. Local 
government must be able to operate independently of the central state, and must have the 
ability to make its own laws, rules and regulations. In order to capacitate local government to 
achieve its autonomy, there is a need for local authorities to have the ability to hire, promote 
and discipline its own staff, without central government interference (Berman 2015). 
Autonomy in local government can be achieved through pursuing devolution as a form of 
decentralisation.  
It is important to emphasise that local autonomy must not be confused with local democracy. 
According to Haus and Sweeting (2006: 267), “local democracy implies that local 
government, like governments at upper levels, has a process of collective self-determination 
as its normative core”. What this implies, is that it is possible to have local democracy 
without autonomy. Taking cognisance of the various African examples discussed in the 
literature review, it can be argued that the majority of African countries decentralised to 
achieve local democracy, not local autonomy. When citizens are voting, they are exercising 
local democracy through the election of their representatives. While, the voting process in 
local government gives some semblance of autonomy, it is important to note that voting in 
itself does not mean there is autonomy or local democracy.  
5.3.1 Autonomy pre-2013 
It is important to examine autonomy in local authorities before and after the enactment of the 
new Constitution in 2013. Prior to 2013, local authorities did not enjoy constitutional legal 
standing. They derived their legal standing from Acts of Parliament which the ruling party 
was able to change with a simple majority. While local authorities had specific powers and 
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functions that were distinct from the state, these powers and functions were controlled by the 
Minister of Local Government, who had the power to add or withdraw some of these powers. 
Therefore, local authorities were not operating independently of the central state.  
Local authorities also had ‘limited’ ability and powers to make their own laws, rules and 
regulations, formulate policies, and implement their own policies. Exercising of these powers 
was mainly at the pleasure of the central government which had the final say in all decisions 
taken by the local authorities. Local authorities also did not have full control in the 
appointment and dismissal of their senior staff.  This could only be effected with the approval 
of the Local Government Board and the Ministry of Local Government. Even though local 
authorities had the powers to discipline their staff, they had to get approval from the Local 
Government Board and the Ministry of Local Government to implement the outcomes of the 
disciplinary process. This worked against the autonomy of local authorities. With regard to 
fiscal autonomy, urban local authorities enjoyed only semi autonomy, as their budget and 
sourcing of finances required final approval from the central government. As discussed 
earlier, rural local authorities depended on central government; leaving them with even less 
autonomy as compared to urban local authorities.  
My argument in this case is that local government in Zimbabwe, before the enactment of the 
new Constitution in 2013, enjoyed semi-autonomy which was characterised as delegated 
authority. In order to exercise the delegated authority, the approval of the central state was 
required. It is clear also that urban local authorities enjoyed more autonomy than their rural 
counterparts.  
5.3.2 Autonomy post- 2013  
As has been stated previously, the new Constitution has not yet been fully implemented. 
Various Acts of parliament, such as the Urban Councils Act of 2008 and the Rural District 
Councils Act (2002) have not yet been aligned to the new Constitution. However, the new 
Constitution, by advocating for devolution of power to the lower tiers of government, does 
give legal status to local government in Zimbabwe. The new Constitution Section (264:  
Devolution of governmental powers and responsibilities) states the following:  
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1) Whenever appropriate, governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved to 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities which are competent to 
carry out those responsibilities efficiently and effectively. 
2) The objects of the devolution of governmental powers and responsibilities to 
provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities are— 
a) to give powers of local governance to the people and enhance their participation in 
the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them; 
b) to promote democratic, effective, transparent, accountable and coherent 
government of Zimbabwe as a whole; 
c) to preserve and foster the peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe; 
d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further 
their development; 
e) to ensure the equitable sharing of local and national resources; and 
f) to transfer responsibilities and resources from the national government in order to 
establish a sound financial base for each provincial and metropolitan council and 
local authority.  
Compared to the previous system, the new Constitution allows for local government to have 
greater autonomy. However, autonomy as envisaged by the new Constitution will only be 
possible once the relevant Acts of parliament which operationalises local government have 
been amended, aligned to the constitution, or repealed.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the institutional framework for local government in Zimbabwe. While 
the new Constitution has not yet been implemented, it is important to note that the 
institutional framework will provide some form of challenges in the event that there is 
disjuncture in the state i.e. when the ruling party is different from the political party 
controlling local government. The centre-local relationship did not manifest as a result of the 
new Constitution but as a result of the old parliamentary Acts controlling decentralisation in 
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Zimbabwe. The next chapter will show that although the institutional framework plays a 
critical role. Actors/stakeholders in decentralisation can influence the outcomes and outputs 
of decentralisation. In some cases, the actors act outside the legal parameters to further their 
agenda, hence the argument that if the new system as provided for by the new Constitution 
still has the same actors then very little change is expected. The next chapter provides an in 
depth discussion of this disjuncture.  
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CHAPTER 6 : CONTESTING ‘UNSHARED 
VISION’ IN THE CITY OF HARARE 
 “Why should the African political elites dismantle a political system which 
serves them so well?” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 14) 
6.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapters the thesis looked at mainly the context and institutional environment 
in Zimbabwe. This chapter and subsequent chapters, aims to provide an in-depth analysis of 
the pragmatic challenges that the interface between politics and development presents. The 
point of departure is the current social actors’ understanding of their role and issues. The 
timeframe is the period before the election or appointment of office bearers to their positions 
and their experiences currently. In this regard, 2013 is a significant year because it marks the 
beginning of the formal time frame for the current political role players. However, the 
discussion will refer to political issues and manoeuvres long before 2013.  
This chapter presents three broad sections which deal with various levels of contestation. The 
first contestation is the centre-local contestation between the City of Harare and the 
Zimbabwean central state. The second contestation is the intra-local contestation, which is 
between the administrative (bureaucrats) and councillors within the City of Harare. The third 
contestation is of ‘substance’ and refers to the contestation between political parties in power 
and local governments’ policies; especially between ZANU PF and MDC. I define the term 
‘contestation’ broadly as differences not only in ideology and policy but also in approaches to 
implementing government programmes. Contestation also covers differences in personal and 
political preferences within institutions which influences the outcomes of decentralisation.  
6.1.1 Current composition of the City of Harare council 
The elections for the current council were held following the expiration of the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) in 2013. A government of national unity, which was made up of main 
MDC
31
, a splinter of the MDC, and ZANU PF at the national level, was in place from 2009 to 
                                                 
31
 I am referring to it as the main MDC because it has a higher number of Members of Parliament as compared 
to the other MDC. 
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2013, the council of the City of Harare has been controlled by the opposition MDC
32
 since 
2002. The opposition’s electoral grip on the City of Harare has been uninterrupted since 
2002. The only interruptions occurred in 2004, when mayors and councillors were dismissed 
and replaced by a commission by the Minister of Local Government.  Figure 4 depicts the 
dominance of the opposition in the City of Harare council.  
Figure 4: Composition of the City of Harare Council 
 
Source: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 
6.1.1.1 Special interest councillors  
The figure above shows that special interest councillors were only appointed after the 2008 
elections. As stated earlier, a clause in the Urban Councils Act of 2008 section 20 provides 
for the appointment of special interest councillors. The Act enables   the Minister of Local 
Government to appoint not more than 25% of councillors as special interest councillors. 
These councillors do not having voting powers in full council meetings, but participate fully 
in council committees. My observation in the City of Harare is that the majority of council 
business is conducted during council committee meetings and full council meetings are 
mainly used to ratify the decisions taken by these committees. The rationale is behind the 
appointment of these councillors is to augment the skills of the council by appointment of 
individuals who has skills needed to run the affairs of the council. However, these 
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 The MDC is referred to in this thesis as the opposition because of its status at the national level. Nationally 
there are two major political parties the ruling ZANU PF and the official opposition the MDC. They are other 
smaller parties but only one of these other parties are represented in parliament (MDC-N) and it is a splinter 
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appointments have been viewed with suspicion, as most of the special interest councillors are 
known to be activists in the ruling ZANU PF political party. In 2009, the City of Bulawayo 
resisted the appointment of these councillors by lodging a court case against the Minister of 
Local Government and the city won the case.  
The appointment of special interest councillors is problematic in the sense that it is the 
preserve of the Minister of Local Government which can create a situation where special 
interest councillors can potentially pay their allegiance to the minister who appointed them. 
In situations where the minister comes from a different political party than the one controlling 
the council then there is a chance that the special interest councillors can be used as a tool to 
represent the policies and aspirations of central government. My argument is based on the 
fact that councillorship is Zimbabwe is a political office. In Harare, the special interest 
councillors were regarded as central government spies who were behind several suspensions 
of elected councillors (Munzwa and Wellington 2010).  
Secondly, they can be used to boost numbers of the central government ruling party. In some 
local authorities, the opposition has a slight majority over the ruling party. However, through 
the appointment of these councillors, this majority was whittled down; hence subverting the 
wishes of the electorate who gave the opposition a mandate to govern the local authority. In 
2008, in the City of Harare, the ruling party won only 2% of the total wards in the City which 
in real terms translates to only one ward out of forty six wards. However, with the 
appointment of the special interest councillors, the composition changed to 21% of the 
councillors representing the interests of ZANU PF. Eight of the eleven councillors were 
former ZANU PF councillors. In other urban areas, the appointed councillors were actually 
ZANU PF candidates who had lost in elections. A common perception is that since these 
councillors serve at the pleasure of the Minister of Local Government, this propagates the 
interests of the central government.  
While there might be nothing wrong with the appointment of special interest councillors, it is 
the mechanisms and processes of appointing them that must change, so that their appointment 
does not subvert the electoral wishes of the residents. One way of doing that is by assigning 
the responsibility of appointment/nomination of the special interest councillors to the elected 
councillors. This is based on the assumption that the elected councillors themselves are in the 
best position to know the skills that are lacking hence they can nominate suitable candidates 
to fill the positions of special interest councillors. The nominated councillors can then be 
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ratified/approved by a parliamentary portfolio committee, provincial Council or Local 
Government Board. Issues arising from the dismissal of special interest councillors should be 
dealt with by the elected ward councillors. In this way the democratic aspirations of residents 
of a particular local authority can still be maintained.  
6.2 Centre-local relationships  
The term centre-local relationship describes the nature of the relationship between the City of 
Harare councillors and the central state. As stated earlier, the central state is represented by 
the Ministry responsible for Local government. The perceptions of centre-local relationships 
were sourced through documentary research and interviews conducted with residents, civil 
society organisations such as HRT and CHRA, City of Harare senior administrators and 
councillors, and Ministry of Local Government officials. The findings indicate that the 
relationship between the centre and local authorities shows that there is polarity especially 
between the elected councillors and the central state. It is very interesting to note that of the 
thirty six councillors interviewed, only twenty one said that they have a cordial relationship 
with the Ministry of Local Government, whilst the remaining councillors said that their 
relationship is not good. The nature of the centre local relationship is depicted in Figure 5 
below:  
Figure 5: Centre-local relationship perceptions 
 
Even though the majority of councillors attested to a good relationship with the Ministry of 
Local Government, the majority of them (32 out of 36) said that the Ministry should not 
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intervene in local authorities’ issues (Figure 6). Those who indicated that the Ministry should 
intervene are from ZANU PF. They felt that the Ministry’s intervention is justified when the 
local authority deviates from the provisions in the Urban Councils Act. However, all the 
interventions by the Ministry of Local Government were based on this pretext.  What the 
councillors are inferring may be that the majority of the interventions by the Ministry were 
not based on the Act but on political expediency. 
Figure 6: Intervention by the Ministry of Local Government 
 
On the issue of the intervention by the Ministry in local authorities, all the community leaders 
interviewed said that the Ministry has no business intervening in the day to day running of the 
local authorities. Some community leaders felt very strongly that the meddling of the central 
state in the City of Harare has negatively affected the level of services delivered in Harare. 
The perception of the city councillors is that they believe that the Ministry is too powerful 
and it always follows through with heavy sanctions if its directives are not heeded. One 
councillor alluded to this point by saying:  
“A few years back some councillors were bent on investigating alleged corrupt land 
deals which were done when the council was still under ZANU PF but the ministry 
instead stifled the investigation and suspended the councillors … now all the 
councillors understand that if you go against the Minister of Local Government you 
will either be fired or suspended.” 
One residents’ association official concurred with this view by saying: 
11% 
89% 
Should the Ministry of local government intervene in local authorities?  
yes no
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“Whatever relationship you see now has been shaped by a previous show of power by 
the Ministry of Local Government. The relationship is now of master and servant, any 
deviation from the servant results in heavy sanctions.” 
While the councillors alluded to a good relationship with the central state, the underlying 
issue is the relationship which has been shaped by past confrontations with the Ministry. It 
seems that the councillors have resigned themselves to the fact that the central state 
determines the vision and developmental direction of the city. In this case, the ministerial 
intervention through directives has resulted in the decision-making powers of the legally 
elected representatives being usurped. This shows that the central state is too powerful for 
meaningful decentralisation because the elected councillors who are responsible for policy 
formulation and political direction of the city are subjugated by the central state. In essence, it 
can be concluded that the city is allowed to implement its own vision but only when it 
conforms to the vision of the central state. 
6.2.1 Bureaucrats’ perspectives of centre-local relationships  
It is important to examine what the central state and local authorities say about the centre-
local relationship. The Ministry officials and city administrators did not indicate any issues 
with regards to their relationship with the Ministry of Local Government. The city 
administrative officials view Ministry officials as their seniors, since they report to them 
directly. Hence their relationship is a professional one.   
All the administrative officials referred to the fact that power in local authorities’ lies with the 
Ministry. One city administrative official emphasised this point by saying: 
“When the councillors are elected they come in thinking they have the power to 
change everything. They think they have power, but power lies with the central 
government.” 
One official said that if councillors understand the situation from the beginning, it will 
improve the relationship between councillors and the Ministry. Also, the administrative 
officials admitted that at times the councillors do not understand their roles (as discussed in 
Chapter 5, these roles are not clear), and end up meddling in administrative issues; thereby 
opening up an avenue for the central state’s intervention in the affairs of the city.  
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Other administrative officials said that the main cause of problems in centre-local relationships in 
Harare is that the councillors push their own agenda instead of the agenda of the central government.  
“The opposition wants to champion their manifestos as compared to the development 
policies of the national government. This causes a lot of conflicts.” 
This view brings to the fore the core issues with regards to the main research questions in this 
study. It reveals the complexities in the system of local government in Harare. The key issue 
being revealed here is that the central state has inculcated the belief that all spheres of 
government should get their developmental policy direction from the central government. 
The system in Zimbabwe cannot be fully characterised as a neoliberal democracy but a 
mixture of socialist and neoliberal democracy practicalities. While on one hand the 
Zimbabwean state supports the free market economy approach, on the other it is using it to 
provide subsidies to goods and services to those who can’t afford it. The government 
provides subsidies for primary health care and primary education. Furthermore, the State had 
price controls on basic foodstuffs. This indicates that it is a neoliberal state infused with 
socialist aspects. With such a system, where there is no clear demarcation of powers, there is 
bound to be contestation of powers. Councillors are elected with the understanding that they 
will be responsible for policy formulation in local authorities. However, once elected they are 
required to seek approval from the central government on each and every policy they 
propose. Instead of devolving power to local authorities, as advocated for in the Constitution, 
the central state acts as if the local authorities are deconcentrated structures or field offices of 
the central state. The issue of developmental agenda of local authorities needs to be clarified 
so that it is clear whose agenda these institutions must follow.  
On further probing, some of the officials argued that the councillors from the opposition 
political parties want to use their own system of local government, which does not conform to 
the legislative legal instruments used in Zimbabwe. In other words, the opposition was also 
accused of using their positions to further their political objectives. They emphasised that this 
creates battles and contestation with the central government which is reinforced by political 
muscle. Some of them emphasised that the battles which are being fought between the central 
state and opposition-controlled local authorities have very little to do with service delivery, 
but more to do with political ideologies and personal differences. One official suggested that 
opposition councillors and their political parties should approach local government in 
Zimbabwe with the sole objective of improving the services being delivered by the local 
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authorities – not to use local authorities for political grandstanding. This view was echoed in 
the statement below:  
“The approach by opposition-controlled councils should not be about politics but 
improving service delivery. Prioritising politics leads to polarisation and hampers 
collaboration between central state and local state in areas of mutual interest … have 
you ever seen a battle where the central government has denied local authorities the 
chance to buy equipment to deliver service? No. The battles are mainly to do with 
political ego and posturing at the expense of service delivery.” 
To support this perspective one of the respondents from the Ministry cited an example of the 
former executive mayor of the City of Masvingo
33
. The executive mayor was elected on the 
opposition ticket in 2001. What is peculiar to his situation is that his election was not 
synchronised with that of the ward councillor elections; resulting in him being elected as an 
executive mayor in a council dominated by ZANU PF councillors and no opposition 
councillors. This situation persisted for two years. He had a cordial relationship with the 
Ministry of Local Government. In fact, the Ministry regarded him as the best performer in 
terms of service delivery. He also had no confrontational issues with the central state; despite 
being from the opposition. The message from the central and local bureaucrats in the 
interviews conducted for this study was that the opposition should change their approach 
when dealing with the central state. One official said: 
“If councillors and the Minister of Local Government adopt a confrontational 
approach then nothing is going to work out well. Their approach must be what can 
we do to improve service delivery through our institutions?” 
The issue of local authorities conforming to the policies of the central state raises some 
critical questions. If the central state controls the policy direction of the local authorities, 
what is the function of politically elected councillors? If local authorities are to follow the 
policies of the central state, then can the councillors be trusted to propagate the ideals of 
another political party at the expense of their own? Who should be accountable to the 
residents? These questions take this research back to the nature of state and the 
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 The City of Masvingo is the oldest city created by the colonial administration. During colonial times it was 
named Fort Victoria. 
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decentralisation model in Zimbabwe. The nature of the state determines the success or failure 
of the opposition controlled councils in delivering services to the people.  
In order to explore this further, one needs to examine the development policy making process 
in Zimbabwe. Economic development policies adopted by the state were mainly a conversion 
of ZANU PF election manifestos; hence they were not drafted through an inclusive, 
nationally agreed upon, democratic processes with all opposition parties also playing a role. 
Consequently, the majority of the policies adopted after independence in 1980, did not last 
beyond the next election period. The fact that the state is pursuing what the opposition regard 
as ‘ZANU PF policies’, means that those local authorities under the control of opposition 
political parties continue to be antagonistic towards the national development policies and 
reluctant to take ownership of these policies and/or implement them. The situation in 
Zimbabwe cannot be compared with countries such as South Africa, where there are long 
term development policies, such as the National Development Plan, which are drafted 
through a consultative inclusive process and which opposition political parties can identify 
with. In Zimbabwe, policy development is mainly the preserve of the ruling ZANU PF party. 
Therefore, one has to view the ZANU PF policy making process through the lens of their 
previous ideology, which was to convert Zimbabwe into a one party state. My argument is 
that, although Zimbabwe is not a one party state at the moment, the same actors who once 
advocated for a one party state are still in power. Therefore, one should not expect a 
significant shift from one party state ideology to a democratically aligned ideology. The 
various policies implemented since 1980 is highlighted in Table 4 below:  
Table 4: Zimbabwe Economic Development Policies Since 1980 
Zimbabwe Economic Development Policy Year 
implemented  
Growth With Equity 1981 
Three Year National Development Plan  1982 - 85 
First Five Year National Development Plan  1986 - 1990 
ESAP 1990 - 1995 
Zimbabwe Programme For Economic and Social Transformation – ZIMPREST 1996 - 2000 
Millennium Economic Recovery Programme- MERP 2001 - 2002 
National Economic Revival Programme – NERP 2003 
Post-Election Economic Development Strategy and Economic Recovery Programme  2003 
National Economic Development Priority Programme – NEDPP 2007 
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme – STERP 2009 - 2012 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio – Economic Transformation – Zim Asset  2013 - 2018 
 
The Table above shows that the ZANU PF state was vacillating between several policies and 
this affected the state bureaucracy as they were not able to perform long term planning as the 
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expectation was that the national policies would change after every election hence there is no 
point in planning ahead. The vacillation also resulted in the bureaucracy (state administrative 
officials) looking up to ZANU PF for policy direction instead of the central state. This led to 
the usurpation of state functions and duties by the ruling party hence the central state was 
now synonymous with ZANU PF. As stated earlier, within these policies there was very little 
reference to local government. This created a vacuum, as local authorities did not have a clear 
direction in terms of policies. This led to the opposition, which was in control of local 
authorities, exploiting the situation and implementing their policies; thus creating the 
disjuncture between the central state and the local authorities who did not share the same 
development vision.  
In Zimbabwe it is clear that the system of decentralisation is an impediment to service 
delivery in the event of the opposition capturing local authorities. The local decentralised 
institutions are primed to get policy direction from the central government or ZANU PF 
hence the political challenges and tussles in the control of MDC dominated councils as they 
prefer to advance their local government agenda. This also has implications regarding the 
ability of the decentralised institutions performing their primary function of delivering basic 
services to the residents. The 1980 - 2013 local government system was enacted with the 
understanding that there would not be a disjuncture between the central state and the 
decentralised institutions hence the capture of the local state by the opposition presented 
various problems both structurally and politically
34
. 
It can therefore be argued, that elected councillors have limited powers to decide and steer the 
developmental agenda of the local authorities; which is contrary to democratic 
decentralisation and local democracy.  According to Heller (2001), democratic 
decentralisation advocates for citizens to take charge of their development destiny. What this 
means is that the citizens themselves (through councillors) should decide the developmental 
agenda that the local authority should follow. The role of the central state is to create an 
enabling environment which ensures that the views of citizen are respected, considered and 
are decisions of the citizens are implemented and protected.  
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In order to circumvent this centre- local conundrum, some administrative officials within the 
City of Harare interviewed for this study suggested that the central state give autonomy to the 
local authorities so that they approach service delivery without too much interference from 
the central government. One administrator said:  
“There is need for more autonomy on decision making, budgets, appointment of 
directors [senor administration staff], borrowing powers, deciding levels of rates and 
so forth…” 
Another official said:  
“The focus should not be on political differences but on what people want and 
adequately deliver services to the residents. The fight here is about putting money in 
councillors’ pockets.” 
In order to illustrate the relationship between the City of Harare and the central state since the 
opposition political party (the MDC) took control of the City of Harare in 2002, the case of 
the dismissal of the first executive mayor in Harare is presented below. 
6.2.2.1. Dismissal of the first opposition executive mayor of the City of Harare 
The first opposition executive mayor of City of Harare was elected in April 2002. His 
position was bolstered by the fact that the opposition MDC won forty two wards out of the 
total forty three wards in Harare at the time. This was the first time the MDC had control of a 
sphere of government. Before the issue of the suspension and subsequent dismissal of the 
mayor can be discussed it should be noted that the first opposition mayor of the City of 
Harare was not the first to be dismissed in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Before the discussion of 
the dismissal of the first opposition executive mayor in the City of Harare, it is necessary to 
discuss the dismissal of the ZANU PF mayor who preceded the opposition mayor. 
Prior to the MDC taking over urban local authorities, the Minister of Local Government in a 
period spanning 22 years dismissed two mayors. The first dismissal of a mayor was that of 
Gweru
35
 mayor who was dismissed in 1985 (Chatiza 2010). The reason put forward for his 
dismissal was that of insubordination. In response to his dismissal the councillors resigned in 
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 Gweru is a city located in the Midlands province.  
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solidarity with the mayor. The second case of dismissal occurred in 1998 in Harare, when the 
whole council (councillors and mayor) were dismissed for poor performance, corruption and 
mismanagement of council funds (Thomson Commission 1999). It is important to note that 
the dismissed mayors and councillors were from the ruling party ZANU PF. Critics argued 
that prior to the opposition taking over urban local authorities the ministers used the Urban 
Councils Act and Rural Districts Councils Act to dismiss only truant councillors (Matumbike 
2009, Kamete 2007).  
Very scant information is available pertaining to the dismissal of the Gweru mayor in 1985 as 
compared to the dismissal of the Harare mayor in 1998. In Harare, the Minister of Local 
Government first suspended the ZANU PF mayor (Solomon Tavengwa) and councillors. The 
minister also appointed an investigation commission (Thomson Commission) to investigate 
the allegations against the mayor and the councillors. The investigative commission produced 
a comprehensive report referred as the Thomson Commission Report. The commission 
reported two important issues which had a bearing on the present composition of the City of 
Harare. The report indicated that there was no city centralised control of staff recruitment and 
there were competing interests between the executive mayor, the town clerk and the 
individual councillors (Thomson Commission 1999). This created confusion and uncertainty 
with regards to recruitment, as the mayor and councillors took it upon themselves to recruit 
the city’s personnel. The report indicated that the mayor allocated council vacancies to 
councillors to fill them from their wards which resulted in politicisation of the administrative 
staff of the City of Harare as political patronage was used to appoint them. According to the 
report, in one instance the councillors allocated themselves eleven non-existent vacancies 
each; this resulted in the recruitment of staff which was not needed. The report also 
highlighted that employment procedures were abandoned in favour of discretionary practices 
that promoted cronyism, nepotism and tribalism (Thomson Commission 1999).  
The Commission indicated that because of the systematic allocation of vacancies to 
councillors,   the City of Harare staff compliment ended up being bloated with non-essential 
staff. This had two major implications for the city; firstly, the city was spending more on 
wages compared to service delivery thereby depriving the residents of better service delivery. 
Secondly, it can be argued that workers appointed on the basis of political patronage, owed 
their allegiance to the councillors who had recruited them; instead of to the administrative 
supervisors in the City of Harare. It also created an unhealthy wedge between mayor, 
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councillors and administrative staff headed by the town clerk as the powers to recruit staff 
normally lies with the city’s administrative head who in this case is the town clerk.  
The other important finding by the Thomson Commission was that they were two centres of 
powers. Power was centred on the executive mayor and the town clerk leading to clashes and 
stepping on of toes during the exercising of these powers. It is obvious that the creation of 
two centres of power was caused by the introduction of the executive mayorship without 
realigning the powers of the town clerk. Prior to 1995 the local government system in Harare 
used the ceremonial mayoral system whereby the mayor was a part time employee of the city 
council. The administration of the city was the sole responsibility of the town clerk 
(Makumbe 1998). The introduction of the executive mayor was aimed at bestowing chief 
executive officer powers upon the elected mayor; this was only going to be achieved through 
making the town clerk subordinate to the mayor who was supposed to carry absolute political 
and administrative authority in the affairs of the city of Harare. I posit that there was no due 
diligence done to align the powers of the town clerk to the new executive mayoral system 
hence it created two centres of power which were detrimental to the capacity of the city to 
function and deliver services to the residents.  
Despite the executive mayor being dismissed in 1999, the Minister and the Registrar General 
did not announce elections in Harare to replace the mayor and the councillors as per the 
Urban Councils Act of 1995, which stipulates that upon the dismissal of the mayor or 
councillor elections to replace must be held before the expiry of the 90 day period. The 
Minister instead of calling an election, appointed a commission to run the affairs of the City 
of Harare; thereby flouting the requirements of the Urban Councils Act of 1995. As stated 
earlier, elections were only held in 2002, after an application to the High Court by the 
Combined Harare Residents’ Association to force the minister and the president to arrange 
elections, which was successful (Kamete 2002). It is important to note that this disregard of 
the law and dismissal of mayors and councillors was happening when ZANU PF was still 
dominant in urban areas and there was no substantial challenge to its power. Current 
literature on local government in the City of Harare paints a picture which assumes that the 
flouting of the law and dismissal of the councillors was as a result of the opposition political 
parties taking over urban local authorities. However, the evidence is clear that meddling by 
the Ministry of Local Government and disregarding the law did not start when the opposition 
took control of Harare. The meddling only intensified and came into the public domain after 
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the takeover by the opposition. The intensification was as a result of disjuncture between 
central state and local authorities. My argument is that ZANU PF had set a patron-client form 
of state (evidenced by offering jobs on a patronage basis) so losing control of the local state 
resulted in the loss of largesse for patronage resulting in increased attempts to recapture the 
local state.  
Before the 2002 local government elections in the City of Harare were held, the events 
surrounding  the dismissal of the  mayor (Tavengwa) and council presented two issues that 
would pose a challenge to the next elected mayor and councillors. The first issue was that the 
city’s personnel was bloated; therefore there was a need lay off redundant staff. The second 
issue was that the personnel, because of the nature of their appointment, were politicised and 
were pro-ZANU PF, since the majority was appointed directly by ZANU PF councillors. 
These two issues primed the political battle which the incoming executive mayor of the 
opposition was going to experience.  
6.2.2.2 The new opposition executive mayor 
After the 2002 local government elections in the City of Harare the opposition MDC 
candidate for the mayorship Elias Mudzuri won. The new executive mayor was a qualified 
civil engineer and had vast experience working as an engineer both in government and the 
private sector. Politically he was a strong activist and a founding member of the MDC. In 
terms of wards the MDC won 42 out of 43 wards with ZANU PF only winning one ward. 
This was a complete revolution in the City of Harare as ZANU PF had had unfettered control 
of the city since 1980. The victory in the City of Harare was not replicated in the presidential 
elections held at the same time and the parliamentary elections held the previous two years 
where ZANU PF won. This presented a situation whereby the central state was controlled by 
ZANU PF whilst the local state was controlled by the opposition. In a democratic state this 
situation is not supposed to pose serious problems and political contestation.  
What complicated the centre-local relationship was that the politics of the day was ruled by 
polarity and violence against members of the opposition (LeBas 2006). The ZANU PF 
viewed the MDC as a political project of the West created to cause regime change in 
Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos 2000). Because ZANU PF’s grip on power had never been seriously 
challenged, it resorted to using the state machinery and its state bureaucratic patronage 
system to fight its political battles. Raftopoulos (2000) cites examples where the army, state 
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controlled media, police, the civil service (bureaucrats) and the judiciary were used to fight 
the opposition’s grip on power. This created a daunting challenge to the MDC to effect 
meaningful change in the City of Harare as the ZANU PF’s state was resisting its grip on 
power. An example is when the Minister of Local Government refused to officiate at the 
installation of MDC executive mayors of Bulawayo, Masvingo, Chitungwiza and Chegutu 
cities after they won elections fairly (Kamete 2003; Tamborinyoka 2002).  
This was exacerbated by the fact that decentralisation in Zimbabwe was not 
constitutionalised, but was borne out of an act of parliament. The Minister of Local 
Government was responsible for administering this act of parliament. As stated by Olowu 
(2003) during the process of legalising decentralisation in the African context, windows were 
left for the central state to intervene in the affairs of the decentralised institutions. The MDC 
in the City of Harare also faced the problem of ZANU PF installed senior executives. As 
previously stated, the fact is that ZANU PF survived on patronage hence appointment to 
senior positions in central or local spheres was based on patronage not merit in most cases. 
The new executive mayor was faced with the challenge of not stepping on the toes of the 
already powerful town clerk who was directly reporting to the central ministry as the Urban 
Councils Act of 1995 dictates. In such situations even if the senior administrative officials of 
the decentralised institutions were not politicised, there would have been a problem as those 
officials were supposed to account to both the executive mayor and the central government. 
The problem was complicated by the fact that the executive mayor and the minister were 
from different political parties thereby presenting differences in their approaches to 
governance and ideology. The senior administrative officials were sandwiched between 
contesting political visions thereby spending considerable effort and time navigating political 
battles instead of executing their professional duties. It can be argued that the first executive 
mayor was preoccupied with fighting political battles rather than addressing service delivery.  
In terms of the status of the City of Harare, when the opposition took over it had not had a 
substantive elected council for three years. The city had been run by a commission appointed 
by the central government. There were serious challenges in delivering services to the 
residents. The city’s personnel was bloated and some of the council workers were political 
activists, an example being Joseph Chinotimba, the council’s municipal chief inspector of 
police who must have been appointed to this position because of political patronage because 
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he had no formal educational qualifications. He was known for spearheading farm invasions 
and terrorising opposition supporters while on council time (Carver 2002).  
6.2.2.3 The suspension 
From the moment the executive mayor of the City of Harare took over, he was in constant 
political battles with the Minister of Local Government and the senior administrative staff. In 
an attempt to regularise the city’s personnel the mayor laid off redundant labour (Mukaro 
2005). The affected personnel had been appointed directly by former ZANU PF councillors 
so it seemed as if the mayor and the council were performing a witch hunt hence the Ministry 
of Local Government intervened by trying to protect ‘ZANU PF’ workers suspended by the 
executive mayor of Harare. The reasons for suspension
36
, according to Chikuhwa (2004), 
were as follows:  
 Mismanagement of council resources; 
 Dismissing council workers without valid reasons; and 
 Supporting mass strikes called by the opposition against government. 
The Minister of Local Government used the Urban Council Act of 1995 to suspend the 
mayor. The minister also appointed a commission of enquiry headed by an academic Jameson 
Kurasha and hence it was known as Kurasha Commission. It is important to note that the 
head of the commission was previously a member of the commission which ran the affairs of 
the City of Harare from 1999 to 2002 before the executive mayor from the opposition took 
over. After he completed the investigation, he was appointed a member of the commission 
which ran the affairs of City of Harare after the mayor had been dismissed. His appointment 
was problematic in the sense that the issues which he was investigating were of the period 
when he was part of the commission managing the city so he was party to the personnel 
arrangements of that era. Therefore, fear of his bias may not have been unwarranted. The 
appointment and composition of the commission of enquiry was contested in court and the 
High Court declared that the commission was appointed improperly (Kamete 2006). This 
judgement was only passed after the commission had finished its work and had submitted its 
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report and recommendations to the Minister of Local Government. The report of the 
commission was never made public.  
In response to the judgement, the minister appointed another commission headed by a lawyer, 
Johannes Tomana. That commission recommended that the mayor be dismissed. The minister 
dismissed the mayor (News24 2004, 16 April). There are some important points to note; the 
first point is that the minister dismissed the mayor without affording him the opportunity to 
see the report prepared by the Tomana Commission (The Standard 2004, 25 July. p 2). The 
second point is that up to now the report has never been made public. This goes against the 
principle of fair justice and subverts democratic principles of openness, accountability and 
people’s wishes. The allegations against the mayor bordered on criminality so one would 
have assumed that since the Tomana commission recommended dismissal of the mayor 
criminal charges would have been laid against the mayor. This did not happen which brings 
to the fore the inference that the dismissal of the mayor was motivated by political reasons. 
According to the Minister of Local Government the dismissal of the mayor was in the 
interests of the residents of Harare. The very same residents who the minister purports to 
represent were not afforded the opportunity to scrutinisze the veracity of the report or decide 
on the course of action to be taken against the mayor, since it was them who voted him into 
power. In a normal democratic state the dismissal of the executive mayor is supposed to be 
the responsibility of the residents who voted him into office, not an appointed minister from 
an opposing political party, who is only accountable to the president. This is evidence that the 
state under ZANU PF believes that absolute power rests with the central state and hence it 
cannot tolerate disjuncture or a different approach to how it operates. This highlights the 
main thrust of this study of the vision of local authorities. The non-tolerance of vision from 
other political parties controlling local authorities is clear in this case. The belief by ZANU 
PF is that it holds the vision of all local authorities hence any deviation from what the central 
state dictates is punishable.  
In any democratic state the elections are a process which is used to afford citizens power to 
hold the governors accountable and it also affords citizens the opportunity to choose their 
own leaders. In a representative democracy like Zimbabwe, once elected the representatives 
are supposed to advance the wishes of the electorate. It is only proper that the removal of 
elected representatives, therefore, should be done according to the wishes of the very same 
electorate who elected them. If the electorate is not involved in the process of removal of 
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elected representatives then democracy is subverted. It is important to note there is very little 
literature which tries to explain the process of removing elected representatives in situations 
such as in Zimbabwe. However, it also important to note that the new constitution of 2013 
section 278 advocates two ways for the removal of mayor, deputy mayor and councillors 
from office. The first is the recall process which is similar to the removal of a member of 
parliament. The second method is the use of an independent tribunal.  
6.3 Intra-local contestation / disjuncture    
Contestation is not only experienced between the central state and the local state but also 
within the local state. The contestation within the local state is between the city 
administrators / bureaucracy and the elected councillors and mayors. The disjuncture within 
the local state also involves the central state. In order to understand this disjuncture it is 
important to revisit the structure of accountability in the City of Harare, examine its impact 
on the local disjuncture, and to cite examples. The results of this study show that the 
disjuncture is caused by three main issues:  
1. The system of local government (reporting and accountability structures); 
2.  Suspicion of political activism; and  
3. Division/allocation of the roles of administrators and elected ward councillors.  
6.3.1 Reporting structures of local government system in the City of Harare 
The bureaucratic local government structure in Zimbabwe has dual reporting structures where 
bureaucrats. While on the one hand, they are expected to report to the central government 
through the Ministry of Local Government, and on the other, they are also expected to report 
to the elected councillors and the mayor. This system poses serious challenges, as city 
administrators are accountable to three different stakeholders, which are the central state, 
councillors and the residents who are the receivers of the services. As stated earlier, all the 
senior administrative staff is appointed by the Local Government Board; according to the 
Urban Councils Act of 2008, the elected councillors can only recommend their dismissal or 
appointment but the final decision is made by the Local Government Board with the approval 
of the Ministry of Local Government.  
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The administrative officials’ professional accountability is divided between the central state 
bureaucrats and the local authority political leadership. It can be argued that this creates a 
professional accountability conundrum which is difficult for the bureaucrats to navigate in 
situations where the central government and the local authority political leadership give 
conflicting policy direction. It also affects the autonomy of the local authority as it has no 
control over its human resources hence it loses critical leverage to implement the policies it 
has crafted. By virtue of senior administrative staff reporting to the central government 
through the Ministry, an assumption is created that senior administrative officials are there as 
proxies of the ruling party
37
. One community leader supported this assumption by saying: 
“Administrative officials were appointed by powerful politicians at times, they are 
whipped to follow orders now and then.” 
This problem was compounded by the introduction of the executive mayoral system which 
created two centres of power. One councillor in the City of Harare highlighted the problem of 
the bureaucrats by saying:  
“Those guys do not report to us, they report directly to the Ministry of Local 
Government and we are just bystanders in the whole process.” 
Politically, the councillors are also required to report both to the Ministry of Local 
Government and to their political parties. This creates a situation where each and every issue 
is contested because of known political differences between the opposition and the ruling 
party. If the policies prescribed by the Ministry of Local Government differ from the policies 
of the elected representatives (councillors and mayor); then a political battle ensues between 
the bureaucrats and the councillors. It can be assumed that normally they are likely to 
implement central government directives for two reasons.  Firstly, all the senior 
administrators are appointed and can be dismissed by an institution (Local Government 
Board) appointed by the Ministry of Local Government. In order to protect their jobs, they 
have to comply with central government directives or face dismissal. Secondly, precedents 
had been set in the City of Harare; whereby councillors had dismissed or recommended the 
dismissal of senior city administrators and the Ministry of Local Government rescinded the 
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dismissals; thereby portraying a picture that absolute power rests with the Ministry.
38
. 
Examples of this disjuncture and contestation between the senior administrators and the 
elected councillors will be discussed in the following sections. In order to circumvent the 
conundrum of dual professional accountability, I am suggesting that the system of local 
government be reformed, and the mayor be designated as the link (both politically and 
administratively) between the local authority and the central state. This will shield the 
administrative staff from being labelled as ruling party proxies and will enable the local 
authority administrative staff to be under one political party. The proposed system also 
prevents disjuncture between the city administrators and the councillors.  
6.3.2 Suspicion of political activism  
The majority of the councillors and residents of the City of Harare suspect that the city’s 
administrators are ZANU PF political activists who have been appointed to senior posts to 
further ZANU PF political interests. Some of the suspicions come from the fact that most of 
the senior administrative officials were appointed during ZANU PF dominance in the City of 
Harare. There is also the assumption that the Local Government Board is aligned to central 
state, which is controlled by ZANU PF. Some of the appointments as discussed earlier were 
political appointments not based on merit. One councillor said: 
“There is suspicion that since these administrators were appointed during the times 
of ZANU PF then they are aligned to it.” 
The suspicion causes strain and tension in the relationship between councillors and 
administrators. In the event of differences between the councillors and the administrators, 
there is a high possibility that the differences are likely to be branded political differences.  
6.3.3 Misunderstanding of roles  
All administrative officials from the Ministry of Local Government and City of Harare 
interviewed for this study indicated that because the councillors do not understand their roles, 
they often encroach on administrative roles, causing tensions.  One official said:  
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“At times councillors do not understand their role, they want to meddle in 
administrative duties…” 
Another official added to this saying: 
“Councillors want to be involved in administrative issues which are not their turf … 
when we try to correct them they say we are being resistant to them and call the 
whole process insubordination.” 
One official indicated that in some cases councillors are involved in parcelling out land for 
housing which is the duty of the administrative officials. The official went onto explain that 
they faced this problem even when ZANU PF had the majority in the City of Harare, citing 
the  example of land given to housing cooperatives by councillors illegally, and residents 
building on the land without approval of the city’s housing and planning departments. 
According to city’s bylaws such illegal settlements should be demolished.  
“When such illegal issues are raised by officials (administrative) it becomes a 
political issue and might lead to dismissal depending on the political power of the 
councillors who parcelled out that land.” 
The reason for the lack of clarity and misunderstanding of roles can be attributed to the fact 
that they there is no legally binding document which stipulates the roles of councillors. If the 
Acts which give rise to local government in Zimbabwe are silent on the roles of councillors it 
opens the possibility of councillors assuming duties which are not theirs. Therefore, there is a 
need for reform of the Urban Councils Act and the Rural Councils Act.   
Furthermore, the majority of current councillors in the City are new, and have no experience 
of council business. Figure 7 shows the number of years councillors have served (as of March 
2015).  
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Figure 7: Years of experience as a councillor 
 
Various community members and civic leaders believe that the City of Harare has 
inexperienced and poor calibre councillors; hence their failure to use the local government 
system to further their development agenda. Administrative officials also believe that because 
councillors are inexperienced it takes them time to understand their role and act effectively in 
delivering services. Even the current mayor of the City of Harare (from MDC) publicly 
declared that the councillors do not possess enough skills and educational qualification.  The 
following statement appeared in a daily newspaper:  
“In 1927 Harare had two lawyers in council — nearly 90 years later the entire 
country has only one lawyer out of over 2 000 councillors. I would favour the 
inclusion of a non-partisan, non-political basis of individuals with minimum key skills 
that are critical to our tour of duty. Not less than one-third of city fathers
39
 must be 
people that are able to present strong business credentials, academics, engineers, 
lawyers, finance persons, health specialists and others. When this is not achievable or 
achieved through electoral processes, modalities for accommodating special skills 
councillors must be found. 2018 is around the corner and it is time to look for new 
councillors. I prefer non-political actors, but with expertise. You can’t expect me for 
                                                 
39
 The language shows the patriarchal nature of local government politics. Subsequent chapters will show that 
less than 15% of councillors are females.  
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example, to supervise Dr (Prosper) Chonzi
40
 when I am not a doctor and when I do 
not know the difference between ARVs and aspirin”. (Matenga 2015) 
Figure 8 shows the highest educational qualifications of councillors in the City of Harare (as 
of March 2015).  
Figure 8: Highest educational qualification 
 
The low level of education amongst councillors was highlighted by most administrative 
officials as the cause of disjuncture as some of them fail to understand basic procedures and 
documents prepared for them. One respondent said: 
“If you are going to be good councillor you need the ability to understand complex 
documents and understand the whole system of local government in Zimbabwe for you 
to be effective…” 
One central government official reiterated this point by saying:  
“Democracy has no qualification; even the illiterate get elected and this has a huge 
impact on councils.” 
When I pointed out to the respondent that perhaps the administrative officials should help the 
councillors to understand their roles and duties since they are professionals with years of 
experience, the respondent said: 
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“The problem is that of suspicion that we are ZANU PF, so in most cases they do not 
accept our advice.”  
One civic leader observed that the nature of politics in the City means that councillors are not 
elected based on their ability to deliver services but on the political parties they represent. He 
went further to state that:  
“If you look in Harare, I think the MDC is still winning the majority of the wards not 
because of the strength of their local government policy/performance but because 
residents are just fed up with national failures of ZANU PF. Since they took over in 
2002 the service delivery has worsened so we cannot say they are being retained 
because they are providing better services.”  
These perspectives lead one to question the whole system of democratic elections, especially 
representative democracy. Does this system of democracy yield better quality representatives 
who are effective in service delivery? These results show that the current system of 
representative democracy does not produce the best councillors who are capable of delivering 
services. Because of political polarity and preferences candidates are voted in because of the 
political party they represent, and not their qualifications, expertise or experience.  
In response to the problem of councillors encroaching on the roles of administrative officials, 
one official said:  
“It’s simple, councillors need to stop using political influence or muscle on issues 
which should follow administrative protocol.” 
The misunderstanding of roles is not one sided, administrative officials are also accused of 
encroaching on policymaking roles, which are the preserve of councillors. The detailed 
example below shows some of the encroachment by administrative officials on councillors’ 
roles. 
6.3.4 Resignation of the Finance Committee chairperson (2014) 
The finance committee chairperson of the current City of Harare council resigned on 4 
February 2014; citing several reasons for his resignation (Ruwende 2014). After each election 
local authorities are mandated to set up committees composed of councillors. The main 
responsibility of the committees is to hold the administrators under that particular committee 
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accountable for their actions and provide policy direction. The finance committee in the City 
of Harare is responsible for overall financial administration; ensuring that the city’s finances 
are used properly. In a normal situation, the entire city’s revenue and expenditure is supposed 
to be approved by the finance committee before it is ratified by a full council meeting. The 
chairperson of the current committee resigned only after seven months as the chairperson. 
The following excerpt from his letter of resignation raises certain issues. 
“It is with regret that I tender my resignation as chairman of the finance committee and 
indeed the committee itself. I cannot believe that anyone with any self-respect would 
chair the Harare City Council finance committee as it stands and runs today. 
“For over six months we have been waiting for contracts for grade one to four 
employees. This scope, like all the grades is overstaffed for our resources, but the 
packages are extraordinary. This band alone accounts for nearly 10 percent of our wage 
bill. We have no control over contracts, benefits drawn….. 
“… An amazing folly which I cannot accept is a budget of US$ 1, 6 million to sponsor 
a football club in the current economic crisis. Yet Harare City Council cannot afford 
any support to its amenities and associated residents. 
“… I shudder at the water rehabilitation deal that has been signed in the deal. 
Information technology equipment is covered in this contract which I have not seen to 
the tune of over US$1 million. Yet in the HCC budget, we also had a similar budget 
placed for similar equipment….” (City of Harare 2014b, letter of resignation) 
The letter of resignation raised two very critical issues in relevant to intra-local relations. The 
first issue is that the administrative arm of City of Harare feels that there is no obligation for 
them to be accountable to the elected representatives. This is evidenced by their refusal to 
reveal salary scales to the city’s finance standing committee. The issue of salaries is a 
contentious issue in the city of Harare as the media during the same period alleged that the 
city’s administrators were earning mega salaries at the expense of service delivery. 
According to two local newspapers (the state owned The Herald [Machivenyika 2014] and 
Newsday published on the 26
th
 of January 2014) the top 18 directors and the town clerk of the 
city of Harare were earning a total monthly salary of US$500 000 which averages US$26 000 
per month per individual. These salaries were confirmed by the parliamentary local 
government portfolio committee during a public hearing. This is more than some of the 
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average salaries paid to municipal officials of developed countries who have a bigger budget 
and provide better quality services compared to the City of Harare. It has to be noted that 
there is a lot of secrecy with regards to the salaries of top officials to the extent that what they 
earn is not easily accessible to the public or the city councillors.  
In an effort to get to the bottom of the mega salaries, the ceremonial mayor, requested the 
salary schedule of the top executives of the city from the town clerk who refused to provide 
the schedule. In response the mayor suspended the town clerk pending a disciplinary hearing. 
The mayor was forced to withdraw the letter of suspension by the Minister of Local 
Government a day after the town clerk was suspended (Muperi 2014). This resulted in the 
mayor ending up with an egg on his face but also entrenched insubordination as the 
implication was that the mayor was powerless. It also perpetuated disjuncture in an institution 
which is supposed to be united. 
The impact of these mega salaries on the City’s ability to deliver services and service its 
residents can be best presented by examining the proportion of the city’s wage bill against 
expenditure on service delivery. Table 5 presents the wage bill (employment costs) compared 
to expenditure on service delivery.  
Table 5: Percentage of employment costs in the City of Harare budget 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
41
 
Employment costs  96% 73% 65% 55% 48% 48% 40% 
Service delivery cost 4% 27% 35% 45% 52% 52% 60% 
Source: City of Harare 2014 Budget 
The Ministry of Local Government guidelines stipulate that both rural and urban councils are 
to cap their employment costs at 30% of their total budget. The City of Harare has not met 
this requirement for the past 5 years. The majority of the city’s budget is to finance 
employment costs. In 2009 and 2010, the city spent 96% and 73% of the income on 
employment costs respectively. City residents raised this issue in several meetings but it was 
not dealt with during the consultation process adequately. One resident interviewed for the 
current study said: 
                                                 
41
 Projected costs.  
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“If most of the revenue raised goes to pay salaries instead of offering a service, then 
something is wrong in this city. How can we pay someone a salary for not doing their 
job?”  
Another resident concurred with this view by saying:  
“…. We are just donating money to the council.” 
What these salaries show is that the administrators are not accountable to the residents and 
the elected councillors which open the door for looting of council resources. In order to 
address the issue of the huge wage bill, city councils should stick to the Ministry guidelines 
which stipulate that both rural and urban councils should cap their employment costs at 30% 
of their total budget.   
The second issue raised by the resignation letter is that elected councillors have very little 
control over the council’s financial resources. This is problematic in the sense that public 
resources are supposed to be managed in an accountable and open manner. The fact that the 
residents, through the councillors, are not able to play an oversight role in the city’s finances 
is against the democratic principle of active citizenry where the residents are supposed to 
determine the development agenda of their communities. The letter shows two examples of 
misuse of council resources, the first example being the sponsoring of a football club when 
most of the residents are not receiving any services. This shows misplaced priorities in a city 
where most residents are receiving erratic water supply of questionable quality. The second 
example is the duplicity of financial decisions, where the same Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) equipment is budgeted for twice thereby opening a window of 
mismanagement of public resources.  
The fact that the councillors do not have control over the financial resources shows that they 
are mere bystanders in the whole process. One can argue that since the councillors are not 
able to play an oversight role over the administrative officials then there is no room for 
another political party to introduce a new vision and new approaches to governance in local 
authorities in Zimbabwe. If councillors are not able to control the operations of the local 
authority then it can be argued that there is an unshared vision within the local authority. In 
this case the local authority’s vision is determined by the stakeholder who carries more 
power; this goes against good governance and democratic principles.  
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6.4 Contestation of substance  
Contestation of substance refers to the local government policies of the political parties 
controlling central state and local state. It is pertinent to analyse what each political party 
stands for when it comes to decentralisation in Zimbabwe so that the disjuncture at play can 
be understood in its context. It is also important to examine whether the MDC won the urban 
local authorities through the strength of their local government policy or whether it was 
mainly a protest vote. The MDC general policies are mainly centred on neo liberal politics 
with a touch of socialist ideology. The ZANU PF policies are similar although they 
emphasise socialist ideology, which is just rhetoric because in a practical sense they are 
implementing neoliberal policies which are at times adjusted to suit their strategy for political 
survival. One would assume that the battles being fought between the central and local state 
are to please the voters/residents as they have the power to give the governing mandate 
through elections. In order to understand the contestation of substance it is important to 
examine ZANU PF and MDC local government policies using three broad themes which are 
governance, service delivery and community participation.  
6.4.1 Policy differences  
As discussed earlier, governance in this study is defined as a government's ability to make 
and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is 
democratic or not (Fukuyama 2013). In governance there is a distinction between the 
governors and the governed. From ZANU PF’s point of view the party with the mandate to 
govern the central state has absolute authority over all the other state institutions; hence 
decentralised institutions are supposed to propagate the ideals and policies of the central state 
hence there is not room for disjuncture in policies. This perspective has been instilled in all 
the bureaucratic structures of the state. One Ministry of Local Government official espoused 
the fact that there is no disjuncture or argument about which policy to follow in local 
government in Zimbabwe by saying:  
“…there is no unshared vision in local government in Zimbabwe, local authorities 
carry out the policies of the ruling government and we adhere to that...”  
The approach by ZANU PF shows that they believe that the local state is an avenue which the 
central state uses to achieve its developmental objectives. The party does not believe in 
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devolving power to the local level, but rather in a semi-autonomous local state which reports 
to the central state. The central state decides and has to be consulted with before any major 
decisions can be taken by the local state. To reinforce this point, the Minister of Local 
Government was quoted by a daily newspaper in 2004 as saying: “local councils enjoy a 
delegated authority, and thus should follow government and by extension, ZANU PF 
policies” (The Daily Mirror, 30 August 2004: 4) 
The grip which the central state has on the local state has resulted in the local state being used 
to further the ruling party’s fortunes during elections. As discussed earlier, ZANU PF created 
a clientalistic state which depends on the spheres of the state for its patronage network hence 
there is a need for the central state to control the local state and perpetuate the patronage 
system. Losing control of the local state means losing the means to pay patronage rewards, 
and eventually losing the political favours during the elections. The local authorities in 
Zimbabwe have been manipulated so that they serve ZANU PF interests. This is highlighted 
by one of the City of Harare administrative officials interviewed for this study.  
“…In most cases we are afraid to go against the ZANU PF, taking action against 
them has its own consequences. A good example is the illegal parcelling out of 
council land to ZANU PF aligned cooperatives by ZANU PF politicians. We can’t do 
anything about it because if you raise these issues you will find yourself unemployed. 
Even the local councillors cannot evict these cooperatives because once they try to do 
that they will be dismissed…” 
What this shows is that the local state is a pawn of the central state and is expected to follow 
directives from the central state. The situation is that either you carry out the directives of the 
central state (ZANU PF) or you are dismissed. This situation applies for both the elected 
councillors and administrators. This has affected how the local state is governed and the 
professionalism of the local state administrators. It has also subverted the purported 
neoliberal democratic politics in Zimbabwe. In Harare the electorate voted to be governed by 
the MDC hence their wishes must be respected.  
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The approach of the MDC to governance is the devolution of power
42
 and letting the 
citizens/residents decide on governance. What is lacking in the practical approach of both the 
MDC and ZANU PF is their failure to put service delivery above politics. A critical analysis 
of service delivery in Harare shows that the central state and the local state through their 
governing political parties prioritised national political battles, instead of service delivery to 
the residents. One of the community leaders interviewed for this study highlighted this by 
saying:  
“What is evident is that these two political parties are caught up in this big political 
battle and they are forgetting the residents of Harare. This is the reason why we have 
such appalling level of service delivery.” 
One of the residents and a self-confessed member of the MDC added that:  
“…when you read the MDC’s local government policy you will find out that there is 
an emphasis on citizens governing themselves, but this not happening, why? Now our 
councillors in Harare want to introduce prepaid water meters, who did they consult? 
They want us to pre pay for unsafe water?” 
Other residents said that the last time their taps were running was in 2008, but they still pay a 
fixed water charge 7 years later. The majority of the MDC councillors in Harare blame the 
Ministry of local government for its interference which leads to poor delivery of services. 
They place all the challenges they face squarely at the door of the Ministry of Local 
Government. A deeper analysis of the MDC governing period since 2002 shows that there is 
prioritisation of winning political battles against the Ministry of Local Government. In the 
process, accountability has been shifted from the councillors to the central government hence 
the tendency to blame the central government for poor service delivery and in turn the central 
government blames the MDC councillors. One would expect both the central state and local 
state to deliver services to the residents but this has been converted into political battles 
which do not help the residents.  
One MDC councillor in Harare said:  
                                                 
42
 The issue of devolution is propounded by a large constituency in the MDC which is the Matabeleland region 
mainly made up of the Ndebele tribe. The argument is that the Shona dominated government failed to bring 
development to Matebeleland provinces hence the need for devolution so that the Matebeleland people can 
determine their own development agenda.  
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“If the system does not favour us how can we deliver services?” 
This researcher agrees that the system does not favour opposition political parties controlling 
local authorities. However, the opposition could be more pragmatic in their approach to 
deliver services. Instead of focusing on fighting political battles, the MDC could have taken a 
different approach aimed at improving service delivery in local authorities. They could have 
started by implementing their policy on active citizenry. What is evident is that the MDC 
councillors do not value community views and do not consult on decisions they take in the 
council. The only time they are compelled to consult is during the budget consultation 
process. 
Literature on decentralisation shows that devolution is not a panacea for poor service 
delivery. Devolved local authorities may fail to deliver services, whilst deconcentrated local 
authorities are delivering better services. Of course, the issue of disjuncture has a bearing on 
the ability of the decentralised institution to deliver services but one has to examine 
disjuncture in other countries, for example South Africa. In South Africa the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) won the Cape Town metropolitan city when the Western Cape was still under 
the African National Congress (ANC). What the DA pursued was not abrasive politics, but 
improved service delivery in the metropolitan area. This enabled them to win the elections in 
the Western Cape Province twice (in the 2009 and 2014 elections).  The lesson which can be 
learnt from this is that the DA as the governing stake holder in a local authority which is 
under the broader central state government of ANC did not take a confrontational approach 
but channelled its efforts towards better service delivery. The same could have happened in 
the City of Harare. One City of Harare administrator said: 
“…. if the MDC were to lose power in the next election, what infrastructure will they say 
this is our legacy? Nothing! … at the present moment everything is on standstill because 
of politics, why can’t everyone say let’s forget about politics and fix this city?” 
6.5 Conclusion  
The various examples of disjuncture/contestation show that the central state and the local 
state do not share the same vision. Vision is defined in this study as the ability of the state 
(local or central) to think or act about the future development agenda of its citizens and how 
it is supposed to be achieved. Vision is shaped by the political ideology of the political party 
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controlling any tier of the state. Political ideology also defines the processes which the state 
must use to achieve development. The research related to this section revealed that there is a 
contestation between the central state and the local state in the following areas: political 
ideology, processes, and political personal differences. These differences show that there is 
unshared vision in local government in the City of Harare. One would argue that the goal of 
each and every political party should be to see the state fulfilling its development agenda, but 
in this case this goal is not sacrosanct as other issues like political survival become more 
important because of unshared vision in local government. The interference by the Minister 
of local governance is a direct defending of ZANU PF’s political grip on local authorities. 
The main argument is that ZANU PF has used state resources to fight its party political 
battles. There is also strong centralisation of the local authorities which the raises the 
argument by Bland (2011: 348) that this results in the intrusion of national politics in local 
authorities rendering them unable to respond to local community needs. The contestation in 
the City of Harare can be summarised by Linder (2009: 3) who states: “The process of 
decentralisation is always political, accompanied by conflict as new actors gain and old actors 
lose power”. 
In the next chapter the issue of public participation will be discussed, which is a critical 
component of decentralisation and democracy. The approach is to examine how the 
contestation of vision in the City of Harare has influenced citizen participation 
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CHAPTER 7 : ACTIVE CITIZENRY AMIDST 
POLITICAL CONTESTATION 
“All politicians in my own view serve their own interests first, and then their families, 
relatives and then the general residents will follow last.” (City of Harare Resident) 
7.1 Introduction  
The literature review has shown that in the African context the principles of decentralisation 
are not being applied in practice. As highlighted in Chapter 2 decentralisation must be able to 
transfer power and hold the state accountable to its citizens. It must also enable citizens to 
play a role and contribute to shaping the developmental trajectory of both the central and 
local state. Transfer of power and accountability requires a transformation of political and 
state structures so that the public have genuine access to power which enables them to hold 
state bureaucrats and political parties accountable. The previous chapter has shown that this 
has not happened in Zimbabwe. Instead, ZANU PF has created an interventionist state, which 
has made it difficult to separate the public and the private spheres in social life. The state is 
reluctant to cede some of its governance powers and functions to local authorities; let alone 
citizens.  
The Zimbabwean context has shown that the central state at some point believed in the 
involvement of ordinary citizens in development planning through the VIDCOs, WADCOs 
and DDCs (as discussed in Chapter 4). In this chapter policy contradictions in the relationship 
between public participation, governance and development will be examined.  The chapter is 
based on the premise that Zimbabwe sees itself as a democracy. Therefore, one should expect 
the state to promote ‘a rule by the people or, at least, ‘rule with the consent of the governed’ 
(Diamond 1990). It also regards decentralisation as a process of bringing government closer 
to the people.  
The previous chapter dealt with the various contestations within the City of Harare and they 
have shown that there is a bitter political struggle between the central state and the City of 
Harare. The rhetoric peddled by the contesting parties is that the bitter struggle is centred on 
advancing the wishes of the ordinary residents of the City of Harare. The intervention by the 
Minister of Local Government in various instances in the City of Harare is premised on the 
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understanding that he/she is furthering and defending the interests of the residents. On the 
other hand, the elected councillors view themselves as the bona fide representatives of the 
residents of the City of Harare. This chapter will examine how residents are part of 
governance systems of the City of Harare amidst the political disjuncture and will examine 
the purported claim by the contesting parties that they represent the residents of the City of 
Harare. It also examines how the residents hold the bureaucrats and political actors 
accountable. Within all this examination the focus is on presenting the perspectives of the 
residents of the City of Harare. At the end of this chapter, a case study of the budgeting 
process is presented to illustrate the level of public participation within the City of Harare.  
7.2 Public participation, governance and development 
Public participation is a very important concept in decentralisation as it is regarded as the 
driving force for better governance and service delivery. Gaventa and Valderama (1999: 7) 
define public participation as the exercise of power by various actors in the spaces created for 
the interaction between citizens and local authorities. Through public participation, citizens 
claim the right to participate in decision making which affects their lives and well-being and 
promotes active citizenry (Cornwall and Coelho 2007). It also entails the redistribution of 
decision-making power from the state to citizens as a core element of a democratic 
governance system (Zinyama 2012: 76). In democracies, public participation is regarded as a 
basic principle. Governments derive their power from the citizens so they have an obligation 
to respond to citizen’s needs in local government, it leads to government or the state meeting 
the real needs of the community (Mafunisa and Xaba 2008: 454).  
The decentralisation process does not guarantee that the decentralised institution is going to 
implement an effective public participation process. Decentralisation (delegation and 
deconcentration) can result in local authorities being agents of the central state which mean 
they are mainly there to further the development vision of the central state with very limited 
contribution from the local communities. In some cases (for example devolution), 
decentralisation can also ensure that the local state, through effective public participation, is 
the agent of the public who consume the goods and services produced. In the case of the City 
of Harare, the Minister of Local Government claims to be an agent of the consuming public 
hence the various interventions in the operational matters of the City of Harare. On the other 
hand, the councillors, by virtue of being elected by the consuming public, also claim that they 
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are their agents. If these claims are taken at face value it will mean that the City of Harare is 
the agent of the consuming public since the Ministry of Local Government and the elected 
councillors claim to be working for the public. I am of the opinion that given the level of 
disjuncture within the City of Harare and between the councillors and the central state, there 
is something amiss with regards to the agency being claimed by these two stakeholders. This 
warrants a further examination of how the issue of agency gives rise to public participation. 
By virtue of claiming agency, it means there must be a process which is used to source, 
include and incorporate the development aspirations and wishes of the consuming public by 
these two stakeholders.  
The stakeholders allude to a situation whereby public participation is incorporated into a 
system of governance so that the residents can determine their own developmental agenda 
which their ‘agents’ will implement. In this way a link is created between public 
participation, governance and development. The link between these three aspects describes 
the extent of a shared vision between the various stakeholders in decentralised local 
authorities.  It also measures the practicalities of decentralisation within the context of 
different actors claiming to be agents of the public. The triangle in Figure 9 illustrates the 
relationship between public participation, governance and development.  
Figure 9: Link between public participation, governance and development 
 
The triangle highlights three important issues in a democracy. For governance to be effective 
it requires sufficient concentration and autonomy of power to be divested bestowed on the 
governors to choose and implement policies with energy and vigour (Diamond 1990). Public 
participation entails the need to hold those in power (governors) accountable to popular 
scrutiny, representation and control. A closer examination of these two indicates that a 
conflict can be created between the governors and the public. If the consuming public has too 
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much power it will stifle the power and ability of the governors to choose and implement 
policies; leading to a ‘hamstrung’ government. This situation is reversed if there is too much 
concentration of power in the governors; leading to a situation where the consuming public 
loses its access to power and its ability to influence decisions. The third critical component of 
the triangle is development / service delivery. In a mature democracy, the legitimacy of the 
governors depends on effective performance in delivering development to the citizens. 
Failure to deliver development influences the attitude of the citizens because, through public 
participation, they can change the governors (Kohli 1993). The assumption is that in a 
democracy, the electorate is supposed to reward office holders they approve of and throw out 
the ones they are dissatisfied with (Randall and Svasand 2002: 5). In such a situation public 
participation becomes a vital tool for enforcing accountability and oversight over the 
governors. The ideal situation in local authorities is a situation where the correlation between 
governance, public participation and service delivery is strong.  
The following sections of this chapter examine how the system of decentralisation in the City 
of Harare conforms to or deviates from this triangle of public participation. It also examines 
the agency of the central state and the locally elected councillors. It also examines the 
avenues which the residents use to influence the development trajectory of the City of Harare. 
Throughout the chapter, there is an analysis of how the disjuncture and political contestation 
among the various governors has affected (either positively or negatively) the residents of the 
City of Harare. 
7.3 Avenues for public participation in Harare  
The system of local government in Zimbabwe does not prescribe what the councillors should 
do between the elections, with regards to community engagement. However, there are 
avenues which the residents can use to engage with the administrative officials and 
councillors. Residents may raise administrative issues at various district offices in the city. 
The issues raised at these offices are mainly related to fault reporting for example burst water 
pipes, faulty street lights and so forth. All the other issues which have anything to do with the 
governance of the council are supposed to be raised with the ward councillors. Nationally 
citizens are expected to engage with the Members of Parliament from their elective 
constituency. 
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Most ward councillors interviewed said that for ease of consultation they meet the residents 
of their ward once in a month on a stipulated day of the week, for example, the first Tuesday 
of the month. The meeting venues are also fixed so that the residents are not confused. It is 
expected that those who would like to raise issues with the councillors will have to attend 
these meetings and engage with the councillors. Some councillors regard these meetings as 
feedback meetings, where they can update their ward residents on programmes which the 
council is carrying out in the city. The Urban Councils Act of 2008 is not very clear on how 
councillors must interact with their wards. However, in the Handbook for Induction of 
Councillors, great emphasis is placed on that fact that a good councillor must consult 
regularly with his/her ward. The only time the City of Harare is expected to consult and show 
evidence of consultation is during the budget formulation process (According to Circular 3 of 
2012 as a directive by the Minister of Local Government).  
While all the councillors interviewed, alluded to the fact that they consult residents on a 
monthly basis, this assertion this contradicts other sources of data on consultation. Reports by 
the City of Harare residents’ associations show that councillors hardly consult. For example, 
during the period July 2013 to June 2014 the Harare Residents Trust
43
 documented that on 
average, City councillors in Harare held only one formal consultative meeting (Harare 
Residents Trust [HRT] 2014). Even though consultation of residents may have happened 
informally, it is suspected that the HRT was merely talking about a formal invitation.  
Furthermore, citizens themselves indicated that monthly meetings do not occur, that they do 
not even know who their councillor is, and that the first time they saw their councillor was on 
the ballot paper on voting day. The elective wards also lack structures such as Ward War 
Rooms found in South Africa. These are structures which involve various stakeholders who 
meet and work regularly, to advance the aspirations of the ward residents. In the case of the 
City of Harare the absence of systems and structures which allow politically acquired 
structures to translate into neutral development structures which in turn, serve the 
community/ward as whole, has resulted in the politicisation of the genuine community 
development issues. As discussed earlier, Zimbabwe is a country marked by political polarity 
and violence which might be a contributing factor which makes it difficult for the creation of 
ward structures which represent all the residents as they are open to capture by political 
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 According to officials from HRT, they send representatives to all the official meetings called for by the 
councillors in each and every ward in the City of Harare.  
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parties. Later in this chapter evidence will be provided to show that ward structures are 
politicised to the extent that there is a perception that the councillors only represent the 
members of their party as compared to all the community members. 
The City of Harare employs various methods to communicate with the residents; including 
public notices on radio, television, flyers, newspapers, and council notices boards. The 
residents may also attend full council meetings as observers and have access to council 
minutes. An interesting observation is that, full council meeting minutes are in most cases 
useless to the residents as they mostly refer to council committee meetings which are closed 
to the public. Without access to committee meetings residents are not be able to make sense 
of the bulk of full council meeting minutes.  
7.4 Representative democracy in Harare  
The City of Harare conforms to the type of democracy which is a representative democracy. 
In Zimbabwe, the nature of democracy entails citizens electing representatives who will sit 
either in a local authority councils or parliament. These representatives may be independent 
candidates or from political parties. The assumption is that citizens are knowledgeable to 
elect representatives who will represent them for a specific term (five years in local 
government).   
Participation in a representative democracy manifests in citizens engaging in political parties, 
and voting in national and local elections (Hingels et al. 2009: 3). In a democracy, the 
electorate is supposed to reward office holders they approve of, and throw out the ones they 
are dissatisfied with (Randall and Svasand 2002: 5). While voting occurs periodically, what is 
critical is to understand what happens between election periods. For example, do the citizens 
have the power and opportunity to influence decisions between elections? Several scholars 
have tried to answer this question which varies across countries in Africa. However, the 
underlying general agreement is that, on the African continent, there have been muted 
attempts by governments to achieve effective citizen control of public decision-making 
process in decentralised institutions. Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) noted that, for effective 
citizen control to be achieved, there is a need to change the perceptions of citizens from being 
‘users and choosers’, to being ‘makers and shapers’ of interventions and services. For 
effective public participation to be achieved, Gaventa and Valderama (1999) stated that 
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citizen education and awareness building, training of officials, alliances with civil society, 
and advocacy is crucial for citizen control.  
In the City of Harare, all the current councillors come from political parties. The interviews 
conducted with the residents of Harare show that councillors are elected not because of their 
ability, but because of the political party they represent. Political parties play a large role in 
determining who is going to be elected as a councillor. In terms of qualities they would look 
for in a councillor, most of the residents indicated that they prefer councillors who are honest, 
hardworking, and have people at heart.  
“We normally look at councillors who are hardworking, honest and have people at 
heart but the first selection issue is which political party they are coming from.” 
One resident emphasised this point by saying: 
“I only vote for a councillor from the political party of my choice.” 
The tendency to prioritise the political party instead of the qualities of councillors can be 
explained by the nature of national politics. Nationally most urban voters believe that the 
economic problems they are experiencing are as a result of ZANU PF. Therefore, there is a 
need to vote it out of power. It can be argued that voting for the opposition is more of a 
protest vote. National election results show that, since 2002, the opposition has been winning 
the majority of wards and parliamentary constituencies in urban areas.  
The polarity of the national politics leads one to expect voters to stick to one political party; 
both nationally and locally. This brings to bear a second question:  Is the opposition winning 
the elections in urban local authorities because of the calibre of their candidates, or are they 
beneficiaries of a protest vote against ZANU PF? One resident’s observation may hint at an 
answer to the question above. The resident said:  
“Unfortunately, councillors are imposed on people by political parties even though 
they have little education and experience.” 
However, several inferences can be drawn. Since the opposition took over in 2002, service 
delivery has decreased to appalling levels Even though some of the opposition councillors 
were caught up in proven corrupt activities, the residents still voted for them. One can infer 
from this that national politics is playing a role in influencing who gets elected at the local 
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level. Therefore, it can be said that the political situation in Zimbabwe, and specifically the 
City of Harare, is not conducive to the election of the best councillors. The quality and calibre 
of the councillors are superceded by their political affiliations.  
7.4.1 Whose views do these councillors represent? 
This question was posed to city residents and elicited some very interesting responses. The 
objective was to get an understanding of whether councillors represent the views of the 
residents. One resident said:  
“No! No! Councillors do not represent my views; most of them have their agendas 
that have nothing to do with residents. Once voted in, they forget about their 
promises.” 
Another resident said: 
“All politicians in my own view serve their own interests first, and then their families, 
relatives and then the general residents will follow last.”  
Almost all the residents’ association / civil society leaders interviewed echoed the opinion 
that the councillors serve their own interests, and do not represent the interests of the general 
residents. One resident, when pressed what course of action he takes if councillors do not 
represent his wishes, said:  
“Personally, I have stopped voting since it’s not making any difference. No councillor 
is serious to represent my vote.”  
The feeling amongst residents is that the councillors are not representing their needs and 
aspirations. It is important to note that the councillors being referred to here are from the 
opposition MDC. The residents also believe that the Minister of Local Government in 
Zimbabwe does not represent them. If these views are to be generalised
44
 across the City of 
Harare then it shows that there is a huge gap between what politicians represent and what 
residents want. One respondent said:  
                                                 
44
 As stated in the methodology section, the residents sample did not allow for generalisation but it captured 
views from low, middle and high income groups within the City of Harare. 
 
 147  
 
“Despite voting, I do not think we have the power to change anything, even if we 
complain there is no response from authorities.” 
What this shows is that there is a clear disassociation between what the councillors represent 
and what the residents want; there is also no consequence for non-delivery of service. The 
whole electoral process becomes detached from public participation and at times the residents 
themselves do not see the reason why they should continue participating in a process over 
which they have no control over and yields no tangible benefits to them. The complexity of 
the political context in Zimbabwe limits how the residents punish the governors for non-
performance. Public participation is still relevant but it has been overshadowed by national 
politics to the extent that the residents in the City of Harare are now lenient towards the 
governors even though they are not delivering. 
7.3.1.1 Gender representation in the City of Harare  
Gender representation is important if the objective of inclusiveness is to be achieved in 
decentralised local authorities. Since 2002, women’s representation in the composition of the 
City council has been below 15%. Gender representation from 2002 to March 2015 is 
depicted in Figure 10 below:  
Figure 10: Gender representation in the City of Harare Council 
 
Figure 10 does not paint a good picture of gender representation in the City of Harare. It 
shows that the overwhelming majority of the councillors are males. This goes against the 
policy pronouncements of the MDC which advocate for gender equality in council and other 
2002 2008 2013
% of Female Councillors 11 11 11
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political body representation. This skewed representation of females in the City of Harare is 
ironic in the sense that an observation made by the Harare Residents Trust (2014) over the 
years was that the majority of participants of council budget meetings are females as 
compared to males. Given the cultural context of the City of Harare; failure in service 
delivery is felt more by the females who are culturally responsible for the majority of 
household chores like cooking, cleaning, laundry and so forth; it is these women who bear the 
brunt of fetching water from open wells yet they are not represented in the city council.  
The problem of non-representation is entrenched to the extent that even the few elected 
female councillors do not hold any positions of influence in the city council’s committees. At 
the present moment, only two females are deputy committee chairpersons and none are 
chairperson, mayor or deputy mayor. What this means is that there is under-representation of 
issues which are faced by women in the City of Harare as the majority of decision makers are 
males. I argue that there is a need for political parties to ensure that the political environment 
and system guarantee equity in gender representation in the candidates put forward for 
election as councillors. The argument is that if more women are elected as councillors then 
the decisions taken will reflect more accurately the issues affecting women who bear the 
brunt of poor service delivery. I take cognisance of recent work on gender representation 
which shows that equitable representation does not always yield a critical representation of 
women’s issues. However, equitable representation in itself is a step forward. If the MDC and 
ZANU PF had wanted to address the issue of gender inequality they could have fielded more 
female candidates but this has never happened. Even the language of these political parties 
resists female leadership and refers to city leadership as ‘city fathers’. There is a need for 
political parties in the City of Harare to address gender inequality not only fielding females as 
candidates but female candidates who are effective decision makers.  
7.4.2 What happens in between elections in Harare?  
As discussed earlier, representative democracy works on the premise that the elected 
councillors represent the interests of the electorate. Representation can be achieved in two 
ways. In the first instance, the elected representative can continuously consult the electorate 
on various issues during the course of his/her term. Secondly, the elected representative is 
entrusted with making decisions on behalf of the residents using his/her own judgement. 
However, what is missing, is the role of the political parties from whence the representatives 
come. Political parties by nature have their own agenda and policies, which they peddle 
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between elections. In the case of representation in the city, there is clear evidence that the 
representatives hardly consult the electorate between the elections. Most residents 
interviewed feel very bitter about the lack of consultation and visibility by the councillors. 
Several residents said:  
“We only see councillors when they come to campaign for elections.” 
“Once elected, they don’t come back to us.” 
“There is total silence in my ward. I do not even know who the councillor is. I will 
just wait till 2018.” 
The views expressed here indicates that public participation ends once voting is completed 
during elections, and that residents have no further say in the affairs of the city. Some 
residents felt very strongly that they must be involved in the entire decision-making process. 
One resident said:  
“Ratepayers should be involved in decision-making in the council rather than them 
making decisions that deprive ratepayers.” 
Some of the residents even felt that councillors have no power to make decisions in the 
council once elected.  
“Councillors are doing nothing once elected into office.” 
“In council affairs councillors are passive participants, they are not doing anything 
visible. Maybe I do not know; as for residents, there is zero consultation.” 
These views allude to the disjuncture between the principles and practicalities of 
representative democracy. The system lacks oversight mechanisms to ensure that, the 
councillors once elected, continue to represent the views of the residents. It would seem that 
the current system only uses the residents as voting fodder; with no expected or elicited 
contribution from them between elections. If democratic decentralisation is to achieve its 
objectives, then there is a need processes whereby residents can have decision-making 
powers and are able to participate in governance matters between elections. 
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7.4.3 Role of civil society and community forums in Harare  
Civil society and community-based forums are pivotal stakeholders in decentralisation and 
governance in any democracy. The growth and development of civil society and community-
based forums largely depend on the environment which is created by the state. These forums 
play a critical role in holding the state accountable and enhancing active citizen engagement 
with the state. According to Diamond (1990: 54), “civil society not only checks and 
scrutinises power; they also enhance the legitimacy of democracy by providing new means to 
express political interests; increasing the political awareness, efficacy, and confidence of 
citizens; and training and recruiting new political leaders.” As stated in the methodology 
chapter, in Harare one would have expected a variety of community-based forums to be in 
existence and being used as a vehicle to advance the agenda of various community members, 
but this is not the case. Such community-based forums or structures enable communities to 
come together and deliberate on issues of service delivery and governance. 
As a researcher I take cognisance of the complexities of civil society in developing countries, 
and am aware that there are various forms of civil society in Zimbabwe. Some are controlled 
by the state, some are only issue based activist civil society groups, some are controlled by 
their funders and some originate within the community and are centred on community issues. 
It is important to note that despite the various debates about aims and objectives of various 
forms of civil society in developing countries, they play a critical role in the development and 
shaping of democracy. A vibrant civil society enhances governance and accountability, and 
strengthens representation and the vitality of democracy. Although the functional capacity 
and effectiveness of the civil society are debatable it is important to note that they can offer a 
platform to transform politically acquired structures into neutral development structures.  
There are two main residents’ associations in Harare; namely. Harare Residents Trust (HRT) 
and Combined Harare Residents’ Association (CHRA). These organisations are not ward 
based and have evolved to become registered non-governmental organisations. They do not 
get their funding from the residents but from local and international donors. Although these 
organisations advance the issues affecting the residents, the residents themselves have no 
control on how these organisations are governed. Most of the residents interviewed stated that 
they have never engaged with these organisations.  
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The fact that the residents’ associations operating in the City are funded by donors, and lack 
continuous engagement with citizens, causes them to be viewed with suspicion by political 
parties, who then question their agenda. Civil society is critical in holding the state 
accountable for its actions. In Harare, where there is a lack of viable community-based 
forums, civil society organisation can be very useful in building the capacity of residents so 
that they can engage meaningfully with the city council.  
All the councillors interviewed in this study admitted that there are no politically neutral 
structures in their wards which focus on governance and service delivery. The only structures 
which are prevalent in the wards are political party structures. Political party structures by 
nature are not representative of the communities. Political party structures push the agenda of 
their political party so they are not suitable as avenues for active citizenry, especially in a 
polarised political environment. The absence of community-based forums in the city of 
Harare depicts the state of poor active citizen engagement as community members lack the 
opportunity to speak with one voice hence in most cases they are not heard.  
Most councillors admitted that they use their political party structures to communicate 
council related information to the residents. One resident confirmed this by saying:  
“The meetings are only called for the members of the political parties.” 
Another resident went further and explained the influence of political structures by saying:  
“Councillors only serve their own members and some of the councillors victimise 
supporters of other political parties.” 
This communication is not likely to reach other residents with no political affiliation or from 
a different political party because of political contestation and polarity between the national 
ruling party ZANU PF and MDC, a good example of such a scenario was observed during the 
2015 budget consultation process meetings where the meetings were punctuated by political 
party slogans; despite the fact that the councillors represent all the residents in the ward. One 
resident emphasised this view by saying:  
“Councillors chant their party slogans at ward meetings and say all the new projects 
were done by their political party even though we know that the projects were funded 
by us through City of Harare.” 
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In order to inculcate a culture of active citizenry in the City, there is a need to create 
platforms where the citizens can participate in making decisions on matters which directly 
affect them. The aim of local democracy is to give the residents genuine access to power 
whilst at the same time ensuring the smooth functioning of state institutions. Several studies 
(Nabatchi 2012, Baiocchi 2001, Cornwall and Coelho 2007, Morrison and Dearden 2013) 
have confirmed that there is a greater chance of achieving a developmental agenda and 
success in development programmes if citizens are part of the whole process.  
7.5 The state and impact of public participation in the 
city of Harare  
The main challenge to public participation is that all the stakeholders in local government, 
except residents, do not seem to take public participation seriously. The main reasons for this 
is that firstly, residents do not have a platform where they are actually involved in 
development planning of their city; secondly,  in cases where the public has been involved in 
consultation, the public voice is only used as a tick boxes by the councillors and the city 
administrators to show that they have consulted the people; thirdly,  there are no attempts by 
various stakeholders in decentralisation to capacitate the residents, so that their contribution 
to decision making is of high quality and effective. Fourthly, national politics is playing a 
major role in how the various stakeholders view active citizenry engagement in the City of 
Harare. Because of national political battles between ZANU PF and the MDC active citizen 
engagement has not been regarded as a key component of decentralisation. This leads to 
decisions being implemented in the City of Harare going off tangent compared to what the 
residents want to see. The residents feel that their representatives and administrators do not 
represent them hence they do not have control over what happens in the City of Harare. 
Lastly, is the argument that in the City of Harare the avenues available for public 
participation by residents does not guarantee that their contribution will be respected and/or 
implemented, or and that they will be able to hold the stakeholders responsible for 
implementation. In this case, it can be argued that in the City of Harare residents are allowed 
to be heard, they have no assurance that their decisions are implemented. This is supported by 
Mushamba (2010: 113) who said that presently the focus of public engagements in local 
government in Zimbabwe is not on participation but on consultation.  
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All the five issues raised above, show that democracy and decentralisation in Zimbabwe is 
not functioning as it should be. Democracy must be a contest of policies and effective 
delivery of services; not a contest of political survival. My argument is that the governors’, 
especially political parties, are of the opinion that they do not need to be legitimised by the 
citizenry of the city. On the one hand, the residents end up with the perception that the state is 
no longer a neutral agent for providing public goods and services, and on the other, the 
governors have become too powerful to the extent that accountability is non-existent, and the 
residents no longer have access to power.  
7.6 Conclusion  
Public participation in the City of Harare must be allowed to play a critical role; given the 
disjuncture in the city. If the City of Harare had a vibrant system which encourages active 
citizen participation, then residents could act as the voice of reason between various political 
stakeholders and bureaucrats who are contesting each other. Since the residents are the 
receivers, users and financiers of the services delivered by the City of Harare, then reason 
dictates that they should have a greater say in how the city is run. The results of this study 
showed that, while the Ministry of Local Government purports to act on behalf of residents, it 
does not provide avenues and platforms to elicit residents’ views and encourage/accept 
proposals, before it acts in local authorities. Furthermore, elected representatives, purport to 
act on behalf of the residents, but do not consult; even where some avenues which they can 
use to engage with the residents, may exist. Both the central and the local state only use the 
rhetoric of public participation when it suits them.  
For public participation to be successful in the City of Harare, residents must be capacitated, 
and must have the power to force implementation of their decisions so that their participation 
is effective. Such public participation must be transparent, responsive, accountable and 
inclusive. Therefore, for effective public participation in the City of Harare requires 
institutionalising the state, and new political habits and beliefs. If the state is not 
institutionalised properly, it will produce a weak bureaucracy; resulting in capture of the state 
by in political parties and denying the citizens not only access to decision-making power, but 
also the opportunity to hold the state accountable.  The following case study illustrates the 
level of public participation in the City of Harare.  
 
 154  
 
7.7 Case study: City of Harare 2015 Budget 
Consultation Process  
7.7.1 Introduction  
The Ministry of Local Government, in Circular 3 of 2012, requires that all local councils 
conduct pre-budget consultations with the residents before the annual budget is crafted and 
adopted. The circular provides guidance in terms of the level of consultations which are 
supposed to take place before a budget is adopted. Section 288 of the Urban Councils Act 
(Chapter 29.15) requires that, before the expiry of any financial year, a local government 
authority’s Finance Committee shall draw up and present for the approval of Council, 
estimates in such detail as the Council may require regarding the income and expenditure on 
revenue, and capital accounts of the Council for the succeeding financial year. The Minister 
of Local Government is responsible for administering this piece of legislation. The Act is in 
the form of carrot and stick. The carrot is realised when the council consults the residents; 
thereby legitimising its operations and creating a buy-in from the residents in the event of 
effective consultation. The stick is realised in the form of the Ministry having the power to 
not approve the budget in the absence of non-consultation. The legislation is silent on the 
consultation methods and expected outcomes; leaving room for local government authorities 
to have their own interpretation which might result in unintended outcomes. 
7.7.2 Results and discussion  
7.7.2.1 The consultation process 
The consultation process for the 2015 budget followed the guidelines of Circular 3 of 2012. 
Notices for the consultative meetings were published in the newspapers, council district 
offices, radio and online media platforms. It was the responsibility of councillors to make 
sure their wards were notified of the budget consultative meetings. Because of political 
polarity in the City of Harare this researcher observed some issues with regards to the 
residents’ notification of these meetings. There was blatant partisanship of councillors in 
terms of how they interacted with their wards. In most cases councillors used ward party 
political structures to communicate council related notices. This created the likelihood that 
the meeting notices were mainly targeted at members of the councillors’ political party. This 
argument is supported by observations at some of these meetings where the majority of the 
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attendees were from a certain political party. This goes against the principle of inclusiveness 
in public participation. If the process is not inclusive then it does not advance the ideals of 
effective public participation as it does not afford all the residents equal opportunity to decide 
on how they are governed and to influence development decisions in their wards.  
The consultative meetings were chaired by administrative officials from the City of Harare. 
An interesting observation in some situations was that administrative officials who were there 
were not prepared to answer some of the questions posed to them by residents despite the fact 
that they were representing the city’s various departments. In some cases, the contingent of 
the administrative officials was more than the number of residents present at some 
consultative meetings. This created an intimidating environment which did not encourage 
robust debate on issues affecting the residents. The average number of administrative 
officials per meeting was between ten and twenty. A residents’ association official was of the 
opinion that the high number of administrative officials was as a result of the allowances they 
are paid to attend these meetings. If this opinion is correct then the high attendance of council 
employees has a direct bearing on the high employment costs of the City of Harare. 
The meetings were being conducted in a rushed manner; the chair was sticking to strict time 
frames and there was no opportunity for proper deliberation and feedback. The approach was 
mainly to document what the people expected in the 2015 budget. In most cases the 
consultative meetings degenerated into a fault reporting meeting about street lights not 
working, unavailability of water, potholes etc. What can be deduced from these meetings is 
that there is a lack of continuous engagement by the City of Harare with residents. 
Continuous engagement with the residents builds capacity and trust between the residents and 
the city officials. In other wards meetings were punctuated by party political sloganeering and 
singing thereby turning the consultative meetings into party political rallies. The environment 
was intimidating for the neutrals let alone to the members of other political parties.  
7.7.2.2 Attendance at budget consultative meetings 
The attendance across the wards highlights the issue of apathy with regards to the 
consultative process. It has to be noted that in the 2014 financial year this was the only 
meeting which was called for by the city administrators. Councillors have also conducted, on 
average, only one feedback meeting in their wards for the whole year. This might also 
explain low attendance as there is no culture of deliberative interaction between the city 
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authorities and the residents. Table 6 shows the raw numbers of attendees at consultative 
meetings.  
Table 6: Consultative meeting attendance 
Range of Attendees per ward Number of Wards 
1 -25 12 
26 - 50 18 
51 - 75 8 
76 - 100 4 
101 and above 4 
Source: HRT, 2014 
It has to be noted that scheduling of only one consultative meeting per ward with an average 
of 4000 active voters is not conducive if the views of all the citizens were to be captured. It is 
important to note the observation that the way in which the residents contributed to these 
meetings showed that they had not met and agreed on common positions prior to the 
consultative meeting. This weakened the bargaining power of the residents and created 
discord in residents’ voices. In Zimbabwe, there is a very low culture of active citizenry 
through community-based forums and other spaces afforded to communities. If there was a 
strong active citizen engagement, then attendance to these meetings and their effectiveness 
would be improved. By virtue of residents coming together and agreeing on common 
positions before the budget consultative meeting, residents would increase their bargaining 
power.  
Residents revealed the underlying reasons why they did not attend these meetings. Most of 
the reasons are based on the perception that the consultative meetings were not effective and 
that they are a fruitless process. One resident said:  
“… we are tired of meetings which do not yield anything.” 
This statement shows that residents draw from their previous experience and perceive these 
meetings as a waste of time because they are not effective in influencing the final budget. 
Another resident bolstered this view by saying:  
“… if they cannot solve our day to day problems like potholes how can we expect 
them to take our views seriously in these meetings?”  
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What is clear from residents’ perspective is that they feel that they do not have a say in 
decision-making process within the City of Harare. If there was continuous engagement with 
the residents most of the issues raised above would not have occurred. It is important to note 
that the objective of the Ministry of Local Government in enforcing budget consultation 
process is that there is a sense of ownership of the budget by the residents. It seems that the 
whole participatory budgeting process is alienating the very residents who are supposed to be 
owners of the budget.  
7.7.2.3 Pre-budget proposals  
Prior to commencement of the budget consultation process, the Harare City Council’s 
Finance Department consolidates priorities from various city departments and comes up with 
draft proposals which are taken to the residents for consultation. An analysis of the 2015 
budget draft proposals shows that the proposals were actually based on the previous year’s 
budget priorities with no or little deviation. The city’s pre-budget draft proposals are 
discussed below. Most of the 2014 projects were not completed because of limited funding 
which is compounded by growing debt.  
The first priority was to address the water and sanitation infrastructure. This component of 
the budget is being funded through loans acquired from international stakeholders. The 
justification of the city is that for them to provide clean adequate water to the residents they 
will have to rehabilitate the water system. The second priority was road maintenance, with 
the main objective being the forming and capacitating of zonal road repair teams. These 
teams are responsible for maintaining the road networks in Harare. The third priority was 
refuse collection capacitation; the city acknowledges that for a number of years they have 
failed to provide a full service to the city residents with regards to the provision of refuse 
collection despite the fact that residents are paying for it on a monthly basis. The final two 
priorities were the construction of public transport holding bays and improving Wireless 
Local Area Network (WLAN) connectivity within the various City of Harare offices.  
7. 7.2.4 Residents’ priorities  
During residents’ consultative meetings in Harare, the majority highlighted certain priorities 
which they wanted addressed in the 2015 budget. What is unique about the priorities of the 
residents is that most of them highlighted issues which are to do with basic services which 
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they feel are not being delivered by the city authorities. The issue of clean reliable water 
supply is a contentious issue in the City of Harare. Some suburbs go for days without water 
but at the end of the month, there is no significant change in the water bill. Some residents 
angrily told the city officials this:  
“… the water which you are providing is discoloured and smells; it’s not suitable for 
consumption… You are charging us for pumping dirty water to our homes.” 
Other residents highlighted the problem of the shortage of water in such as in the following 
statement: 
“At times we go for weeks without water but still we still receive bills with no 
variation in water usage, this is daylight robbery,”  
Even the city council officials admit that some areas have gone for years without water. 
“Areas that have gone for years without water have begun to experience some 
positive results of the on-going water and wastewater rehabilitation programmes.” 
(City of Harare 2014) 
Observations in most of the middle and higher income areas show that most of the residents 
now source their water from private boreholes drilled on their properties. In low-income 
areas, some depend on council drilled boreholes but in some suburbs, residents depend on 
open unsecured wells for water. The general availability of piped water is erratic and most of 
the residents do not use it for drinking purposes because of its perceived poor quality. The 
problem of water supply is a perennial problem; water-borne diseases (like cholera and 
typhoid) breaking out is not new in Harare. A careful analysis of the City of Harare budget 
shows that water revenue contributes about 50% of the total city revenue.  
The second major issue raised during the consultation process was the issue of leaking 
sewage and non-collected refuse is also a very emotive issue which was raised by residents. 
Some residents said:  
“… this past year I can count on my fingers the number of times the city collected 
refuse from our street. We rely on burning whatever refuse we produce and some 
families do not burn they just dump their refuse in the streets. This is a health 
hazard.”  
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One resident emphasised this point by saying: 
“… look around our streets, they are full of used diapers and flowing raw sewage, but 
every month you charge us for refuse removal.”  
Poor refuse removal has a direct bearing on the quality of water which the city receives at its 
treatment plants. The City of Harare is situated in the middle of a water catchment area which 
then supplies water to the city. Improper sewage and refuse removal means that this waste 
can work its way into the water supply which means that the city has to pay more in water 
purification costs.  
Another major issue raised was that of street lighting; residents complained that because 
broken street lights are not fixed on time, thieves are taking advantage of the darkness at 
night to rob residents. In some suburbs in Harare, the city authorities are encouraging 
residents to fit lights on their fences to provide street lighting. Most suburbs have gone for 
years without street lighting which is not ideal as this increased exposure of residents to the 
danger of criminals.  
Residents also highlighted the problems of the dilapidated road network infrastructure. The 
major concern of the road network in Harare is that it is old and most of the roads in 
residential areas are in dire need of repair. One resident at a meeting in Highfield Township 
said:  
“These roads were inherited from the colonial administration and since then they 
have never been repaired. Most of them have reverted from being tarred to gravel 
roads.”  
The impact of poor roads is mainly felt in the damage it causes to vehicles and the number of 
road accidents which are related to the poor road network.  
The final contentious issue raised by the residents was the high ratio of employment costs. 
The Ministry of Local Government guidelines stipulate that both the rural and the urban 
councils are to cap their employment costs at 30% of the total budget. The Harare City 
Council has not met this requirement for the past 5 years. The majority of the city’s budget is 
to finance employment costs. In 2009 and 2010, the city spent 96% and 73% of the income 
on employment costs respectively. City of Harare residents raised this issue in several 
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meetings but it was not dealt with adequately during the consultation process. One resident 
said:  
“If most of the revenue raised goes to pay salaries instead of offering a service, then 
something is wrong in this city. How can we pay someone a salary for not doing their 
job?”  
Another resident concurred with this view by saying  
“…. We are just donating money to the council”. 
The cause of high employment costs in the past years has to be understood in the context that 
the city employs a workforce of around 9271 to serve a total population of 1.6 million as of 
June 2014. The other context with regards to the salaries is the high salaries paid to directors 
and their deputies. In 2014, the salary schedule submitted to a parliamentary portfolio 
committee on local government shows that the average salary of the directors of the city of 
Harare was around US$15, 000 per month (allowances not included) (Machivenyika 2014). 
This is more than some of the average salaries paid to municipal officials of developed 
countries who have a bigger budget and provide better quality services compared to the City 
of Harare. It has to be noted that there is a lot of secrecy with regards to the salaries of top 
officials to the extent that what they earn is not easily accessible to the public or the city 
councillors.  
Table 7: Percentage of employment costs in the City of Harare budget 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Employment costs 96% 73% 65% 55% 48% 48% 40% 
Service delivery cost 4% 27% 35% 45% 52% 52% 60% 
Source: City of Harare, 2014 
There is a need for the city to contain the employment costs so that the larger chunk (at least 
70%) of the budget can be directed towards improving service delivery. There are several 
ways in which the issue of employment costs can be addressed. The city administration can 
reduce its number of workers through a human resource audit and weed out redundant staff. 
This would have an impact on reducing the salary bill and related costs. One recognises that 
laying off of employees has various social implications but on the other hand it is not fair for 
residents not to receive services due to the expense of paying wages for redundant staff. The 
second approach is to adjust salaries so that they reflect the financial situation of the 
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municipality and the overall economic situation of the country. It is folly to continue paying 
mega salaries at the expense of better service delivery to the residents who are the clients.  
7. 7.2.5 Revenue sources  
The main sources of income for the city of Harare are mainly water charges and property 
rates. These two sources contribute 76% of the total city revenue. An interesting observation 
during the budget consultation process was that the administrative officials of the City of 
Harare did not disclose how much they borrowed or how much they intend to borrow from 
local and international funders for the current year and the following budget year. If the city 
is borrowing, it is borrowing on behalf of the residents and there is a need for residents to be 
involved in decision making since it has a direct bearing on the current and future financial 
situation of the city. The table below shows the sources of revenue for the City of Harare. 
Table 8: Sources of revenue for the City of Harare 
Source Amount in US$ 
Property Tax (domestic/industrial/commercial) 105.3 million 
Refuse collection 23.8 million 
Welfare 0.8 million 
ZINARA and Billboards 4.0 million 
City Architect 6.7 million 
Clamping and Towing 5.8 million 
Health Fees 6.6 million 
Housing: Rentals, Leases and Markets 9.0 million 
Harare Water 102.0 million 
Parks and Cemeteries 0.8 million 
Public Safety 0.8 million 
Education 0.7 million 
Estates 3.2 million 
Other 3.5 million 
TOTAL 272.7 MILLION 
Source: City of Harare, 2014 
A closer analysis of the budget shows that the majority of the capital projects which are being 
carried were not funded directly from the budget but from borrowing. This poses a problem 
because it shows that the budget of the city of Harare is not capable of maintaining and 
funding new capital projects from its own resources. What is needed is for the residents to 
understand whether the borrowing was as a result of a liquidity crisis or because the revenue 
being raised by the council is not enough for capital projects. If the city is borrowing for 
capital projects, questions which need to be addressed with the residents are: what are the 
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terms of the loans? Is the city capable of repaying the loans? What impact does it have on the 
future of the city and what are these loans used for? Without providing clear answers to these 
questions residents will continue to doubt the effectiveness of the city in managing the city’s 
revenue resources. 
7. 7.2.6 Final budget allocation for 2015 
In the City of Harare, the approach to consultation is centred on taking ideas to the people 
instead of taking ideas from the people. There is overwhelming evidence that consultations 
are only conducted as a result of fulfilling the legal obligations mandated by the Ministry of 
Local Government. The attitude of the city authorities is that the whole process is a matter of 
ticking boxes, thereby fulfilling the requirements of Circular no 3 of 2012. This view is 
supported by the allocation of the 2015 budget which does not reflect the priorities raised by 
the residents during the consultation. The underlying finding of the final budget allocation 
was that it did not deviate from the city authorities’ pre-budget proposals. It is clear that the 
public consultation process in the City of Harare is devoid of substance and effectiveness and 
geared to mollify the residents. 
7. 7.2.7 Addressing service delivery challenges  
According to the city authorities, the reason why they are not able to provide services is 
because of low revenue. The low revenue base, according to the councillors and 
administrators, is as a result of the Ministry of Local Government which caps and controls 
how much the local authorities can charge and levy on the services which they provide. Most 
of the councillors and administrators interviewed concurred that they are charging rates and 
levies which are below cost recovery. There has been an instance where the urban local 
authorities attempted to charge cost recovery rates and levies but the Ministry of Local 
Government did not approve the budget. City of Harare revenue base needs to be extended; 
this can be achieved by charging full cost for the services they provide as collecting less than 
it costs to provide a service leads to deterioration of the service. It is pointless not to collect 
the revenue using full cost recovery since this leads to non-delivery of services and non-
maintenance of infrastructure which leads to huge future costs. The future generation must 
not be forced to bear the costs of the present generation. Where the government decides to 
cushion the poor, the cushioning policy must be of direct subsidisation of the poor in order to 
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ensure that local authorities balance their books and continue providing services at acceptable 
levels.  
7. 7.2.8 Addressing public participation inadequacies in the City of Harare  
There is evidence to show that the City of Harare does not provide adequate capacity building 
opportunities and channels of information to the public so as to enhance their participation 
capabilities. An informed citizenry forms the basis of effective and active citizen 
engagement. There is no system which ensures a two-way flow of information from the 
council to the residents and from the residents to the council. For residents to engage 
effectively there is a need for the continuous building of their capacity. Capacity building is 
not a once off event; there is a need to continuously build the capacity of the residents so that 
they reach a point where they can contribute effectively to decision making within the City of 
Harare. Civic societies and other non-governmental organisations can play a role in building 
the capacity of residents so that they equipped with the skills to participate. This can only be 
possible if the political environment is conducive to the formation of community forums and 
encourages the operation of civic organisations without impediments.  
There is a belief by city administrators that there is no need to be continuously engaging with 
citizens since the citizens are represented by councillors. Most of the councillors only hold an 
average of two meetings in two years. Councillors heavily depend on their political party 
caucus for policy direction hence the record of poor consultation and feedback meetings. This 
may be addressed by enacting the necessary acts and policies which ensure that residents of 
local authorities form a critical component (backed by active citizenry) in the governance 
structures of these institutions. One can argue that because the residents are represented by 
democratically elected councillors then there is no need for continuous engagement with 
residents of the local government authorities. This argument goes against decentralisation 
principles where the citizens are supposed to have a voice in decision making; in the City of 
Harare, it is clear that what the city administrators and councillors put forward is completely 
different from what the residents want. The councillors are elected on the pretext that they 
will represent the residents in their wards but in the City of Harare, but this is not the case. I 
argue that within the acts and policies of local government there should be a framework 
which makes it possible for the residents to hold both the administrative officials and 
councillors accountable for their actions. In the event that the councillors no longer represent 
the aspirations of their wards then there should be a provision for recalling them. In the case 
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of the City of Harare there is little conceptualisation of who is accountable to whom in what 
domain of life, or how a person might deal with a variety of often contesting individuals. 
Strengthening systems of accountability in the City of Harare would lead to the greater 
inclusion of the residents in decision making within the city thereby increasing the 
effectiveness of public participation.  
The local government system in Zimbabwe provides for people’s participation in choosing 
their representatives in council with a degree of success. It is when it comes to planning and 
provision of services that the local government system faces the greatest challenge leading to 
services which residents and communities have no ownership of or affection for, thereby 
creating serious challenges. It is recommended that active public participation in all council 
operations should start from the planning stage up to full implementation including the 
design, monitoring and evaluation. The budgetary process should be a continuous exercise in 
order for people to appreciate the need for and levels of rates and service charges.  
7.7.3 Conclusion  
Active citizen engagement helps develop citizens into informed citizens who are aware of 
their rights. Participation is not a once off event but a continuous process. To reach full 
participation there is a need for the city to engage citizens on a constant basis. Citizens do not 
just wake up and say we have our rights. Citizens learn by starting to engage with various 
stakeholders and in the process gain critical skills. Active citizen engagement is not about one 
voice it is about collective action by the community for its benefit. The collective action 
comes from the forming of various networks; this bolsters certain positions in the community. 
Citizen engagement deepens democracy as citizens are transformed from being users of 
services to decision makers.  
In the City of Harare, there is a need for a public participation system which is inclusive, 
accountable, responsive and open. The administrative officials and the councillors need to 
change their attitude on public participation and ensure that they respond in an open manner 
to the issues raised by the residents. The residents’ views must not be viewed as optional but 
must be integral in decision making in the City of Harare. This calls for a change in how the 
central state and local state tackle active citizen engagement. For the budget formulation 
process to succeed in the City of Harare, there is a need for the whole process of public 
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consultation to be part of a broader citizen engagement approach which is centred on 
inclusiveness, openness, accountability and responsiveness.  
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CHAPTER 8 : THE STATE OF SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN THE CITY OF HARARE 
 “This is criminal! We cannot be paying for non-existent services...” City of Harare 
resident. 
“Do not drink tap water it’s not safe. If you are going to important meetings always 
carry a shoe brush, the roads are more of dust than tar. You do not want to meet some 
very important people with dusty shoes.” Another City of Harare resident. 
8.1 Introduction  
The second verbatim quote above is a set of instructions given to me by my sister when I first 
arrived for my fieldwork in Harare; signifying the state of service delivery in the City of 
Harare. What is evident to everyone in the City of Harare is that the service delivery is 
appalling and of a low standard. The only bone of contention in terms of service delivery in 
Zimbabwe is the answer to the question: who is the architect of this poor level of service 
delivery? All the residents interviewed acknowledged the impact of the economic situation on 
service delivery, and were critical of how the city authorities are managing the affairs of the 
City of Harare. What is evident is that there is no zeal or urgency regarding service delivery, 
and that the focus of the various stakeholders is on contestation for political spaces, and 
accruing personal benefits. This chapter focuses on how the City of Harare is faring on its 
service delivery mandate. The later sections of this chapter will deal with some of the factors 
that impede service delivery, and finally the chapter proposes some approaches to achieving 
basic minimum levels of service delivery.  
8.2 The mandate of City of Harare in service delivery  
The Urban Councils Act of 2008 prescribes certain responsibilities to urban local authorities. 
The major mandate of urban councils is to deliver the following services to residents: water 
provision, infrastructure development and maintenance, housing provision, health services, 
sewerage and sewage reticulation, refuse collection and general governance function. As 
discussed earlier in chapter 5, the local authorities have two broad functions. Firstly, 
administrative functions, performed by administrative officials, include the implementation 
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of policies and secondly, the policy and legislative function (making of policies and bylaws), 
which is performed by the elected councillors and the central state legislative arm.  
The setup of local government in Zimbabwe creates the impression that whatever is 
implemented is coming directly coming from the policies developed and enacted by the 
councillors and the central state. The policy and legislative framework roles performed by the 
councillors fall within the broader constitutional and policy framework prescribed by the 
central state. This means that councillors have very little room for manoeuvre and they must 
work within the constitutional and policy framework prescribed by the central state. The 
assumption is that before councillors start manoeuvring, they need to first exhaust the 
prescribed mandate. Local authorities are also mandated to spearhead the development 
agenda (socio-economic development) of the areas under their jurisdiction, by acting as 
facilitators and catalysts of development in their areas. With the new constitutional 
dispensation, enacted in May 2013, the function of steering development has been legislated 
through the creation of metropolitan and provincial councils. The major challenge is that this 
constitutional provision has not yet been implemented. Therefore, the City of Harare’s major 
function is to deliver the services discussed above.  
8.3 Sources of funding for the city of Harare  
Local authorities in Zimbabwe get their funding from various sources. Urban local authorities 
get their funding from property rates and levies which are charged on services delivered to 
the residents (Urban Councils Act of 2008). The city mainly charges for property rates, water 
charges, and sewage and refuse collection rates. The city also receives levies from housing 
rentals, health facilities, and licence fees from various business entities operating in the city. 
The majority of the city’s revenue is generated from selling water and property rates. The 
central state is also expected to augment the revenue of local authorities through grants, 
which are channelled towards development projects within the local authority. These grants 
ceased in the late 1990s, because of a shortage of resources. Local authorities can source 
funding through loans from local and international financial markets, and multilateral aid 
institutions. Previously World Bank and USAID funded several housing and infrastructure 
projects.  
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8.4 The state of service delivery in the City of Harare  
The state of service delivery in the City of Harare is appalling. Evidence from interviews 
conducted with various stakeholders; including residents, city officials, Ministry of Local 
Government officials, and councillors reveal the level of service delivery is low and of 
unacceptable standards. Most residents blame both administrative officials and councillors 
for focusing on raising revenue for their salaries and allowances, instead of using revenue to 
improve service delivery. One resident said:  
“The majority of the budget must be allocated to services not salaries and 
administrative costs. The thrust of Harare officials is on raising revenue to pay for 
salaries instead of providing a needed service to the residents.” 
In order to understand the level of services being provided by the City, services such as water 
provision, infrastructure development, refuse and sewage, are examined in the sections 
below.  
8.4.1 Water provision  
Water provision is a major service which the City of Harare must deliver to the residents. The 
importance of safe portable water cannot be underestimated, as it forms part of the broader 
component of the health and sanitation of the city’s residents. Without safe clean water 
provision, outbreaks of disease are inevitable. However, interviews and observations suggest 
that the City has been failing to provide clean safe water to its residents. Water department 
officials stated that the city has a daily demand of 1.4 million cubic metres, while the council 
is only able to deliver 600,000 cubic metres, less than half of that. The evidence of this failure 
is mainly illustrated by several outbreaks of water-borne diseases, like cholera and typhoid in 
the City of Harare since the year 2000. The most devastating outbreak of cholera in 
Zimbabwe was in 2008, when there were 98 592 reported cases and 4 293 deaths (World 
Health Organization 2009). The cause of this outbreak was the failure of the urban water 
supply system in major urban centres in Zimbabwe. What is interesting is that, since 
independence, the City’s revenue from   water service contributed closer to 50% of the city’s 
revenue. However, most of this revenue is not ploughed back into the city’s water 
infrastructure. In 2008, water services charges contributed to more than 50% of the city’s 
revenue, but in total, the city allocated only 4% of the budget to service delivery; with the 
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other 96% of the budget going to pay for employment costs (City of Harare Budget Statement 
2014). This highlights a major issue. The focus is not on planning for better service delivery 
but on fundraising for city workers’ salaries. To highlight how the issue of clean water 
provision has deteriorated, one resident interviewed for this study stated:  
“Water supplies ceased in 2008 up to date no drop from my tap at my house but I am 
still being levied water charge. We actually rely on open wells for domestic water.” 
My observation from my various visits to the City of Harare revealed that the issue of water 
supply is causing residents a great deal of hardship. The water supply is erratic, of low 
pressure, and of poor quality to the extent that at times it is discoloured and has a foul smell. 
Most of the residents no longer use it for drinking and are forced to buy borehole water from 
those residents who have drilled private boreholes. At times, the residents go for days without 
reticulated water; exposing themselves to unsafe water sources. Sanitation in the urban areas 
also relies on water supply, unlike in the rural areas where toilets are not designed to use 
running water and the rural residents have other sources of water.  
The public spat conveyed below illustrates the lack of prioritisation and planning with 
regards to water and infrastructure. The public exchange of words was started by the mayor 
when he posted the following on social media, which was published in The Herald newspaper 
on 12 February 2015.  
“Would you unveil a new spanking Land Rover in addition to just as new (Toyota 
Land Cruiser) V 8? Ignoring all public sentiment … would you guys look residents 
straight in the eye and say yes I have two new cars from the same employer for the 
same job?” (The Herald 12 February 2015) 
In response, the town clerk emphasised that the car was not allocated to him but was part of 
the water infrastructure upgrading scheme which was being funded by a loan sourced from 
China. It is evident that individuals working for the City are not prioritising the delivery of 
services, but instead are maximising personal gain. With the poor levels of water provision, 
one would not expect the city administrators utilise the loan to develop water infrastructure. 
The city cannot go to the residents and say they are lacking resources to deliver services 
when they are travelling in expensive sport utility vehicles (SUVs); it is a slap in the face of 
the residents who are responsible for footing the bill of the loan. The failure to provide clean 
safe water in the City of Harare can squarely be blamed on both the current and previous 
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councillors, and the city administrators, who failed to plan for future population growth and 
for maintaining the water infrastructure.  
8.4.2 Housing provision  
In the City of Harare housing is a service which can be provided by both the central 
government and the local authority. The approach to housing in the City of Harare is twofold:  
the site and service scheme and the provision of core dwellings, which can be extended later. 
The Directorate of Housing and Community Services officials in the city of Harare estimated 
that the housing backlog in the city is above one million. In a 2013 study, I found that in one 
of the townships in Harare, low-income earners were failing to access houses to the extent 
that the number of tenants per dwelling has increased dramatically. The study revealed that 
on average, each household in Glen Norah has 3 tenant households living in one dwelling. 
The shortage of housing is affecting both the high and low-income earners, to the extent that 
the high-income earners are now competing with low-income earners in low-cost housing 
developments; thereby causing gentrification (Masvaure 2015). 
The main approach to housing provision at the present moment is the site and service scheme, 
which entails the city providing all the basic services like water, sewerage and road networks 
before it allocates the plots to the residents on the waiting list. The residents will then be 
given a specified time period within which to complete core permanent dwelling units on 
their own. The second option entails the city authorities building permanent core dwellings 
which are composed of bathroom, kitchen and a bedroom. The rest of the house is supposed 
to be completed by the new owner within a stipulated time.  
Housing developments in the City of Harare from the 1980s to the 2000s was being 
spearheaded by the international donor community, with the main funders being the World 
Bank and the USAID, through their Urban I and Urban II infrastructural development project 
(Kamete 2001). The target of the donor housing provision was mainly low-income urban 
residents. The international donors later suffered donor fatigue; resulting in in a very low 
quantity of housing units being delivered to the residents. The central government has not 
facilitated any new housing developments in Harare since the late 1990s.  
Another funding model for housing development in the City of Harare is through the 
formation of housing cooperatives, which  the ZANU PF  government encouraged in the late 
1980s (Rakodi and Withers 1995). The cooperative members would come together and pool 
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their resources and apply for housing plots from the city, usually the low-cost housing plots. 
The city would provide basic infrastructure and services and allocate the plots to the 
cooperatives. The cooperative members would then pool resources and build houses for each 
other. Several low-income earners in the City of Harare gained access to housing through this 
method.  
According to the Directorate of Housing and Community Services officials, the cooperative 
method was a viable method of providing housing to low-income earners until it was hijacked 
by politicians for political patronage purposes. One official explained the hijack by saying:  
“Politicians mobilised their supporters without houses to form cooperatives and 
exerted enormous pressure on the city officials through the councillors to provide 
land for plots for their cooperatives. In this way the waiting list was no longer 
followed; only housing cooperatives from a certain political party were assured of 
housing land.” 
Observations made during fieldwork show that political interference in housing provision in 
the City of Harare has resulted in the illegal occupation and construction of permanent 
structures by cooperatives and individual residents on city land. One city senior 
administrative official interviewed for this study communicated the following with regards to 
this practice:  
“…the problem we have at the present moment is that, because the city is failing to 
provide houses, senior ZANU PF officials allocated land to their supporters without 
city’s approval since they can’t approach the council because it is controlled by the 
MDC. We cannot even demolish the illegal structures before getting a go-ahead from 
the Ministry of Local Government. If we demolish the structures then it means we will 
be fired by the minister. We are just spectators in this whole issue of housing 
provisions.” 
This perspective was graphically illustrated during the fieldwork for this study, during which 
time a campaign was being spearheaded by the Ministry of Local Government to demolish 
‘illegal’
45
 housing structures. The so-called illegal structures were fully permanent, brick and 
                                                 
45
 The quality of some of these houses is better than middle income houses in the City of Harare. 
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mortar houses, some of which were built some years back and had been receiving water and 
refuse services from the City of Harare. The fact that the houses targeted for demolishing 
were permanent structures, shows that it was either that the city’s administrators turned a 
blind eye to the illegal housing developments in the first place, or that someone applied 
pressure for them not to act. Politicisation of services has resulted in illegal activities, which 
have disadvantaged genuine and desperate house seekers.  
The main issue which emanates from this example is that there are differences in vision 
between the central state and the local authorities. The administrative arm of the city is 
hamstrung by this unshared vision, to the extent that they are not able to execute their duties 
without stepping on the ‘overextended toes’ of the political actors. The unshared vision has 
also resulted in the politicisation of housing provision. Political machinations in housing 
provision in the city should be stopped, if the city is to fulfil its mandate. The city must 
allocate housing impartially to all residents. The provision of housing for political patronage 
purposes deprives residents who may be supporting a different political party or are 
politically inactive. The long waiting list for housing in the city is a clear indication that the, 
City of Harare has failed to provide affordable houses to its residents.  
8.4.3 Health delivery  
Health delivery in the City of Harare is mainly through the primary health care facilities and 
hospitals, managed by the city’s health department. The health services are not free. 
Residents are required to pay a nominal fee when they visit these facilities. The majority of 
the working residents in Harare (a small proportion of the total city’s population) prefer to 
contribute to medical aid / health insurance, as they do not trust that the public health 
facilities can provide adequate health facilities. The low-income earners and unemployed are 
the main users of the city’s primary health facilities. Given the economic decay in Zimbabwe, 
there is a huge population of low-income earners without medical insurance. This has 
increased the number of residents who use public health facilities in the City of Harare 
Like all the other services, the health services are also not adequate and are of poor quality. 
Residents who were interviewed for this study highlighted some of the biggest challenges 
they face when they try to access these services.  
“The problem is that the city expects us to pay charges when we go to clinics, some of 
us we don’t have that money. If you do not have money you are sent home without 
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getting treatment. You can also pay the charges and end up getting painkillers 
because they say they do not have money to buy proper medication.” 
The system of charging levies to those who want health care services is not an ideal situation 
for those who cannot afford to pay. In most instances cases some of the health issues are 
caused by the failure of the city to provide safe clean drinking water and providing adequate 
sewage and refuse disposal infrastructure for example the persistent outbreak of waterborne 
diseases. The health facilities also have not been spared from water shortages, and in some 
cases, the major referral hospital operated by the City of Harare (Harare Hospital) has gone 
for months without running water. According to a report from a daily newspaper, The Daily 
News of 13 August 2014 (Chikwanha 2014) health practitioners were using water from 
buckets in the intensive care unit.  
“There is no running water at Harare hospital and they are using buckets to wash 
hands in the ICU.”  
One Member of Parliament (National Assembly) interviewed for this study stated that, the 
city has misplaced priorities with regards to health provision. He went on to say that you will 
find that the hospital’s chief executive officer is rented a car which costs the city USD$ 6000 
per month, but the hospital does not even have drugs or clean running water. It is clear that 
the City is prioritising the benefits and comfort of the workers, at the expense of delivering 
basic services to the residents. These sentiments support the results presented earlier, that the 
city spends more on administrative costs and salaries on actual service delivery. Access to 
proper health care is a basic human right. If the institutions mandated to provide such services 
are failing to provide them, then there is a need to take remedial action and provide policies 
and legislation to ensure that residents of local authorities receive these services at all the 
times; regardless of the economic circumstances of the local authority.  
8.4.4 Infrastructure maintenance and development  
Cities across the world plan for the future growth of their population through the 
development of their infrastructure and by prioritising the maintenance of their existing 
infrastructure. A close examination of the past five years’ budgets shows, that there is very 
little money budgeted for infrastructure maintenance, let alone development. This trend has 
been going on in Harare since the early 1990s, when the government changed its focus from 
the massive infrastructure developments of the 1980s. If new infrastructure is not constructed 
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it means that the growing population will put a strain on the present and old infrastructure; 
leading to its quick deterioration and ultimate collapse. In the case of the City of Harare, two 
things have happened; neither is city constructing new infrastructure, nor is it maintaining the 
old infrastructure.  
The majority of councillors and residents in Harare highlighted the fact that there are no 
major projects in their wards. The only ‘major’ projects indicated by councillors and residents 
are those associated with borehole drilling; which is as a result of the failure of the city to 
provide clean, safe tap water. From the city administrators’ perspective, the only major 
project they are undertaking is the rehabilitation of the water supply infrastructure in the City 
of Harare. However, there is no evidence of such maintenance going on, from what can be 
observed. Instead, there is evidence of a potholes, non-working traffic lights, raw sewage 
flowing in some residential streets, and non-working street lights. In certain affluent suburbs 
the city has encouraged residents to fit lights at the entrances to their properties, to deal with 
the problem of pitch darkness at night, because the street lights are not working. In terms of 
road infrastructure, the increased vehicle traffic, and poor maintenance and development of 
road networks are causing a traffic nightmare throughout the day. In the residential areas, 
observations reveal that many of the once tarred roads are now dirt roads because of lack of 
maintenance. One resident said:  
“When we pay property rates, we expect the city council, at least, to take care of 
roads and other infrastructure. Now look at the roads, pot holes everywhere, when it 
rains it becomes very dangerous because these potholes are filled with water. The 
City of Harare does not care about the damage to our cars.” 
In the case of damage to cars, in most cases there is no recourse for the owners. The current 
state of infrastructure in the City of Harare is not adequate to cater for its residents. If this 
issue is not addressed, then it will worsen as some of the infrastructure is collapsing. The city 
administrators and councillors must find innovative ways of funding infrastructure. It is 
convenient to blame the economic situation of the country as the main cause of poor 
infrastructure, but there is a need to understand that if the infrastructure is not maintained 
then a total collapse is inevitable. 
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8.4.5 Sewage and refuse collection 
Sewage and refuse collection services in Harare, although improved from previous years 
(residents views), is not being adequate. One resident narrated why the city is unable to 
provide better quality sewage services by saying:  
“If I report a burst sewage pipe in my street they say come and fetch us or give us 
money for fuel since the city does not have fuel to come and fix it but their senior 
managers are going around in expensive cars bought by our money.” 
The problem of raw sewage flowing in residential streets is common occurrence. According 
to the City officials, the sewage reticulation infrastructure is old and needs to be replaced. As 
one official emphasised, this infrastructure was designed to serve less than half a million 
residents but is now serving more than one and a half million residents. Previous city budgets 
show that this was not prioritised; despite its impact on the outbreak of the water borne 
diseases like cholera. There is a high possibility of raw sewage flowing into open wells, 
which residents rely on for water during the rainy season.  
The same can be said for refuse collection. Even though rresidents explained that there is a 
slight improvement from the previous years, there were times when refuse collection was 
erratic; leading to residents illegally dumping or burning their uncollected refuse. One 
resident highlighted the following:  
“… because of poor service we end up boycotting payment of rates and opting for 
other options such as creating our own dumping sites and digging our own wells.” 
Observations and responses from both city officials and residents show that the City of 
Harare is not able to deliver even basic services to the residents. This failure exacerbates the 
problem of non-payment of rates and other services charges by the residents. The city is in a 
vicious circle; failure to deliver services results in residents not being willing to pay for ‘non-
existent’ services, while at the same time the city needs revenue to improve its service 
delivery.  
8.5 Challenges to service delivery in the City of Harare  
There are various reasons which were proffered as to why the City of Harare is failing to 
deliver services. Both the official and councillor perspectives indicate that the lack of 
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adequate resources is a major impediment to service delivery. All the councillors interviewed 
agreed that they are not able to execute their duties to the fullest, because the city lacks access 
to resources. What is very interesting is that there is no reference to political contestation as 
an impediment to service delivery. Administrative officials views on the reasons for the lack 
of resources may be summarised as follows and discussed in detail in the next section: The 
huge debt which is owed by the City residents, lack of borrowing powers because of poor 
credit ratings and charging below cost recovery for services provided.  
8.5.1 Residents’ debt 
The City of Harare indicated that their biggest problem is residents’ bad debt. Residents are 
not paying rates and other service charges; leaving the city with no financial resources to 
deliver services. The issue of debt is a contentious issue amongst residents and political 
players alike. Residents cited several reasons why they are not paying their levies and rates. 
Some of the responses from the residents are as follows:  
“Why should we pay them anything? They just send bills for things they didn’t 
deliver; it’s criminal to collect revenue on non-delivered services.”  
Another resident said: 
“There is too much corruption within the top hierarchy of council. We see them 
driving top of the range vehicles and they award themselves hefty salaries; so why 
should we pay for all this?”  
The general sentiment among the residents interviewed is that while City requires revenue to 
deliver services, they believe that the city officials are not using the available resources 
efficiently and effectively. As discussed and confirmed earlier, the residents hold the view 
that the senior administrators and councillors are there to serve their needs only. Any 
campaign to drive the settlement of the huge debt is met by resistance as there is a general 
belief (which might be true), that the drive is for city officials to raise funds for their 
luxurious perks and salaries, at the expense of service delivery.  
The second major reason why residents are not settling their debt is that, in July 2013-two 
weeks before the harmonised national and local government elections, the Minister of Local 
Government issued a directive (Section 133 of the Rural District Councils Act Chapter 29: 13 
as read with section 303 of the Urban Councils Act chapter 29: 15) addressed to all local 
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authorities to wipe out all the debt owed by the urban and rural residents (Matenga 2014). 
The main reason, proffered by the Minister, was that all the local authorities controlled by the 
opposition were overcharging the residents. The irony of this reasoning is that all the local 
authorities’ budgets were approved by the Minister.   It can be inferred that the timing of this 
initiative was guided by political considerations, as ZANU PF was trying to regain its 
foothold in urban areas through courting voters by using the debt write off. This shows that 
interventions by the central state in local authorities were being used to prop up the ruling 
party during the election period. The impact of the directive was that the residents, who had 
been paying their rates and levies and were up to date in their payments, did not benefit from 
this directive. This directive might therefore have had the unintended consequence of 
discouraged the paying residents, and in so doing, further exacerbated the situation. The 
following response, from one of the residents sums up residents’ feelings regarding paying 
rates and levies. 
“We are not going to pay them anything, we are waiting for 2018.”  
What this statement means is that, in 2018, when the country is due to hold another general 
election, there is likely to be another announcement by the Ministry that all the debt owed by 
the residents will be wiped out. The consequence of writing off the debt, according to the 
City of Harare, is that the city is no longer able to collect enough revenue to meet its 
administrative costs, let alone to improve service delivery. If the central state is keen on 
cushioning the poor, it should devise strategies which do not discourage other ratepayers 
from paying. It can be argued that the debt write-off by the Minister worsened the revenue 
collection challenges in the City; and that it only served the political purpose of ZANU PF. 
This created the mind-set on the part of residents that they can get away with non-payment, 
because another debt write-off is to be expected before the next elections. Debt write offs two 
weeks before local elections can be regarded as using state resources for patronage; thereby 
subverting the principle of fairness in elections. It is also clear that the Ministry was usurping 
the operational responsibilities of the local authorities. This brings to the fore once again the 
disjuncture in vision and policy, between the local authorities controlled by the opposition 
and the ruling party. 
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8.5.2 Messy borrowing powers and poor credit rating  
As discussed earlier, the City of Harare has a complicated borrowing mechanism. In order for 
the City of Harare to borrow funds from the open market, locally and internationally, the 
Urban Councils Act dictates that the local authority has to get approval from Local 
Government Ministry.   The other condition is that, borrowed funds can only be used on 
capital/infrastructure projects. In all loan deals, the central state acts as a guarantor of the 
loans. Throughout the process of borrowing, what is interesting is that, there is no 
requirement that residents have to be consulted; despite the fact that the residents are the ones 
responsible for paying back the money. At the present moment, the city’s credit rating is 
poor, because it has defaulted on loans since the late 1990s (Matumbike 2009).  
Consequently, the city is finding it difficult to get loans; let alone at favourable interest rates. 
This is further compounded by the fact that the central state which acts as the guarantor has a 
poor credit rating itself, because it defaulted on several loans. At the present moment, the 
only major loan to the City is the Chinese loan, meant for water infrastructure rehabilitation.  
Most city officials believe that the failure to secure loans for infrastructure development is a 
major impediment. Although a detailed examination of the city’s finances is beyond the 
scope of this research study, it is important to note that the national credit rating had a major 
impact on the ability of the local authorities to borrow from international financiers. The 
Zimbabwean central state has defaulted on several international loans;
46
 leading to a poor 
credit rating, and rendering as worthless its role as a guarantor for international loans. In an 
effort to access funds to pay its running costs, the City bartered undeveloped council 
residential and commercial land for hard cash from local individuals;
47
 resulting in the 
council selling land far below its market value, so that the city could pay salaries and running 
costs.  
The major problem is that the city has never prioritised funding of new infrastructure projects 
or maintaining of infrastructure, let alone the provision of basic services. It is clear that if 
substantial funds are not allocated for infrastructure development, it would lead to the present 
                                                 
46
 This is international public knowledge. The Bretton Woods institutions [WB and IMF] are reluctant to 
advance loans to Zimbabwe because of previous payment defaults. There has been discussion amongst 
Zimbabwean officials regarding an approach to these institutions to request a debt write off.  
47
 This was communicated to me by Department of Housing and Community Services officials. 
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infrastructure becoming increasingly dilapidated and no new infrastructure being developed.  
The city must only secure loans to augment what it has allocated from its own revenue. The 
city must find creative and prudent ways of raising enough revenue for infrastructure 
development. 
8.5.3 Charging below cost recovery rates  
According to the city authorities, the reason they are not able to provide services is because 
of low revenue. All the councillors and the administrative officials alluded to the fact that the 
Ministry does not allow the city to charge cost recovery rates. All the local authorities’ 
budgets have to be approved, before being implemented, and such increases are generally 
vetoed. The main argument is that if the local authorities charge full cost recovery rates then 
the poor would not be able to afford the services. While this may be a plausible reason, the 
problem is that central state does not subsidise/contribute financially towards the provision of 
services to those who cannot afford them. If the city cannot charge the full cost of services, 
then where would it source additional finance to augment the revenue collected from 
residents? In most African countries and cities in the developed world, the central state 
normally cushions the poor residents, by subsidising certain services. An example is South 
Africa, where municipalities subsidise poor households in terms of rates, water, and 
electricity. In the case of the Harare, even those residents who are in a position to pay the full 
cost of services, are charged below cost rates. The city needs to develop strategies whereby, 
the poor can access subsidies. This would make the city’s pro-poor approach financially 
sensible.  
The City’s revenue base needs to be extended.  This can be achieved through charging full 
cost for the services they provide.  If less revenue is collected than what it costs to provide a 
service, it would lead to a deterioration of the service, non-delivery of services, and non-
maintenance of infrastructure; which will lead to huge future costs. Where the government 
decides to cushion the poor, the policy must be of direct subsidisation, in order to ensure that 
local authorities balance their books and continue providing services at acceptable levels.  
A previous study (Masvaure 2015) in Glen Norah Township in Harare, revealed that the 
households which are regarded as poor are not necessarily poor in the true sense, as they earn 
income from their homes through renting out rooms. This study revealed that on average 
there are three tenant households living on one property. The tenant households do not pay 
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anything directly, beside water usage to the city coffers; whilst at the same time enjoying all 
the other services offered by the city. What this study shows is that if the city authorities 
charge the full cost of services delivery then the owners of the properties will be forced to use 
some of the rental income to pay for the services; hence there would be an improvement in 
city revenue.  
8.6 Conclusion  
In a normal democratic state, the local authorities are the ones who should be spearheading 
the development agenda of the local communities they govern over. A democratic system 
should ensure that while the broad development agenda of the state is determined by the 
central state, the local authorities work within the parameters and framework provided for by 
the national legislative and policy framework. The basic services which the local authorities 
are expected to deliver are water, health, infrastructure, sanitation services, and housing. All 
local authorities are expected to deliver these services, although in some cases the central 
state may fund some of these services. In the light of expected normal democratic practice, it 
is important to examine the influence of political contestation on the development trajectory 
of local authorities.  
The normal expectation is that the central state carries the development vision of the country 
and dictates/influences lower tiers of the state to implement development interventions; 
which are in turn tailored to achieve the development vision of the central state. The main 
aim of this study is to examine how the development vision of the central state and the local 
state (local authorities) share the development vision. This is issue is deemed relevant in this 
case since these two variants of the state are controlled by different political parties. As 
discussed in chapter 6 development vision is not shared between these two entities. 
Therefore, the impact of the unshared vision on the ability of the City of Harare to deliver 
services and its development vision is relevant.  
The difference in vision has resulted in the local state and the central state playing the blame 
game with regards to poor service delivery. While on the one hand, the central state blames 
the opposition led local authorities as being clueless when it comes to service delivery; on the 
other hand, the City blames the central state for interfering in the affairs of the city. The 
blame game helps both parties achieve their political agenda, but does very little in terms of 
service delivery. In an environment where there is unshared vision one would expect a win-
 
 181  
 
win situation for residents, as the different political parties would be competing for their 
votes through the delivery of services. However, this is not the case.  Instead the contestation 
has affected the professional bureaucrats to the extent that they are no longer performing their 
duties as expected; but are instead expending their energy on being politically active in the 
whole process. Disjuncture of vision and political contestation have stifled the creation of a 
good operative environment, so that the tedious work of formulating a sound budget, 
planning, subsidisation of some services and coordination can take place properly. I posit that 
a decentralisation system, in states where democracy has not yet fully developed, should 
protect and ensure that local authorities are at least able to deliver basic services to the 
people. There is no need for political grandstanding in local authorities if they are not 
delivering on their core functions. Decentralised local authorities must be primed to deliver 
basic services even in situations where there is a disjuncture between the central state and the 
local state. If the local authorities fail to deliver services, then the residents in turn are not 
likely to pay their bills.  
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CHAPTER 9 : CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
“The actors in decentralised state system use every avenue and weakness within the 
state system to pursue their personal and political ambitions”. 
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter synthesises the critical findings and conclusions of this study and their 
significance for policy and practice. This thesis examined the interface between governance 
and development through the lens of decentralisation. The approach focused on three main 
components of decentralisation; namely, the state system, the actors, and how decentralised 
institutions react to various actions of the actors and the state system. The understanding of 
these three components leads to an understanding of why decentralised institutions deliver or 
fail to deliver services to their constituencies. This chapter begins by summarising the 
findings of this study and moves to a discussion of the core contribution of this study. This 
chapter later briefly examines the theoretical implications and recommendations emanating 
from this study.  
9.2 Summary of findings  
The results and the discussion section of this thesis have shown that there are four broad 
themes emerging from this study. These are: 
1. The design of the democratic state system;  
2. The influence actors in decentralisation;  
3. The extent of public participation; and  
4. The ability of decentralised institutions to deliver services to the residents.  
These themes are interwoven and a combination of these themes produces the outcomes of 
decentralisation in Zimbabwe. Through the course of this research I have become convinced 
that although different countries might be using the same system of decentralisation, they are 
likely to have different outcomes because of the context created by the interface of these 
themes. This means that it might be difficult to generalise the findings of this study, without a 
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clear understanding of these themes, and their influence on the outcomes of decentralisation. 
The four themes are articulated below. 
9.2.1. Democratic nature of state system and decentralisation  
This study has revealed that the nature of the state plays a critical role in decentralisation. In 
the case of Zimbabwe, the state regards itself as democratic. The main argument for this 
belief is that since the Zimbabwean state holds periodic multiparty elections then it qualifies 
to be regarded as a democratic state. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis show that the nature of 
democracy in Zimbabwe has gradually transformed from the history of the struggle to the 
reality of manoeuvre and consolidation of power by the ZANU PF. In essence, the 
Zimbabwean state system did not produce institutions which advance democratic principles, 
where democracy has been institutionalised through the development of state institutions 
which advance democratic principles. The underdevelopment of state institutions has led to 
ZANU PF as a political party capturing state institutions and stifling democracy. Democratic 
institutions and systems allow the opposition political parties to contest elections, and use 
available avenues to gain power. In the case of Zimbabwe, the opposition has used the 
available avenue of democratic decentralisation to gain some power. Because the state 
institutions in Zimbabwe are not yet fully developed, the ruling party behaves as if it is 
superior to state institutions and shuts these avenues so that it protects its uncontested power 
in state institutions. This has resulted in a very thin line between the ruling party and the state 
institutions and in most cases the ruling party has the final say even in situations where the 
legal framework states that the local bureaucrats have the final say. The situation where the 
ruling party is more powerful than the state has resulted in various contestations in 
decentralisation. The contestations have resulted in the City of Harare being dysfunctional, 
and unable to deliver basic services to its residents. It has also resulted in central state 
hegemonic tendencies and problems being replicated at the local level, and, in this way, 
dispelling the notion that decentralisation makes the local state more efficient than the central 
state (at least in the case of the City of Harare).  
The main argument for decentralisation in Zimbabwe was to bring government closer to the 
people (Smoke 2003: 9), and by implication this would mean that the citizens will have a 
greater say in the development decisions taken by local authorities. To achieve this goal the 
Zimbabwean state decentralised local authorities, and enabled the citizens to elect ward 
councillors to represent them in local authority decision-making. The results of this study 
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show that the councillors themselves do not actually represent the views of the residents, and 
are elected not because of their ability, but because of their political party affiliation. The 
election of councillors is also heavily influenced by national political issues, rather than local 
political issues. Furthermore, the councillors do not consult their wards regularly; and even if 
they do, the challenge is that if the decisions the residents propose are not in step with what 
the central state wants, then the Minister of Local Government vetoes the decisions. Such a 
situation makes the objective of bringing government closer to the people a façade. The 
residents/citizens have been relegated to being voting fodder, which is where their 
participation in governance primarily ends.  
The ‘democratic’ state system in Zimbabwe has created a ruling party that is too powerful, 
which uses state institutions to fight its political battles; thereby disadvantaging the 
opposition political parties. The system of decentralisation does not allow a different political 
party to effectively control another tier of government, as it does not allow a different 
development vision to be implemented, in these state institutions. In situations where the 
opposition has gained state power in decentralised institutions, there have been various 
contestations; to the extent that the opposition political parties have failed to implement their 
own vision in decentralised institutions which they control. This has rendered the whole 
process of decentralisation pointless and fruitless as the decisions of the central state still 
carry the day in local authorities.  
9.2.2. Influence of actors in decentralisation  
The findings of this study have also indicated that the outcomes of decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe are not determined by the state system only, but by the personal ambitions of 
actors within the decentralised state system. The actors in decentralised state system use 
every avenue and weakness within the state system to pursue their personal and political 
ambitions. The ruling party as an actor has captured the bureaucratic arms of different tiers of 
the state to advance its political ambitions. This capture has also resulted in the 
professionalism and accountability of bureaucrats being compromised; thereby creating a 
disjuncture between bureaucrats and opposition political parties.  
The study has shown that the actors in decentralisation have not behaved/acted rationally. In 
most cases the actors are influenced by political and personal considerations and which has 
led to clashes in the local government systems as the actors contest for political power. The 
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results show that the main priority of the political actors is to win political battles; regardless 
of the impact of these battles on service delivery. The state bureaucrats have not only been 
passive at times, but have also compromised their professional duties by being complicit and 
aligned to certain political parties. In these battles (Chapter 6) , the ruling party, and central 
and local state bureaucrats have emerged as victors.  The opposition political parties and civil 
society in decentralised institutions have been subjugated, and are being forced to comply 
with central government orders. The residents, who are supposed to be beneficiaries of 
decentralisation, have been reduced to be passive spectators who are only courted during 
election time. The actors’ underhand tactics and actions have contributed to the present 
decentralisation processes’ failure to deliver services. The responsibility of the state system 
for being the neutral provider of public goods and services has been subverted; hence the 
citizens regard the state as partisan. 
9.2.3. Public participation  
Public participation forms a critical component in democratic decentralisation. 
Decentralisation purports to bring government closer to the people. In the City of Harare, 
there is evidence to show that decentralisation did not bring government closer to the people, 
but actually alienated the residents further from the government. Residents in the City of 
Harare do not have proper avenues to participate in decision making, and they are not 
capacitated to participate effectively. They also lack avenues and the power to hold various 
state actors accountable for their actions. The only avenue which is available to residents for 
holding accountable their representatives is through elections which are only conducted once 
every five years. While the structural design of politics can bring warm bodies and 
committees closer to the people in name, the intangible reality of loyalties and patronage can 
create a huge gap between people and the governance system. 
Various factors like national political polarities have affected how the residents decide who 
their representatives should be. Consequently, they end up electing councillors according to 
the political parties they represent; and not their qualities and/or skills. This is supported by 
data from the profiles of the councillors. Elections and votes are no longer used as tools to 
reward performing governors and remove nonperforming governors. This situation does not 
promote the ideals of decentralisation. In fact, the decentralisation process in Zimbabwe has 
been captured and diverted from the residents by the political parties and political elites, who 
manipulate how decentralised institutions operate. City of Harare residents have been 
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relegated to being voting fodder for political parties, because councillor ward meetings are 
being organised according to political party structures. The voters have lost their weapon, the 
power of electoral defeat due to the political elites’ manipulation of the system. The power of 
electoral defeat serves as a handicap to representatives’ temptation to deviate from what the 
community wants. One can argue that, in a representative democracy, it is difficult for 
political representatives to represent the views of everyone. However, this argument cannot 
be sustained in the case of the City of Harare, because everyone is yearning for the same 
thing – delivery of basic frontline services. The failure of the representatives to deliver these 
services is a clear indication that the whole system of representation has been captured by the 
political elites.  
The research question in this study on the issue of public participation was: What are the 
forms and outcomes of community participation in local government in Harare? The answer 
to this question shows that there is very little public participation; to the extent that the 
residents do not have control of what happens in the City; except for voting for councillors. 
There are no proper community participation platforms which lead to a lack of accountability, 
openness, responsiveness, and effectiveness of the system. A system of decentralisation 
which does not solicit and disregards the contribution of the residents goes against the main 
ideal of democratic decentralisation in the first place. The residents need to take control of the 
decision-making process in local authorities since they are the funders and receivers of 
services delivered by these institutions.  
9.2.4. Service delivery conundrum  
The findings of the study confirm that the level of services delivery in the City is appalling. 
The problems being experienced by the centralised state have also been replicated at the local 
state level. The main argument for decentralising is that decentralisation removes the local 
authorities from the inefficiencies of the central state; hence the expectation is that 
decentralised local authorities will be efficient, effective, and respond more efficiently to the 
developmental ambitions of the residents/communities. One does not expect local authorities 
to deviate from their core duties of delivering services to their communities, and be caught up 
in political battles, thereby limiting their ability to deliver services. Ever since the city has 
been under the stewardship of the opposition, the city’s capacity to deliver services such as 
clean water, street lighting, infrastructure, sewerage and sewage reticulation, refuse 
collection, transport and housing, has deteriorated. The system of decentralisation has failed 
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if problems experienced by the central state are being replicated at the local level. 
Decentralisation is meant to shield the decentralised institutions from the challenges 
experienced by the central state. In the case of Harare, it could be argued that unshared 
vision, between the ruling party and local government (the opposition), has made the service 
delivery challenges all the more problematic. 
In a democratic space where two different political parties are controlling different tiers of the 
state the expectation is that the two political parties will be competing to please the 
citizens/residents as they get the mandate to be in government from them. The expectation is 
that the voters/citizens will be spoiled as political parties perform their duties with an eye on 
pleasing the voters so as to be elected in the next election. The competition to deliver should 
be greater in a decentralised institution as the opposition political parties aim to prove to the 
voters that they are capable of running national government through delivering services at the 
local level. The ruling party should also be trying to reclaim the lost decentralised institutions 
through rectifying the issues which led the residents rejecting it. Such a condition would 
create a win-win situation for the residents of the decentralised institutions.  
However, the findings in this study show that the residents of the City have not been able to 
capitalise as beneficiaries, when the opposition party MDC gained power in the council in 
2002. What this study revealed is that because of the differences between the political parties 
controlling the national government and local state, the residents have actually received 
deteriorating services and there is no urgency to deliver services in the City of Harare. The 
blame game and contestation between central state actors and local state actors has eclipsed 
the core mandate of local authorities which is to deliver services. The arguments proffered by 
the various actors for failure to deliver services include economic decay affecting the country, 
and according to opposition party, unnecessary interventions by the central state at local 
level. I posit that of course the economic decay plays a role in limiting the ability of the local 
authority to deliver services but the opposition had more than a decade to change its approach 
in service delivery in the City of Harare. The opposition just slotted into the system of local 
government defined by the ruling party with minimal complaints or pragmatic reshaping of 
the system so that at least it was able to deliver basic services. For its part, the ruling party 
has tightened the screws of control via the uninstitutional discretion of the Ministry of Local 
Government. 
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If the opposition had ensured that the residents of the City of Harare had control of decision 
making and had inculcated a different model of decentralisation based on citizen control, then 
perhaps different outcomes could have been experienced. At the present moment, the 
residents have no control of service delivery and their options in terms of the election of ward 
councillors and political parties are limited. One would assume that the residents will use 
their voting power to hold the two political parties accountable for their actions but this is not 
the case as the democratic space has been captured and redefined by the political elites hence 
the lack of viable alternatives. This has resulted in residents preferring not to pay levies and 
charges, and in the end, this has crippled the ability of the city to raise revenue. In some 
cases, because of poor service delivery, the residents are of the opinion that there is no need 
for them to vote as it does not bring any change in service delivery. My argument is that if the 
residents had control of the local authorities then they would have appreciated the problems 
of raising revenues in the City of Harare and perhaps will have mobilised so that the city 
raises enough revenue for its core mandate. Even in the event of failure to raise revenue, if 
the residents had control of the local authority they would have at least understood and 
appreciated the problems positively.  
9.3 Core contributions of this study to decentralisation  
The main objective of this study was to understand the mechanisms leading to different 
outcomes of decentralisation in the event that the central state and the local state are different. 
In mature democracies, as stated earlier, these differences might not have a huge impact on 
how the decentralised institutions operate and their outputs and outcomes. In the African 
context, especially in those countries where there are political polarities and tendencies to use 
the ‘freeness and fairness’ of elections as the only yardstick for democracy, unshared vision 
becomes a critical factor which needs to be examined. This study contributes to 
decentralisation in two ways which are discussed below. 
9.3.1. Central and local state disjuncture in decentralisation  
This study contributes to the body of literature on decentralisation, with special reference to 
the issue of unshared vision between the central state and the local state. Despite several 
studies conducted in the African context, there are very few studies which have examined this 
phenomenon in detail. This study highlights the fact that the state system and its actors play a 
critical role in determining decentralisation outcomes in situations where the political parties 
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controlling the central state and local state are different. The ruling party can use state 
institutions and all avenues, either legally or illegally, to control the decentralised local 
authorities. This does not occur automatically. Therefore, a thorough knowledge of the 
history of the state helps one to fully understand the context and how decentralisation 
unfolds. Where the ruling party has been in power for a long period of time, it can place its 
people in strategic bureaucratic positions, so that in the event of the change of political parties 
at the decentralised levels, the ruling party will use these bureaucrats as proxies to fight its 
battles. This process is regarded as capturing of the state institutions by the ruling party.  
The second condition which favours this scenario is where the legal and policy framework 
gives power to the central government to intervene in local authorities. As articulated in 
chapter 6 the central government uses its power to control decision-making at the local level; 
thereby rendering the opposition political parties powerless and unable to pursue their 
development goals. The whole system of decentralisation is rendered dysfunctional as the 
ruling party through the central state dictates the vision of the decentralised institutions. 
The third condition is related to the ruling party feeling that its control of the central state is 
threatened. In the case of Zimbabwe, the battles which are being fought at the local level are 
not always about local government but are national political battles. In the case of the City of 
Harare, the fact that the opposition political party is controlling the capital city of the country 
and the seat of central government is felt by the ruling party as a considerable threat which 
means they will use all means to survive politically, including interfering with local 
government so that it cannot be effective and efficient on its own (local government’s) terms. 
This is the basis for disjuncture. Ultimately any state must invest in establishing respect for 
institutions and meritocracy in bureaucracy as this will enable the system to resist negative 
political manoeuvre. 
9.3.2. The role of actors in decentralisation  
The second contribution of this study is that it provides an understanding of decentralisation 
that goes beyond the normal legal and policy framework. Earlier work on decentralisation 
placed emphasis on an analysis of the legal framework and policy documents and then 
reached conclusions on whether the system is capable of delivering services. Where 
representatives are elected, and if elections are regarded as free and fair, then there is an 
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expectation that the system is working fine. This study goes beyond this. It sought to examine 
what happens in- between the elections; unravelling how the actors behave and shape the 
outcomes of decentralisation. As revealed in this study actors use underhand and unorthodox 
tactics to further their interests. These tactics are not visible if a researcher only scratches the 
surface; they only become evident when one digs deeper.  
There has been an infatuation by the international community regarding the enforcement of 
democracy and especially of democratic decentralisation in African countries hoping that the 
Western model of democracy will be realised. What is lacking is an understanding of how the 
actors will use the model of democracy to achieve their objectives which do not necessarily 
conform to the Western democratic model. The fallacy of this infatuation is that in the current 
sense a country can be classed as a democracy just because it managed to hold ‘free and fair’ 
elections in a multiparty environment even though the state in reality is autocratic and the 
ruling party uses state institutions to fight its political battles.  
To reiterate the contribution of this thesis; the majority of research on decentralisation in 
Africa has focused on institutional and structural issues and have concluded that most of the 
problems are as a result of these. This research goes further than pointing to the deficiencies 
of the systems and frameworks. It highlights the unseen actions of the actors which are not 
formalised but affect the outcomes of decentralisation. My argument is that in states where 
democracy has not matured and where decentralisation has been implemented the actors play 
a critical role in influencing how decentralised institutions operate and deliver services. The 
influence of actors is strengthened in situations where there is no shared vision and where 
there is a lack of civility between the central state and the local state. Actors use the chaotic 
environment created by disjuncture to further their ambitions and goals which are not in line 
with the developmental aspirations of the residents/citizens. It is important in decentralisation 
research to examine the role and influence of actors in decentralisation processes. Focusing 
only policies, legislation and how the institutions of the state in decentralisation are arranged 
and structured will not reveal a proper understanding of decentralisation. Assuming that 
bureaucrats act professionally and that councillors represent the interests of the voters 
(residents) are naïve, hence, there is a need to examine how these actors influence the outputs 
and outcomes of decentralisation.  
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9.4 Theoretical implications  
The overarching objective of this study was to examine how ‘unshared vision’ between the 
various tiers of state in decentralisation influences service delivery. Theoretically, the study is 
based on a simplistic definition of the state as a single, unified source of political authority 
for a territory; drawing upon the undivided loyalties of its population, operating in a well-
organised and permanent way, and directed towards the interests of the whole society 
(Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009). If this view of the state informs how interventions are tailored 
in decentralisation, then challenges are expected, because in the African context neither is the 
state unified, nor does it represent the interests of the whole society. The level of polarity 
between political parties and how ruling parties have entrenched themselves in the arms of 
the state, makes it important for future studies to revisit the state system in Africa. This thesis 
has also shown that, the view by Kalu (2001), that in Zimbabwe democracy mitigates the 
personalisation of administrative issues into political conflicts can be contested. 
The context of the state in most African countries shows that there are vacillations of 
ideology and governance systems. In most cases African states at one point pursued one party 
state systems and changed to multi-party state systems because of various pressures from the 
international community and their own citizens. In terms of state ideology, there has been a 
dalliance with socialism at the political level but in actual policies states have pursued 
capitalist and neoliberal policies. The post-colonial state in Africa also has a history of being 
highly centralised. This historical background is important in shaping the theoretical 
understanding of decentralisation. The vacillations of the state regarding ideologies and 
governance forms shows that the main emphasis of the state has not been about changing its 
structure so that it delivers its mandate to the citizens but more about political survival of the 
ruling party. This emphasis is also seen in decentralisation where the central state resists 
ceding autonomy to decentralised institutions mainly because these institutions form a critical 
component of the ruling party’s patronage networks. If the ruling party loses control of the 
decentralised institutions it loses the source of patronage goods for its clientelistic network 
hence it is likely to find itself out of power in due course. This perspective is supported by 
Chabal and Daloz (1999) who observed that the state in Africa has not been institutionalised 
hence there is no distinction between public and private spheres of state actors.  
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The theoretical arguments that I am proposing in this thesis are that firstly, decentralisation 
cannot be understood in its entirety, by using singular dimensional analysis. This study has 
shown that various factors like the nature of democracy, state systems, and actors play a 
critical role in influencing the processes taking place within decentralised institutions. The 
second argument is that although the outcomes of decentralisation may be the same in the 
African context (failure in most cases), the context in which the decentralisation is 
implemented cannot be generalised hence understanding of the context leads to correct 
interventions being designed and implemented. This study advocates for research methods 
which incorporate a holistic understanding of the context in which decentralisation is taking 
place without which it will be difficult to understand why the systems of decentralisation are 
working in some countries and not in other countries.  
9.5 Recommendations for policy and practise  
This study proposes several recommendations to rectify the challenges being faced in 
decentralisation in the City of Harare in Zimbabwe. The recommendations address the policy 
gaps and the challenges experienced in the implementation of decisions in local authorities. 
This researcher acknowledges that other researchers have recommended several policy 
directions in decentralisation so this study builds on some of these policy recommendations. 
The recommendations are as follows: 
1. The current Constitution of Zimbabwe calls for devolution in local government. This 
means that there is a need for acts of parliament which support devolution to be 
promulgated as the country is still using old acts which are not aligned to the new 
constitution. At the present moment, it seems decentralisation in Zimbabwe is 
vacillating between delegation, deconcentration and devolution depending on the 
mood of the central state. There is a need for the Urban Councils Act and other related 
acts to stipulate what powers local authorities can exercise and stipulate under what 
conditions the central state can intervene in the affairs of local authorities, and the 
extent of that intervention. The legal framework must close all the lacunas which 
cause contestations in local authorities.  
2. The accountability matrix in local government in Zimbabwe needs to be reformed. 
The mayor should be the designated political and administrative link between local 
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authorities and the central state. This would prevent divided professional 
accountability of bureaucrats as well as, direct interventions in operational matters of 
the city by the central state. Local authorities should have control over their senior 
bureaucrats; including their appointment and dismissal. If the councillors do not have 
control over bureaucrats it creates a gap, as the bureaucrats feel that they are not 
accountable to the elected councillors, but to the central state officials. In countries 
such as South Africa, these bureaucrats are appointed by the local authorities; unlike 
in Zimbabwe, where they are appointed by a board which is controlled by the central 
state. The town clerk should be appointed on a five-year contractual basis 
synchronised with the term of the councillors so that the recruitment process is 
conducted by the newly elected councillors. The argument for this approach is that 
since the new council is coming in with a new vision, it should be afforded the 
opportunity to appoint someone whom they think is able to implement their decisions 
without any political contestations. This will ensure that the local authority overcomes 
the challenge of bureaucrats paying themselves mega salaries at the expense of 
service delivery. Issues to do with unfair labour practices which the Local 
Government Board tries to solve must be addressed through the common labour laws 
of Zimbabwe.  
3. The central state in Zimbabwe should come up with a commonly agreed upon local 
government policy. The lack of a local government policy 35 years after 
independence opens gaps for contestation as various stakeholders are not clear on 
what the central state wants to see in local government. As evidenced in this study if 
there are gaps caused by uncertainty then actors use the gaps to further their interests 
in local authorities. The policy should provide a framework within which local 
government operates stating the broad objectives of decentralisation. The policy 
should leave room for local authorities to decide and define in detail how they want to 
achieve the broad objectives.  
4. If decentralisation is to achieve the objective of bringing government and decision-
making closer to the people then there need to be legal and policy changes which 
strengthens active citizenry in local authorities. At the present moment, the residents 
have no control of decision in local authorities; even the councillors who represent the 
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residents have very little decision-making power. The system to strengthen active 
citizenry in local authorities must be effective in order to ensure capacity building of 
residents, openness, accountability, responsiveness and inclusiveness. Strengthening 
active citizenry will reduce the grip of political parties and political elites on local 
government systems and eventually will lead to a better calibre candidates being 
fielded in local government elections. If the residents are empowered decision makers 
then in the event of non-delivery of services they will be able to understand why their 
local authority is not delivering and come up with solutions. 
5. Local authorities should be able to provide and guarantee basic frontline services like 
water, sewage and waste removal, infrastructure maintenance and development, 
sanitation services and administrative services using the revenue from the levies and 
charges paid by residents. This researcher acknowledges the zeal to cushion the poor 
in cities through capping of levies charged for these services But the problem in the 
City of Harare is that everyone benefits from these caps whether they are able to pay 
or not. Services should be provided at cost recovery level; if the central state and the 
local state want to subsidise the poor then it should be directed only towards poor 
households and not be a blanket subsidy. The central state must also follow through 
its decisions on subsidising through the payment of the grants not expecting the local 
authority to fund the implementation of its decisions.  
6. Decentralisation should not only focus on political democratic decentralisation but 
also use decentralisation as a way of improving service delivery. Several studies in 
Africa have shown that democratic decentralisation has not resulted in a positive 
change to the delivery of services by the decentralised institutions. The reason for this 
is that the main focus of decentralisation has been on the political aspect of 
decentralisation (as dictated by advocates of neo-liberal politics). This led to 
neglecting factors related to how decentralised institutions will be capacitated to 
deliver better services to the citizens. Decentralisation must not be a process of only 
ticking boxes (for a country to be regarded as a democracy) but must ensure that 
improving service delivery is the main objective. This can be achieved through 
ensuring that decentralised institutions receive adequate revenue bases and, fiscal and 
political powers to implement their programmes.  
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My final concluding remarks are mainly focused on research methods. In order to achieve a 
holistic understanding of the mechanisms driving decentralisation in the African context, it is 
recommended that future studies should place greater emphasis on research theoretical 
approaches which advocate for methods which go beyond what is seen on the surface. 
Research approaches such as grounded theory and critical realism ensure that the mechanisms 
driving decentralisation are exposed.  
 
 196  
 
REFERENCES 
ADETULA, V. A. 2011. Measuring democracy and ‘good governance’ in Africa: a critique 
of assumptions and methods. In: KONDLO, K. and EJIOGU, C. eds. Governance in 
the 21st Century. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 10-25. 
HAMILTON, C. 1995. The Mfecane Aftermath. Johannesburg. University of the 
Witwatersrand Press. 
AGRAWAL, A. and RIBOT, J. 1999. Accountability in decentralization: a framework with 
South Asian and West African cases. The Journal of Developing Areas, 33(4): 473-
502. 
AKE, C. 1993. The unique case of African democracy. International Affairs, 69(2): 239-244. 
ALEXANDER, J. 2004 Decentralisation planning and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. In: 
MOHAN, G. and ZACK-WILLIAMS, T. eds. The politics of transition in Africa: 
state, democracy and economic development. Trenton, NJ: James Currey. 
ARBLASTER, A. 1987. Democracy. Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
ARNSTEIN, S. R. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 35(4): 216-224. 
ARRIGHI, G. and SAUL, J. S. 1973. Essays on the political economy of Africa. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
AURET, D. 1990. A decade of development: Zimbabwe 1980-1990. Harare: Mambo Press.  
AXINN, W. G. and PEARCE, L. D. 2006. Mixed method data collection strategies. 
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 
BAIOCCHI, G. 2001. The Porto Alegre experiment and deliberative democratic theory. 
Politics and Society. 29(1): 43-72. 
BAKER, B. 1999. The quality of African democracy: why and how it should be measured. 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 17(2): 273-286. 
BEACH, D. N. 1986. War and politics in Zimbabwe, 1840-1900. Gweru: Mambo Press. 
 
 197  
 
BERMAN, D. 2015. Local government and the states: autonomy, politics and policy. 
London: Routledge. 
BHASKAR, R. 1986. Scientific realism and human emancipation. London: Verso. 
BHASKAR, R. 1989. Reclaiming Reality: a critical introduction to contemporary 
philosophy. London: Verso. 
BHASKAR, R., 2008. Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. London: Routledge. 
BISHOP, P. and DAVIS, G. 2002. Mapping public participation in policy choices. Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, 61(1): 14-29. 
BLAND, G. 2011. Overcoming a decade of crisis: Zimbabwe’s local authorities in transition. 
Public Administration and Development. 31(5): 340-350. 
BOND, P. and MANYANYA, M. 2003. Zimbabwe's plunge: exhausted nationalism, 
neoliberalism, and the search for social justice. Durban: University of Natal Press. 
BOONE, C. 2003. Decentralization as political strategy in West Africa. Comparative 
Political Studies, 36(4): 355-380. 
BOURNE, R. 2011. Catastrophe: what went wrong in Zimbabwe? London: Zed Books. 
BRANCH, D. and CHEESEMAN, N. 2009. Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in 
Africa: lessons from Kenya. African Affairs, 108(430): 1-26. 
BRATTON, M. and VAN DE WALLE, N. 1997. Democratic experiments in Africa: regime 
transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
BRATTON, M., 1989. The politics of government-NGO relations in Africa. World 
Development, 17(4): 569-587. 
BREYTENBACH, W. 1996. Democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa: transitions elections 
and prospects for consolidation. Research Paper No. 58. Africa Institute of South 
Africa. 
BYGSTAD, B. and MUNKVOLD, B. E. 2011. In search of mechanisms. Conducting a 
critical realist data analysis. Proceedings of the Thirty Second International 
Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011. Paper 7. 
 
 198  
 
CARVER, R. 2002. Zimbabwe: permanent crisis? New York: UNHCR. 
CHABAL, P. and DALOZ, J. P. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. 
London: International African Institute. 
CHAKAIPA, S. 2010. Local government institutions and elections. In: DE VISSER, J., 
STEYTLER, N. and MACHINGAUTA, N. eds. Local government reform in 
Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape 
Community Law Centre. 
CHATIZA, K. 2010. Can local government steer socio-economic transformation in 
Zimbabwe? In: DE VISSER, J., STEYTLER, N. and MACHINGAUTA, N. eds. 
Local government reform in Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue. Cape Town: University of 
the Western Cape Community Law Centre. 
CHIKUHWA, J. W. 2004. A crisis of governance: Zimbabwe. New York: Algora. 
CHIKWANHA, T. 2014. Harare hospital goes for months without water. The Daily News, 
13
th
 August. Available from: http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2014/08/13/harare-
hospital-goes-for-months-without-water. [Accessed on 24/04/2015] 
CHITSIKE, L.T. 2000. Decentralisation and devolution of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe. Centre 
for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), Working Paper 107/2000, University of 
Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
CITY OF HARARE. 2014a. City of Harare 2014 Budget statement. City of Harare. Harare. 
CITY OF HARARE. 2014b. Finance Committee Chairperson’s letter of resignation. City of 
Harare. Harare. 
CLAYTON, A. 1998. NGOs and decentralised government in Africa. Occasional Paper 18. 
Oxford: INTRAC. 
COMPAGNON, D. 2011. A predictable tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the collapse of 
Zimbabwe. Pennsylvania, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
CONYERS, D. 2003. Decentralisation in Zimbabwe: a local perspective. Public 
Administration and Development, 23(1): 115-124. 
 
 199  
 
CONYERS, D. 2007. Decentralisation and service delivery: lessons from Sub‐Saharan 
Africa. IDS Bulletin, 38(1): 18-32. 
CORNWALL, A. and COELHO, V. S. 2007. Spaces for change: the politics of citizen 
participation in new democratic arenas. London: Zed Books. 
CORNWALL, A. and GAVENTA, J. 2001. Bridging the gap: citizenship, participation and 
accountability. International Institute for Environment and Development, PLA Notes, 
40: 32-35. 
COUTINHO, B. 2010. Sources of local government financing. In: DE VISSER, J., 
STEYTLER, N. and MACHINGAUTA, N. eds. Local government reform in 
Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape 
Community Law Centre. 
CRINSON, I. 2001. A realist approach to the analysis of focus group data [Unpublished 
paper]. St. Georges Hospital Medical School. University of London.  
CROOK R. C. and SVERRISON, A. 2001. Decentralisation and poverty-alleviation in 
developing countries: a comparative analysis or, is West Bengal unique? IDS 
Working Paper 130. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.  
CROOK, R. C. 2003. Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: the politics of local–
central relations. Public Administration and Development, 23(1): 77-88. 
DAUDA, C. L. 2006. Democracy and decentralisation: local politics, marginalisation and 
political accountability in Uganda and South Africa. Public Administration and 
Development, 26(4): 291-302. 
DAUSKARDT, R. P. A. 2004. Financial improvement planning in local governments in 
Southern Africa, with special reference to Zambia. Development Southern Africa, 
21(2): 329-351. 
DAVIES, R. 1988. The transition to socialism in Zimbabwe: some areas for debate. In: 
STONEMAN, C. ed. 1988. Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State and 
Capital in Southern Africa. London: Macmillan, 18-31. 
 
 200  
 
De SOUZA, D. E. 2014. Culture, context and society–The underexplored potential of critical 
realism as a philosophical framework for theory and practice. Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology, 17, 141-151. 
DE VALK, P. AND WEKWETE, K. H. 1990. Challenges for local government in Zimbabwe 
in decentralising for participatory planning? comparing the experiences of Zimbabwe 
and other Anglophone countries in East and Southern Africa. Aldershot: Gower. 
DIAMOND, L. J. 1990. Three paradoxes of democracy. Journal of Democracy, 1(3): 48-60. 
DICKOVICK, J. T. 2003. Centralism and decentralization in unitary states: a comparative 
analysis of Peru and Senegal. Journal of Public and International Affairs-Princeton, 
14(Spring): 40-63. 
DICKOVICK, J. T. 2007. Municipalisation as central government strategy: Central-regional–
local politics in Peru, Brazil, and South Africa. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 
37(1): 1-25. 
DRAAI, E. and TAYLOR, D. 2009. Public participation for effective service delivery: A 
local government perspective. Journal of Public Administration, 44(1): 112-122. 
DRYZEK, J. and DUNLEAVY, P. 2009. Theories of the democratic state. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
EDIE, C. J. 2003. Politics in Africa: a new beginning? New York: Wadsworth. 
EGBO, B. 2005. Emergent paradigm: Critical realism and transformative research in 
educational administration. McGill Journal of Education, 40(2): 267-284. 
EKPO, A. 2007. Decentralization and service delivery: a framework. Nairobi: African 
Economic Research Consortium. 
ENIKOLOPOV, R. and ZHURAVSKAYA, E. 2007. Decentralization and political 
institutions. Journal of Public Economics, 91(11-12): 2261-2290. 
FASS, S. M. and DESLOOVERE, G. M. 2004. Chad: governance by the grassroots. In: 
OLOWU, D., WUNSCH, J. S. and AYEE, J. R. A. eds. Local governance in Africa: 
the challenges of democratic decentralization. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 155-180. 
 
 201  
 
FEREMENGA, D. T. 2005. Urban planning and development in Zimbabwe. In: SALM, S. J. 
and FALOLA, T. eds. African urban spaces in historical perspective. Rochester: NY: 
University of Rochester Press. 
FUKUYAMA, F. 2013. What is governance? Governance, 26(3): 347-368. 
FUNG, A. and WRIGHT, E. O. 2001. Deepening democracy: innovations in empowered 
participatory governance. Politics and Society, 29(1): 5-42. 
GAVENTA, J. 2002. Exploring citizenship, participation and accountability. IDS Bulletin, 
33(2): 1-14. 
GAVENTA, J. and VALDERRAMA, C. 1999. Participation, citizenship and local 
governance. [Background note prepared for workshop on Strengthening Participation 
in Local Governance.] Institute of Development Studies, Brighton. 
GILIOMEE, H., MYBURGH, J. and SCHLEMMER, L. 2001. Dominant party rule, 
opposition parties and minorities in South Africa. Democratization, 8(1): 161-182. 
GILPIN, R. 2001. Global Political economy: understanding the international political order. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE 2013. Handbook for Councillors. Government Printers. 
Harare. 
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. 1981. Growth-With equity: an economic policy 
statement. Harare: Government Printers.  
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. 1984. The provincial governors and local authorities in 
Zimbabwe: a statement of policy and directive by the Prime Minister. Harare: 
Government Printers. 
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. 2002. Local Governance for Poverty Reduction: The 
Case of Zimbabwe. Paper prepared for presentation at the Africa Governance 
Forum, Maputo, May 23-25. 
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. 2004. Revitalisation of local authorities. Harare: 
Government Printers. 
 
 202  
 
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and 
National Housing. 2012. Circular 3 of 2012. Government Printers.  
HAMMAR, A. 2005. Disrupting democracy: altering landscapes of local government in post-
2000 Zimbabwe. Crisis States Research Centre discussion papers. London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
HAUS, M. and SWEETING, D. 2006. Local democracy and political leadership: drawing a 
map. Political Studies, 54(2), 267-288. 
HEDSTRÖM, P. and YLIKOSKI, P. 2010. Causal mechanisms in the social sciences. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 36: 49-67. 
HELLER, P. 2001. Moving the state: the politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, 
South Africa, and Porto Alegre. Politics and Society, 29(1): 131-163. 
HELMSING, H. J., GASPER D. R., MUTIZWA-MANGIZA N. D. and BRAND C. M. eds. 
Limits to decentralisation in Zimbabwe: essays on the decentralisation of government 
and planning in the 1980s. The Hague: Institute of Social Sciences, 51-78. 
HINGELS, A., SALTELLI, A., MANCA, A. R., MASCHERINI, M. and HOSKINS, B. 
2009. Growing cohesive societies: the characterization of active citizenship. The 3rd 
OECD World Forum on “Statistics, Knowledge and Policy”. Busan, Korea 27-30 
October 2009. 
JONGA, W. and CHIRISA, I. 2009. Urban local governance in the crucible: empirical 
overtones of central government meddling in local urban councils affairs in 
Zimbabwe. Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management, 4: 166-
182. 
JOSEPH, R. A. and PINKNEY, R. 1999. State, conflict, and democracy in Africa. In: 
TAYLOR, S. D. ed. Race, class and neopatrimonial politics in Zimbabwe. Atlanta, 
GA: Emory University Press. 
KALU, K. N. 2004. Embedding African democracy and development: the imperative of 
institutional capital. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70: 527-545. 
 
 203  
 
KAMETE, A. 2003. In defence of national sovereignty: urban governance and democracy in 
Zimbabwe. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 21(2): 193-213. 
KAMETE, A. Y. 2001. US AID’s private sector housing programme in urban Zimbabwe: 
examining the terrain from the terraces. Environment and Urbanization, 13(1): 125-
135. 
KAMETE, A. Y. 2006. Revisiting the urban housing crisis in Zimbabwe: some forgotten 
dimensions? Habitat International, 30(4): 981-995. 
KAMETE, A. Y. 2007. Of jinxes and blessings: the opposition in Zimbabwe's urban local 
governance. In: HULTERSTRÖM, K., KAMETE, A. Y. and MELBER, H. eds. 
Political opposition in African countries. The cases of Kenya, Namibia, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.  
KAMETE, A. Y. 2009. For enhanced civic participation in local governance: calling tyranny 
to account in Harare. Environment and Urbanization, 21(1): 59-75. 
KAMETE, A. Y. 2010. Defending illicit livelihoods: youth resistance in Harare's contested 
spaces. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(1): 55-75. 
KARUMBIDZA, J., 2009. A fragile unsustained miracle: analysing the development 
potential of Zimbabwe’s resettlement schemes, 1980-2000. PhD, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
KAUZYA, J. M. 2007. Political decentralization in Africa: experiences of Uganda, Rwanda 
and South Africa. New York: United Nations. 
KAY, G. and SMOUT, M. eds. 1977. Salisbury: a geographical survey of the capital of 
Rhodesia. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
KEATING, A. 1995. Size, efficiency and democracy: consolidation, fragmentation and 
public choice. In: JUDGE, D., STOKER, G. and WOLMAN, H. eds. Theories of 
Urban Politics. London: Sage, 117–134. 
KITCHEN, R. and TATE, N. J. 2000. Conducting research in human geography: theory, 
methodology and practice. Harlow: Prentice Hall. 
 
 204  
 
KNIGHT-BRUCE, G. W. 1892. Journals of the Mashonaland Mission 1888 to 1892. 
London: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. 
KOHLI, A. 1993. Democracy amid economic orthodoxy: trends in developing countries. 
Third World Quarterly, 14(4): 671-689. 
KUENZI, M. and LAMBRIGHT, G. 2005. Party systems and democratic consolidation in 
Africa’s electoral regimes. Party Politics, 11(4): 423-446. 
KYEI, P. O. 2008. Decentralization and poverty alleviation in rural Ghana: perspectives from 
district elites and voices of the rural poor. Bulletin of the Ghana Geographical 
Association, 3(25): 149-172. 
LEBAS, A. 2006. Polarization as craft: party formation and state violence in Zimbabwe. 
Comparative Politics, 38(4): 419-438. 
LEFTWICH, A. 1993. Governance, democracy and development in the Third World. Third 
World Quarterly, 14(3): 605-624. 
LEMON, A. 2002. The role of local government. In: PARNELL, S., PIETERSE, E., 
SWILLING, M. and WOOLDRIDGE, D. eds. Democratising local government: the 
South African experiment. Cape Town: UCT Press. 
LINDELL, I. 2008. The multiple sites of urban governance: insights from an African city. 
Urban Studies, 45(9): 1879-1901. 
LINDER, W. 2010. On the merits of decentralization in young democracies. Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, 40(1): 1-30. 
LINDGREN, B. 2003. The green bombers of Salisbury: elections and political violence in 
Zimbabwe. Anthropology Today, 19(2): 6-10. 
LONG, N. 2001. Development sociology: actor perspectives. London: Routledge. 
LONG, N. and LONG, A. 1992. Battlefields of knowledge: the interlocking of theory and 
practice in social research and development. London: Routledge. 
LUDEKI, C. 2004. The state and rural development: transcending the centralization-
decentralization debate. Regional Development Dialogue, 25(Spring): 18-34. 
 
 205  
 
MABIN, A. 2002. Local government in the emerging national planning context. In: 
PARNELL, S., PIETERSE, E., SWILLING, M. and WOOLDRIDGE, D. eds. 
Democratising local government: the South African experiment. Cape Town: UCT 
Press. 
MACHINGAUTA, N. 2010. Supervision of local government. In: DE VISSER, J., 
STEYTLER, N. and MACHINGAUTA, N. eds. Local government reform in 
Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape 
Community Law Centre. 
MACHIVENYIKA, F. 2014. City bosses earning mega salaries. The Herald, 26
th
 February. 
Available from: http://www.herald.co.zw/city-bosses-still-earning-mega-salaries/ . 
[Accessed on 23/01/2015] 
MAFUNISA, M. and XABA, B. 2008. Public participation and the integrated development 
planning: the case of Limpopo province. Journal of Public Administration, 3(43): 
452-460. 
MAKUMBE, J. 2010. Local authorities and traditional leadership. In: DE VISSER, J., 
STEYTLER, N. and MACHINGAUTA, N. eds. Local government reform in 
Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape 
Community Law Centre. 
MAKUMBE, J. M. 1996. Participatory development: the case of Zimbabwe. Harare: 
University of Zimbabwe Press. 
MAKUMBE, J. M. 1998. Development and democracy in Zimbabwe. Harare: SAPES Books. 
MAKUMBE, J. M. 2009. The impact of democracy in Zimbabwe: assessing political, social 
and economic developments since the dawn of democracy. Johannesburg: Centre for 
Policy Studies. 
MAMDANI, M. 1996. Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late 
colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
MANOR, J. 1997. The promise and limitations of decentralization. In: Technical consultation 
on decentralization for rural development. Conference proceedings. Rome (Italy), 16-
18 Dec 1997. 
 
 206  
 
MANOR, J. 1999. The political economy of democratic decentralisation: directions in 
development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
MANSURI, G. and RAO, V. 2012. Localizing development: does participation work? 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
MASVAURE, S. 2015. Coping with food poverty in cities: the case of urban agriculture in 
Glen Norah Township in Harare. Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems, 1-12. 
MATENGA, M. 2015. City requires educated councillors. Newsday, 28 August. Available 
from: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/08/28/city-requires-educated-councillors/. 
[Accessed 28/04/2015] 
MATTES, R. and BRATTON, M., 2007. Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, 
performance, and experience. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1): 192-217. 
MATUMBIKE, C. 2009. Local government in Zimbabwe 1970-2009: historical perspectives 
and reflections on the last four decades. In: Discussion document prepared for UNDP-
Ministry of Local Government Strategic Reflection Workshop, Kadoma, 10-12.  
MCFERSON, H. M. 1992. Democracy and development in Africa. Journal of Peace 
Research, 29(3): 241-248. 
MCGOWAN, J. 2012. Democracy and the local network. African Journal of Governance and 
Development, 1(2): 1-12. 
MCGREGOR, J. 2013. Surveillance and the city: patronage, power-sharing and the politics 
of urban control in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, 39(4): 783-805. 
MCKINLEY, D. 2006. Democracy and social movements in South Africa. In: 
PADAYACHEE, V. 2006. The development decade: economic and social change in 
South Africa, 1994-2004. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 
MIDGELY, J. 1987. Popular participation, statism and development. Journal of Social 
Development in Africa, 2(1): 5-15. 
MLAMBO, A. S. 1997. The economic structural adjustment programme: the case of 
Zimbabwe, 1990-1995. Harare: University of Zimbabwe.  
 
 207  
 
MOHMAND, S. K. and CHEEMA, A. 2007. Accountability failures and the decentralisation 
of service delivery in Pakistan. IDS Bulletin, 38(1): 45-59. 
MORRISON, C. and DEARDEN, A. 2013. Beyond tokenistic participation: using 
representational artefacts to enable meaningful public participation in health service 
design. Health Policy, 112(3): 179-186. 
MOUTON, J. 2001. How to succeed in your master's and doctoral studies: a South African 
guide and resource book. Pretoria: Van Schaik. 
MTISI, S. and NICOL, A. 2003. Caught in the act: new stakeholders, decentralisation and 
water management processes in Zimbabwe. Sustainable livelihoods in Southern 
Africa Research Paper 1. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.  
MUKANDALA, R. 1998. Decentralization and democratization in Tanzania. Occasional 
Paper. University of Iowa. 
MUKARO, A. 2005. Chombo lays fresh charges against suspended Mudzuri. The Standard, 
10
th
 June. Available from: http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2005/06/10/chombo-lays-
fresh-charges-against-suspended-mudzuri/. [Accessed on 24/01/2015] 
MUNZWA, K. and  WELLINGTON, J. 2010. Urban development in Zimbabwe, a human 
settlement perspective. Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management, 
5(14): 120-146. 
MUPERI, W. 2014. Chombo reinstates Mahachi. The Daily News, 02 February. Available 
from: http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2014/02/02/chombo-reinstates-mahachi. 
[Accessed on 23/03/2015] 
MUSHAMBA, S. 2010. The powers and functions of local government authorities. In: DE 
VISSER, J., STEYTLER, N. and MACHINGAUTA, N. eds. Local government 
reform in Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape 
Community Law Centre. 
MUTIZWA‐MANGIZA, N. 1990. Decentralization and district development planning in 
Zimbabwe. Public Administration and Development, 10(4): 423-435. 
 
 208  
 
MUTIZWA-MANGIZA, N. 1991. Decentralization and local government administration: an 
analysis of structural and planning problems at the rural district level. In: 
HELMSING, H. J., GASPER D. R., MUTIZWA-MANGIZA N. D. and BRAND C. 
M. eds. Limits to decentralisation in Zimbabwe: essays on the decentralisation of 
government and planning in the 1980s. The Hague: Institute of Social Sciences, 51-
78. 
MUTIZWA-MANGIZA, N. 2000. Comment on Oyugi. Regional Development Dialogue, 
21(1): 23-25. 
NABATCHI, T. 2012. Putting the “public” back in public values research: Designing 
participation to identify and respond to values. Public Administration Review, 72(5): 
699-708. 
NEWS24. 2004. Harare Mayor Sacked. News24 17
th
 April 2004. Available from: 
http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Harare-mayor-sacked-20040416. 
[Accessed on 27/04/2015] 
NYANGONI, W. W. 1978. African nationalism in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). Washington, DC: 
University Press of America. 
OLOWU, D. 2001. African decentralisation policies and practices from 1980s and beyond. 
Institute of Social Studies Working Papers, 334: 1-44. 
OLOWU, D. 2003. Local institutional and political structures and processes: recent 
experience in Africa. Public Administration and Development, 23(1): 41-52. 
OLOWU, D. and SMOKE, P. 1992. Determinants of success in African local governments: 
an overview. Public Administration and Development, 12(1): 1-17. 
OLOWU, D. and WUNSCH, J. S. 2004. Local governance in Africa: the challenges of 
democratic decentralization. London: Lynne Rienner. 
ONIMODE, B. 1988. A political economy of the African crisis. London: Zed Books. 
OXHORN, P. 2004. Unravelling the puzzle of decentralization. In: OXHORN, P., 
TULCHIN, J. S. and SELEE, D. eds. Decentralization, democratic governance, and 
 
 209  
 
civil society in comparative perspective: Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. 
OYUGI, W. O. 2000. Decentralization for good governance and development: the unending 
debate. Regional Development Dialogue, 21, iii-xix. 
PASTEUR, D. 1999. Democratic decentralisation: a review of the African experience. In: 
REDDY, P. S ed. Local government, democratisation and decentralisation: a review 
of the Southern African region. Cape Town: Juta. 
PATEL, D. 1988. Some issues of urbanization and development in Zimbabwe. Journal of 
Social Development in Africa, 3(2): 17-31. 
PATOMÄKI, H. 2003. After international relations: critical realism and the (re) 
construction of world politics. London: Routledge. 
PHIMISTER, I. R. 1988. An economic and social history of Zimbabwe, 1890-1948: capital 
accumulation and class struggle. London: Longman. 
PIERRE, J. and PETERS, B. 2000. Governance, politics, and the state. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
PIKIRAYI, I. and VOGEL, J. O. 2002. The Zimbabwe Culture: origins and decline of 
southern Zambezian states. Lanham, MD: Altamira Press. 
POLLITT, C. 2003. The essential public manager. London: Open University Press. 
PRATCHETT, L. 2004. Local autonomy, local democracy and the new localism. Political 
Studies, 52(2): 358-375. 
PRUD'HOMME, R., 2003. Fiscal decentralisation in Africa: a framework for considering 
reform. Public Administration and Development, 23(1): 17-27. 
RAFTOPOULOS, B. 2000. The labour movement and the emergence of opposition politics 
in Zimbabwe. Labour, Capital and Society, 33(2): 256-286. 
RAFTOPOULOS, B. 2002. Briefing: Zimbabwe's 2002 presidential election. African Affairs, 
101(404): 413-426. 
 
 210  
 
RAFTOPOULOS, B. and MLAMBO, A. eds. 2009. Becoming Zimbabwe: a history from the 
precolonial period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press.  
RAKODI, C. AND WITHERS, P. 1995. Housing aspirations and affordability in Harare and 
Gweru: A contribution to housing policy formulation in Zimbabwe. Cities, 12(3): 
185-201. 
RANDALL, V. and SVÅSAND, L. 2002. Political parties and democratic consolidation in 
Africa. Democratization, 9(3): 30-52. 
REYNOLDS, J. P. 1969. Public participation in planning. Town Planning Review, 40(2): 
131. 
RIBOT, J. C. 2002. African decentralization: local actors, powers and accountability. 
Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 
RIBOT, J.C. and LARSON, A.M. eds., 2013. Democratic decentralisation through a natural 
resource lens: cases from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Routledge. 
RIEDL, R. and DICKOVICK, J. T. 2014. Party systems and decentralization in Africa. 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 49(3): 321-342. 
ROBERTS, J. M. 2014. Critical realism, dialectics, and qualitative research methods. Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 44, 1-23. 
ROBINSON, M. 2007a. Does decentralisation improve equity and efficiency in public 
service delivery provision. IDS Bulletin, 38(1): 7-17. 
ROBINSON, M. 2007b. Introduction: decentralising service delivery: evidence and policy 
implications. IDS Bulletin, 38(1): 1-6. 
RONDINELLI, D. A. and NELLIS, J. R. 1986. Assessing decentralization policies in 
developing countries: the case for cautious optimism. Development Policy Review, 
4(1): 3-23. 
RONDINELLI, D. A., MCCULLOUGH, J. S. and JOHNSON, R. W. 1989. Analysing 
decentralization policies in developing countries: a political‐economy framework. 
Development and Change, 20(1): 57-87. 
 
 211  
 
RUWENDE, I. 2014. Harare City Councils’ finance chair quits in protest. The Herald, 5
th
 
February. Available from: http://www.herald.co.zw/harare-city-councils-finance-
chair-quits-in-protest/. [Accessed on 23/01/2015] 
SACHS, M. 2003. We don't want the fucking vote: social movements and demagogues in 
SA's young democracy. South African Labour Bulletin, 27(6): 23-27. 
SAITO, F. ed. 2008. Foundations for local governance: decentralization in comparative 
perspective. Heidelberg: Springer. 
SARANTAKOS, S. 2012. Social research. 4
th
 ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
SAUNDERS, P. 1984. Rethinking local politics. In: BODDY, M. and FUDGE, C. eds. Local 
socialism. London: Macmillan, 22–48. 
SAYER, A. 1997. Critical realism and the limits to critical social science. Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour, 27(4): 473-488. 
SAYER, A., 2000. Realism and social science. London: Sage. 
SITHOLE, P. 2009. Unequal peers: the politics of discourse management in the social 
sciences. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 
SMITH, M. L. 2008. Testable theory development for small-N studies: critical realism and 
middle-range theory. International Journal of Information Technologies and Systems 
Approach, 3(1): 41-56. 
SMOKE, P. 2003. Decentralisation in Africa: goals, dimensions, myths and challenges. 
Public Administration and Development, 23(1): 7-16. 
SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1937. Native Councils Act 1937. Government Printer. Salisbury. 
SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1941. The Land Apportionment Act 1941. Government Printer. 
Salisbury. 
SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1961. The Local Government Act 1961. Government Printer. 
Salisbury.  
SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1966. Rural Councils Act 1966. Government Printer. Salisbury. 
 
 212  
 
STEWART, F., KLUGMAN, J. and HELMSING, A. 1994. Decentralization in Zimbabwe. 
UNDP Human Development Report Office Paper No. 15. 
STOKER, G. 1998. Governance as theory: five propositions. International Social Science 
Journal, 50(155): 17-28. 
STOKER, G. 2002. International trends in local government transformation. In: PARNELL, 
S., PIETERSE, E., SWILLING, M. and WOOLDRIDGE, D. eds. Democratising 
local government: the South African experiment. Cape Town: UCT Press. 
TAMBORINYOKA, L. 2002. Harare residents boo Chombo at mayor’s installation 
ceremony. The Daily News (online), 13
th
 April. Available: 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com.  [Accessed 12/02/2015]. 
THERKILDSEN, O. 2001. Efficiency, accountability and implementation: public sector 
reform in East and Southern Africa. Democracy, Governance and Human Rights 
Programme Paper Number 3. United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development. 
THOMPSON COMMISSION 1999. Report of the investigating team into the state of 
governance and general administration of the City of Harare. Government Printers. 
Harare. 
THOMSON, A. 2000. An introduction to African politics. London: Routledge. 
TSHISHONGA, N. 2014. Cadre deployment and its implications on service delivery in South 
Africa: a human development capability approach. Journal of Public Administration, 
49(3): 891-908. 
VAN DE WALLE, N. 2006. International responses to state dysfunctionality. In: Clapham, 
C., Herbst, J. and Mills, G. eds. Big African states. Johannesburg: Wits University 
Press, 204-224. 
VAN DE WALLE, N. 2009. The democratization of political clientelism in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In: 3rd European Conference on African Studies. Leipzig, Germany, 4-7 June 
2009. 
 
 213  
 
WANTCHEKON, L. 2002. Why do resource dependent countries have authoritarian 
governments? Journal of African Finance and Economic Development, 5(2): 57-77. 
WEKWETE, K. 1987. Growth centre policy in Zimbabwe: a focus on district centres. RUP 
Occasional Paper Number 7. Harare: Dept. of Rural and Urban Planning, University 
of Zimbabwe. 
WEKWETE, K. 1994. Planning Urban Economies in Southern and Eastern Africa. 
Aldershot: Avebury. 
WEKWETE, K. and MLALAZI, A. 1990. Provincial/regional planning in Zimbabwe: 
Problems and prospects. In: DE VALK, P. and WEKWETE, K. H. eds. 
Decentralising for Participatory Planning: Comparing The Experiences of Zimbabwe 
and Other Anglophone Countries in East and Southern Africa. Aldershot: Avebury, 
73-85. 
WEKWETE, K. H. 1990. Decentralised planning in Zimbabwe: A review of provincial, 
urban and district development planning in post‐dependence Zimbabwe (post‐1980). 
Journal of International Development, 2(1): 110-139. 
WILLIAMS, L., RYCROFT‐MALONE, J. & BURTON, C. R. 2016. Bringing critical 
realism to nursing practice: Roy Bhaskar's contribution. Nursing Philosophy. 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION (WHO). 2009. Cholera in Zimbabwe. WHO 
Epidemiological Bulletin Number 4: 5 January.  
WUNSCH, J. S. 2001. Decentralization, local governance and ‘recentralization’ in Africa. 
Public Administration and Development, 21(4): 277-288. 
WUNSCH, J. S. and OLOWU, D. 1990. The failure of the centralized state: institutions and 
self-governance in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
YOUNG, I. M. 2000. Inclusion and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
ZIMBABWE 1980. District Councils Act 1980. Government Printers. Harare. 
ZIMBABWE 1980. Urban Councils Act 1980. Government Printers. Harare. 
 
 214  
 
ZIMBABWE 1985. Provincial Councils and Administration Act 1985. Government Printers. 
Harare 
ZIMBABWE 1988. Rural District Councils Act 1988 [Chapter 29:13]. Government Printers. 
Harare  
ZIMBABWE 1996. Regional Town and Country Planning Act 1996 [Chapter 29:12]. 
Government Printers. Harare  
ZIMBABWE 1996. Rural District Councils Act 1996 [Chapter 29:13]. Government Printers. 
Harare  
ZIMBABWE 1996. Urban Councils Act 1996. Government Printers. Harare. 
ZIMBABWE 2002. Rural District Councils Act 2002 [Chapter 29:13]. Government Printers. 
Harare  
ZIMBABWE 2008. Urban Councils Act 2008. Government Printers. Harare. 
ZIMBABWE 2013. Constitution of Zimbabwe.  Government Printers. Harare 
ZINYAMA, T. 2012. Participatory budgeting in local authorities: is e-governance the missing 
link: the case of Harare City Council. Journal of Public Administration and 




 215  
 
Annexure A: Ward Councillor Survey  
 ‘Unshared vision’: Decentralization in Zimbabwe, a special reference to 
Harare City Council.   
All the questions below must be answered by an elected councilor.  
Basic information  
1. Full Name (only provide name if you are comfortable doing so) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Ward number represented ____________________ 
 
b) Which category does your ward falls in? (Please tick the correct choice) 
 
Low income residential area (high density)  
Middle income residential area (middle income)  
High income residential area (low density)  
 
3. Which political party do you represent? _____________________________________ 
 
4. How many years and months have you been serving as a councillor? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.  Gender  (please tick) 
 
6. What is your age group?      
18-20 yrs   
21-30 yrs  
31-40 yrs  
41-50 yrs   
51-60 yrs  
Over 60 yrs  
 
7. What is your level of education?  
No formal education  
Primary school  
Secondary   
College   
University degree   
Male   Female   
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8. Which Harare City Council committee/committees do you sit on  (please tick)  
 Human Resources and General Purposes Committee  
Finance and Development Committee  
Environmental Management Committee  
Education, Health, Housing and Community Services 
and Licensing Committee 
 
Audit Committee  
Procurement Board  
Business committee  
Information and Publicity Committee  
Other   
         
 a) If you answered other specify 
………………………………………………………………………………………………                        
 
   b)   Are you a chairperson of any committee?  
 
    c) If you answered Yes which committee? _______________________________________ 
 
9. How long have you been staying in Harare?  
0-5 years  
6-10 years   
11-15 years  
16-20 years   
21-25 years  
Above 25 years   
 
10. What is the status of the house you are living in?  
Own house   
Lodger /tenant   
Other   




11. Besides being a councillor in the Harare City Council what other economic activities are 
you involved in?  
Formally employed   
Informally employed   
Unemployed   
Yes   No   
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Pensioner   
Student   
Own a formal business  
Other   
If you answered other explain your answer  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Governance and Community Participation. 
 
12. How often do you hold consultative meetings in your ward?  
……………………………times per month or  
……………………………times per year 
 






14. How can you describe the attendance of residents to your meetings? (Please tick) 
 
Well attended   
Average attendance  
Poorly attended   












16. What are the main problems/ challenges which the residents of your ward normally 












17. In your own opinion do you think residents from your ward understand your role as a 
councillor?  
 







18. In your own opinion does community consultation have an impact on the services 
which are provided by the city council?          
 


















20. Is there any other way/s your ward residents can use to influence the quality of service 
they are receiving from the city council?  
                                                                           
Yes   No   
Yes   No   
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22. Do you consult with your political party before voting on any council business?  
   
 
                                                                                      







Central government relations  
 













Yes   No   
Yes   No   
Yes   No   
 




24. Harare City Council is currently controlled by the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC). In your own opinion what are the challenges that are created when the MDC 
controlled council is dealing with the ZANU (pf) controlled Ministry of Local 

















25. In your own opinion should the ministry intervene in city affairs of the Harare city 
council? 
 










26. Does the intervention of the ministry affect the level of services you deliver to the 
Harare residents in a positive or negative way?  
 
Positive   Negative   
 
Yes   No   
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27. Is there a major project that you are involved with that is inter-governmental? 
 
 
















29. Do you think that Harare city council senior administrative officials are apolitical?  
                                                           
 








30. What actions are taken if the council employees fail to implement council directives?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Yes   No   
Yes   No   
 







31. Would you be kind to allow a follow up interview?  
Yes   No   
If you answered Yes may you please provide your contact details below 





THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND UNDERSTANDING. 
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Annexure B: Interview Guide – Administrative Officials  
Administrative officials’ questions  
1. Briefly describe your duties 
2. How can you describe your relationship with Councillors or the city of Harare?  
3. What is your relationship with administrative officials of the city of Harare/ the 
Ministry of local government? 
4. Is there a difference between ZANU Pf dominated council/ MDC dominated council?  
5. What are the challenges you normally face when dealing council officials 
(administrative/ councillors). How did you deal with these challenges?   
6. What is the vision of councils which are under your watch/ city council?  
7. Do you share the same the vision with opposition dominated councils? 
8. Can you briefly describe how directives are communicated between the ministry of 
local government and local government structures?  
 Do you by any chance the community regarding directives you issue? 
  What methods do you use to consult communities? 
 Are these methods effective?  
9. How do you deal with noncompliance of your directives?  
10. Do you think councillors understand their role in local government?  
11. What can be done to strengthen the relationship between the ministry of local 
government and local authorities? 
12. As a ministry/council are you satisfied with the level of services being delivered by 
the municipalities?  
13. What can be done to improve the level of services being provided by the city of 
Harare? (Basic services).  
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Annexure C: Interview Guide – Community Members/ 
Residents  
Community and civic groups 
A: Service delivery  
1. What services do you receive from the Harare  
2. What is your opinion on the state of service delivery in Harare? 
3. In your own opinion what causes the city of Harare to fail to deliver services to the 
residents of Harare?  
4. In your own opinion do you think that the workers of the city council are doing a 
thorough and diligent job in delivering services?  
5. Do you think that councillors can control the performance of administrative workers 
of Harare city council?  
6. During the past years more than 50% of the council budget was used for salaries, to 
be specific in 2010, 94% of the budget was used for salaries with only 6% used for 
service delivery, what is your opinion on this situation 
7. What is your opinion on a situation when you pay for services and you don’t receive 
them for example water and refuse collection? 
B Community Participation and Governance 
8. How often does the local councillor consult with members in your ward about city 
affairs? 
a) Do you think that these consultations are useful?  
b) In your own opinion how can the effectiveness of community participation be increased or 
improved in local government? 
9. In your own opinion do you think that councillors are doing their work effectively? 
Explain your answer.  
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10. Do you think councillors represent your views or their political parties? Explain your 
answer and give examples. 
11. During voting for councillors what qualities do you normally look for in the 
candidates? Does the political party they represent matter? Explain your answer.  
12. Do you think that councillors are there to serve all people?  
13. During the previous years many Harare city councillors and a mayor were dismissed 
by the minister of local government, urban and rural development. What is your 
opinion on the dismissals?  
14. Must the minister be directly involved in the affairs of the city?  
15. In your own opinion whose interest does the minister serve?  
16. What form of strategies or interventions must be used by the ministry when dealing 
with local authorities?  
17. What are the major projects that are done by government in your area?  
18. How have these been of benefit to you? 
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FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 Dear Participant 
I am Steven Masvaure a Ph.D. Social Science Candidate at the School of Community 
Development studies at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (UKZN).  I am doing a research on 
decentralization and local government in Zimbabwe. This research will help in the 
understanding of the role being played by decentralization and local government actors in 
service delivery to the residents of Harare.  
 I am inviting you to be part of this research. You do not have to decide today whether or not 
you will participate in the research. Before you decide, you can talk to anyone you feel 
comfortable with about the research. This consent form may contain words that you do not 
understand. Please ask me to stop as we go through the information and I will take time to 
explain.  
This research will involve your participation in answering the questions on the questionnaire/ 
interview schedule. Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. It’s your choice 
whether to participate or not. There will be no direct benefit to you if you participate in this 
research, but your participation is likely to help generate knowledge which will help improve 
the understanding of decentralization, local government and service delivery in Harare and 
elsewhere. 
The information you are going to provide will not be shared with anyone outside the research 
team. The information I am going to collect will remain private and confidential. Any 
information about you will be coded using a number on it instead of your name. Only the 
researcher will know your name. This questionnaire/ interview will take approximately 30 
minutes of your time. 
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If you have any questions, you can ask them now or later. If you wish to ask questions later 
please contact me (Steven Masvaure +27747768815 e-mail 212553305@stu.ukzn.ac.za)   or 
my supervisor (Professor Sithole +27312602288 e-mail sitholep3@ukzn.ac.za).  
 
Questions about your rights as a study participant, comments or complaints about the study 
also may be presented to the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Research Ethics Committee by 
contacting Ms P Ximba telephone +27312603587. Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za 
 
I………………………………………………………………………… (Full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of 
the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT                                                     DATE 
………………………………………                                                 ……………………… 
I hereby (tick appropriate: Agree    t    or disagree          ) to the digital recording (audio/ 
visual) of my participation in the study and to the keeping of a permanent record of this 
interview with the understanding that my name and other identifying information will be 
removed to ensure confidentiality. (Tick appropriate boxes in the table below) 
 
Audio recording 
Agree  Disagree  
  
Video recording    
 
………………………..                                                                     …………………………... 
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Annexure E: Ethical Clearance Letter 
 
